At the end of 2023, the Republic of Moldova, together with Ukraine, started the EU accession process, while Georgia was granted the status of a candidate state for EU integration. These three Eastern Partnership member states, although sharing a similar past, are marked by a different degree of determination for a democratic future. This is visible both among the population as a whole, but even more so among young people.
For example, young people have been the catalyst for protests in Georgia since 2023. Georgians are opposing the “foreign agents law”, borrowed by the Georgian government from its Russian neighbors, rigged parliamentary elections and advocating for the country to continue on its European path. As the Georgian government becomes increasingly authoritarian and abusive in its application of the law, young people are stubbornly exercising their democratic right to protest and expressing their desire to live in a free and EU member country on the streets. The images of the EU flag at the Georgian protests and the mobilization of the crowds have already made history. In Ukraine, young people were among those who took to the streets in 2013 in reaction to then-President Viktor Yanukovych’s refusal to sign a political association and free trade agreement with the European Union (EU) in exchange for a strengthened relationship with Russia. The Russian invasion, the tragedy of losing relatives, home, friends, pieces of one’s own country, only makes young Ukrainians even more determined to support the country’s European course. This is suggested by their behavior in refusing to capitulate, and this is what the figures say.
Young Ukrainians overwhelmingly support both EU and NATO membership. According to data from 2024, 77% of young people in Ukraine want Ukraine to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, while 83% support Ukraine’s EU membership. Young people’s sentiment for EU membership is similar to that of the population as a whole, which is unwavering in its desire to move closer to the EU despite Russian bombs trying to convince them otherwise.
By comparison, young Georgians aged 18-34 almost unanimously support their country’s EU membership – 93%. The figure is more than 10% higher than the general public’s support, which is still impressively high at 82%.
In the Republic of Moldova, in contrast to Ukraine and Georgia, the general public’s support for the country’s EU membership amounts to just 63%. Young Moldovans aged 18-29 support the country’s EU integration by 71%. In practical terms, young people in the Republic of Moldova, although in the majority they support the country’s EU membership, still want a European future to a lesser extent than those in Ukraine and Georgia.
Moreover, existing research, as well as the result of the referendum on amending the constitution in order to integrate into the EU on October 20, 2024, highlights a phenomenon of hesitation and/or indifference among young Moldovans: on the one hand we want to be Europeans, on the other hand we do not act decisively when the opportunity arises to build our future by our own choice.
Asked how they would choose between the EU and the Eurasian Union (a union that has long remained a symbol of the USSR rather than an active and viable entity for Moldovans) in a referendum, only 65% of young people would choose the EU. In the context of the referendum on October 20, about 59% of young people aged 18-29 said they would vote “yes” in the referendum.
Do young Moldovans want less in the EU than Georgians and Ukrainians?
Young people are widely seen as agents of change around the world. They tend to identify with democratic parties, to be more tolerant and open to innovation.
If we are to talk about the role of young people in the EU integration process, there is a general expectation that they should be the driving force of society in promoting the democratic ideals and values of the European Union. And to some extent they do. The vast majority of young Moldovans aspire to an independent, democratic and prosperous country. They strongly condemn corruption and see the EU as a model of development for Moldova. Young people understand perhaps better than the rest of the demographic groups the advantages of Moldova’s EU membership given their aspirations to identify development opportunities and long-term economic benefits.
In a politically and identity fragmented society, young people should be the group that brings society together and pushes it out of its identity and historical traps.
If this is the case in Georgia and Ukraine, young people in Moldova seem to be the result of deep social division and security dilemmas. A hypothesis that emerges from the analysis of comparative data from the three states indicates that Moldovans aged 18-29 do not fully understand the meaning of democracy, cannot distinguish between risks and opportunities, and fall into the trap of political transactionalism, of the psychological comfort offered by the position of the neutral individual, without being fully aware of the long-term consequences of such comfort.
For example, in the two countries that went through a war with Russia, both young Georgians and Ukrainians overwhelmingly favor joining or cooperating with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
In the Republic of Moldova, although it seems that young people understand better than the rest of the population the importance of a security umbrella for peace and prosperity and are about 10-15% more supportive of closer ties with NATO, only 36% of young people are ready to actively support Moldova’s rapprochement with NATO. And this is taking place against the background of Russia’s trampling on the country’s neutrality for more than 30 years by illegally having military troops in the Transnistrian region.
In the same vein, although young Moldovans are predominantly sympathetic to European leaders, more than a quarter of young people trust the authoritarian Russian leader Vladimir Putin and about the same number trust Alexander Lukashenko. It is important to note here that the higher the level of education of young people, the less sympathy they have for the two authoritarian leaders.
The position of young people towards the Russian war in Ukraine reinforces the hypothesis that they do not fully understand the international context. 50% of young Moldovans believe that the military actions taking place in Ukraine are “an unjustified Russian war against Ukraine”, about a fifth consider it to be “an undeclared war between Russia and NATO/West”, while 11% describe the war in Ukraine as a “justified Russian special military operation”, about 5% said they “have no feeling, don’t care”, while 11% don’t know how to describe the war.
By comparison, 84% of young Georgians see Russia as a threat to Georgia’s independence and over 70% see Russia as a threat to national security, the economy and the country’s values. The same trend can be seen among young Ukrainians. In Moldova, just over half of young people consider Russia a threat to national security.
Thus, although Moldova’s post-1990 generation should be the benchmark for Moldovans who lived under communism and dictatorship deprived of the full opportunity to grasp what freedom and the right to choose represent, young Moldovans are the product of a national social and political cleavage that distinguishes them from their peers in Georgia and Ukraine.
Although young Moldovans continue to support democratic ideals, in some aspects of security, values or political issues, they are positioned one step lower than other demographic groups. The fact that the Republic of Moldova, although more than 30 years out of communism, still perpetuates the fear of social dialog on security and foreign policy issues, largely affects the role that young people should play in the political life of the country.
For example, the fact that parents do not discuss foreign and national policy issues in the family leads to the phenomenon that a large proportion of young people are not interested in politics and do not develop civic culture. In the 2024 polls, only 20% of young people said that they discuss political issues with relatives and family.
În contextul referendumului constituțional de pe 20 octombrie, doar 25% dintre tineri cu vârsta cuprinsă între 18-29 de ani indicau că au discutat cu două luni înainte de referendum cu cineva apropiat despre referendum și doar 14% dintre tineri spuneau că sunt la curent despre cum va fi formulată întrebarea supusă referendumului constituțional.
In a society where there is a lack of intergenerational dialog, young people cannot play their role as a driving force for social progress and as a coagulator of the country’s foreign policy direction. This is where the role of youth organizations comes in. In the absence of a healthy political culture and cultural heritage, which still does not tolerate social debate and the right of young people to express their opinions, they must, regrettably, not only promote the material benefits of a country’s accession to the EU, but also increasingly and interactively discuss democratic ideals and values and what dictatorship means for a country’s past, present and future.
