In 2024, the political climax of the Republic of Moldova was marked by the referendum and the presidential elections held this fall. In a society deeply divided along geopolitical lines, like Moldova, the natural competition among political forces in these elections turned into a veritable battle over the country’s integration into the European Union or the Eurasian space dominated by Russia. The pro-European forces’ victory in both the referendum and presidential elections represented merely two battles won, not the war itself. The final victory in this struggle is expected in the 2025 parliamentary elections.
The narrow result of the pro-EU referendum, coupled with the success in the presidential race achieved largely due to diaspora votes, compels the PAS government to undertake a profound reorganization of forces supporting pro-European policies. This is the only solution to maintaining the European trajectory after next year’s parliamentary elections. Initial statements by current government leaders, made immediately after the elections, pledged such reorganization. Post-election, officials acknowledged the electorate’s message as heard and understood. Promises were made to reshuffle the government and accelerate reforms, particularly in the long-suffering justice sector.
Referendum as a test of Pro-European mobilization
However, as has become routine, the current government quickly forgot the “bullet that whistled past their ears” – an expression coined by a PAS minister to describe the narrow referendum victory. Cabinet reshuffles occurred without any public debate or involvement of pro-European actors beyond the ruling party in assessing the meritocracy of new government members. Once again, party self-interest prevailed over the imperative to mobilize the broader pro-European segment by involving other pro-European forces in decision-making, at least at the level of political consultations. This missed opportunity to improve the government’s image and lay the groundwork for a united pro-European front ahead of the parliamentary elections represents a significant setback.
It seems that we are witnessing a recurrence of a dubious political practice, practiced in the case of the launch of the pro-Europe referendum initiative in the current government, a practice that has just brought us to a serious setback in the EU accession process. Let us start by noting that the referendum initiative in the Republic of Moldova was launched in an unprecedented framework in relation to other states that have applied for accession. Unlike other accession candidates, the referendum initiative in the Republic of Moldova was launched at the beginning of the negotiation process and not at the end, as was done in most cases in Central and Eastern European states.
This echoes earlier controversial practices during the launch of the pro-European referendum initiative by the government—a move that disrupted Moldova’s EU accession process. Unlike other EU candidate countries, Moldova initiated the referendum at the start, rather than the end, of negotiations. This approach provided opponents of the European course with ample opportunity to discredit the plebiscite. The government was accused of exploiting the referendum for partisan gains to mobilize voters for the concurrent presidential election. Furthermore, opposition pro-European forces, excluded from consultations on the referendum, were left in a difficult position: supporting a political rival’s initiative while sharing the European vision. Consequently, while these forces expressed formal support for the referendum, they lacked motivation to actively promote it locally.
Hybrid warfare and its impact on Electoral Democracy
The referendum witnessed unprecedented hybrid warfare tactics in Moldova’s political history, with Russia deploying every possible means to interfere. These included vote-buying, electoral tourism (transporting voters by planes and buses from Moscow to Baku, Istanbul, Minsk, and Transnistria), and sophisticated social media manipulation. While these efforts failed to achieve their intended result, domestic voting patterns during the referendum reflected a disadvantage for the European option.
The anti-European stance at the referendum was supported by a vote-buying network orchestrated from Russia, spearheaded by fugitive oligarch Ilan Șor. Moldovan officials revealed that approximately 300,000 voters were bribed, with the authorities uncovering a scheme involving around 140,000 voters who received cash transferred from Russia through Transnistria’s banking system. Police investigations also unveiled extensive voter influence mechanisms, including lists of names and contact numbers indicating a wide-reaching cash distribution system.
This system effectively created a parallel social support structure in Moldova, dubbed “Șor’s system,” which operated through networks like the “Merișor” stores and “Mir” banking cards, linking voters to electoral handouts. Alarmingly, this structure continues to function legally, posing a threat of vote-buying in future elections.
The referendum revealed disillusionment among Moldovan voters, significantly impacted in recent years by inflation, economic and energy crises. Some who previously supported Maia Sandu and the EU integration course abstained or voted against the pro-European option in the referendum. To sustain Moldova’s European trajectory, these disappointed voters must be re-engaged and re-mobilized for the parliamentary elections. This requires addressing economic shocks and advancing judicial and economic reforms with tangible social benefits.
Realistically, the short timeframe before parliamentary elections precludes economic miracles. The most feasible goal is to prevent a decline in living standards. Additionally, mobilization among the unionist electorate—frustrated by the government’s lack of identity-focused policies—is critical. Absenteeism among this group at the referendum highlights the need for targeted outreach.
Uniting Europeanist visions: The key to success in 2025
Moldova’s pro-European camp encompasses two paths to EU accession: integration as a sovereign state or unification with Romania. Both visions have substantial support among Europeanist voters, making dual electoral lists the optimal strategy to maximize mobilization.
PAS effectively represents the sovereign state integration vision and should consolidate alliances with like-minded parties. In contrast, the unionist camp remains fragmented, lacking a cohesive political structure. Delays in uniting unionist forces risk weakening the pro-European bloc in 2025.
Ultimately, Moldova’s European future hinges on the ability of unionist leaders to form a unified electoral platform, ensuring robust parliamentary representation as a critical component of the pro-European majority. This vital lesson from the referendum remains to be fully embraced by Moldova’s European-oriented politicians.
