The elections for the State Duma of the Russian Federation, held between September 18 and 20, 2026, took place in a context completely different from previous parliamentary elections. These are the first Russian legislative elections organized after the onset of the large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and, therefore, have a significance that far exceeds the simple distribution of mandates in the lower house of the Parliament in Moscow.

According to the official results communicated by the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation, “United Russia” obtained 349 mandates in the State Duma, a constitutional majority. The CPRF received 37 mandates, LDPR – 23, “New People” – 19, “Just Russia” – 17, “Motherland” – one mandate, and the independent candidates – four.

Beyond the numbers, however, the essential question is different: what kind of legitimacy can a scrutiny produce in which the political competition is severely restricted, and the independent international observation has been absent?

An election without an electoral alternative

In a pluralistic democracy, elections represent the mechanism through which citizens can change governance, can sanction power, and can offer legitimacy to a new majority. In contemporary Russia, the electoral function has changed considerably.

OSCE announced in August 2026 that the Russian Federation did not invite OSCE/ODIHR observers to the elections for the State Duma. The organization underlined that this decision fits into a broader pattern: neither the presidential elections of 2024 nor the parliamentary scrutiny of 2021 benefited from a full OSCE observation mission. At the same time, OSCE mentioned restrictions on freedom of expression, association, press, and political opposition activity.

This situation is important because the mere existence of ballot boxes is not enough to define a democratic election. Elections also imply real competition, relatively equal access to public space, the possibility for voters to receive diverse information, the freedom of candidates to organize, and the existence of independent control over the electoral process.

In Russia, these conditions have been progressively tightened. Parties and candidates fundamentally challenging the Kremlin’s policy have encountered major legal and administrative obstacles. The liberal formation “Yabloko”, for example, was unable to participate in the parliamentary elections due to exclusion from the ballot, and numerous anti-war politicians are in exile, are incarcerated, or have been prevented from running. Reuters reported that the 2026 elections were presented by the Kremlin as a demonstration of domestic support for its policy, while a part of the opposition and Russian voters abroad contested this interpretation.

Therefore, the electoral result must be read carefully. A percentage of votes expressed in a system with limited competition cannot be automatically interpreted in the same way as a result obtained in a system with full political pluralism.

The Russian context, however, calls for a more cautious analysis

In a political system where the presidential administration and the state apparatus have a considerable influence on political life, the mobilization of voters can itself become a component of the political message. Vladimir Putin has publicly called for participation in the vote and associated it with demonstrating support for the state’s policy and for the war in Ukraine.

At the same time, the independent press and organizations critical of the authorities have pointed out very large differences between regions and problems related to home voting and transparency of procedures. Here arises one of the main differences between a competitive election and a strongly administratively controlled scrutiny: not only the result matters, but also the possibility to independently verify how it was obtained.

The Transnistrian region – where Russia’s elections become a problem for the Republic of Moldova

For the Republic of Moldova, however, the most important dimension of the Russian elections is not found in Moscow, Saint Petersburg or in the Russian regions. It is found on the left bank of the Dniester.

Russia’s decision to organize voting sections for the State Duma elections in the Transnistrian region has sparked a new diplomatic conflict with Chisinau. According to Reuters, Russia has opened 15 sections in the separatist region, while the authorities of the Republic of Moldova have argued that voting should take place exclusively within the section authorized by the Russian Embassy in Chisinau. The Moldovan government has invoked the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova and the lack of control by the constitutional authorities over the region.

This dispute is much more important than it seems at first glance. Formally, Moscow can argue that it is organizing elections for its own citizens residing outside the Russian Federation. The problem arises when these electoral operations are organized on the territory of a state without the consent of that state’s constitutional authorities and, even more so, in a separatist region politically and militarily supported by the Russian Federation.

In this case, the problem is no longer just electoral. It becomes one of sovereignty, security, and international status. Therefore, Chisinau’s reaction must be understood primarily through the lens of the principle of territoriality. The Republic of Moldova does not dispute the right of Russian citizens to vote, but disputes the manner and place where the Russian Federation exercises this right in relation to the territory of a state over which it asserts its own sovereignty.

It is a fundamental distinction

The experience of the Republic of Moldova highlights the moment where electoral rights end and geopolitics begin. The Transnistrian case demonstrates that, in the post-Soviet space, the issue of elections cannot always be separated from the geopolitical issue. The Transnistrian region is not internationally recognized as an independent state, including by the Russian Federation. However, Moscow maintains a military presence there, privileged political and economic relations, and considerable institutional influence. In this context, the organization of Russian elections in the region acquires additional political significance.

In 2021, in the Transnistrian region, 27 polling stations were organized for the Russian elections, and according to Reuters, approximately 76% of the votes cast there went to United Russia. In 2026, the Russian authorities reduced the number of polling stations to 15, but the principle remained the same: Moscow organized the electoral process in a region over which the constitutional authorities of the Republic of Moldova do not exercise effective control.

This may be the most important lesson for Chisinau. A state can accept the exercise of the right to vote of foreign citizens on its territory, but it must be able to establish the conditions under which this occurs. In the case of separatist regions, the issue is even more sensitive because any official action of another state can contribute, even indirectly, to the consolidation of parallel structures.

For the Republic of Moldova, the issue is not only “where do Russian citizens vote”, but also what institutional message the organization of that vote conveys.

Russian passports and the infrastructure of influence

The electoral dimension thus overlaps an older issue: granting Russian citizenship to the inhabitants of the Transnistrian region.

In September 2026, against the backdrop of the dispute over polling stations, Russian ambassador Oleg Ozerov went to Tiraspol and presented the first Russian passports issued to the residents of the region through the simplified procedure established by the Russian authorities. The event heightened tensions between Chisinau and Moscow.

Viewed separately, the passport, the voting section, and the diplomatic representation may seem like administrative tools. Viewed together, however, they form a political infrastructure through which a state maintains its institutional connection with a population located in the territory of another state.

This is where the experience of the Republic of Moldova becomes relevant for Romania and the European Union. Transnistria shows that external influence is not only exerted through military instruments or diplomatic pressures. It can also be exercised through citizenship, mass media, economic infrastructures, social networks, educational institutions, consular representation, and electoral mobilization. Elections thus become one of the tools through which a pre-existing political influence can be maintained and legitimized.

What does this mean for Romania?

For the Romanian public, the Transnistrian lesson has a direct significance. Romania is a member of the European Union and NATO, and the Republic of Moldova is in an advanced process of approaching the European Union. In this context, the political security of the Republic of Moldova is no longer just a bilateral Chisinau-Moscow issue. It is part of European security.

The elections in Russia demonstrate once again that the Kremlin views the post-Soviet space not only through the relations between governments, but also through the lens of communities of Russian citizens and territories over which Moscow exerts influence.

Therefore, Romania has a legitimate interest in the continuation of the democratization and institutional consolidation process in the Republic of Moldova. It’s not about choosing a Moldovan political side, but about supporting rules that make democratic competition possible: verifiable elections, credible electoral institutions, pluralistic press, transparency in political financing, and protection of the electoral process from external interference.

The recent experience of the Republic of Moldova, however, shows that no democratic state is completely immune to such pressures. The final report of the OSCE/ODIHR on the Moldovan parliamentary elections of September 28, 2025, found that the vote was competitive and offered voters clear political alternatives, but was affected by external interference, illegal financing, cyber attacks, and disinformation. At the same time, observers appreciated that on election day, the process was organized and unfolded calmly and transparently.

So, elections thus become one of the tools through which a pre-existing political influence can be maintained and legitimized. However, a relevant contrast appears here: while Russia facilitates to the maximum the obtaining of citizenship for the inhabitants of Transnistria, through simplified procedures and official visits like that of Ambassador Ozerov, in Romania there is simultaneous discussion about restricting access to Romanian citizenship for Moldovan citizens. The contrast raises a fundamental question: if citizenship is a tool of geopolitical influence when Moscow uses it, a possible limitation of access to Romanian citizenship could weaken precisely one of the levers through which Romania and the EU maintain the connection with the citizens of the Republic of Moldova, even at the moment when Russia is intensifying its own tools to attract this population.

A lesson for Europe: elections must be defended before the voting day

The experience of Russia and that of the Republic of Moldova suggest a broader conclusion for Europe.

Protecting elections does not begin on the morning of the vote and does not end after the closing of the ballot boxes. It starts much earlier: through the transparency of party funding, the independence of the electoral administration, media pluralism, the security of digital infrastructure, and the ability of institutions to identify external interference.

In the case of the Republic of Moldova, this issue is all the more important as the country is in a decisive stage of approaching the European Union. Pressures on the electoral process can be exerted not only through the falsification of ballots, but also through informational manipulation, clandestine financing, cyber attacks, vote buying, or the use of social and economic structures dependent on external actors.

This leads to a lesson for Romania and the EU: support for the Republic of Moldova should not be reduced to political statements. Strengthening electoral institutions, independent media, cybersecurity, and the administration’s ability to respond to external interference are concrete elements of European security.

Beyond the result of Russia

The result of the elections for the State Duma will allow the Kremlin to assert that it still has a solid parliamentary majority. From the perspective of Russian power mechanics, this result is important. But for external observers, the fundamental question is not only how many percentages United Russia obtained. The question is under what conditions these percentages were obtained and how broad the political competition offered to voters was.

The absence of OSCE observers, the restriction of political competition, pressures on the opposition, and the use of the ballot as a demonstration of support for the Kremlin’s policy limit the electoral value of figures as an indicator of the free political preferences of Russian society.

And for the Republic of Moldova, there is an additional problem: Russia has not limited its electoral exercise to its own territory. The organization of the vote in Transnistria has brought back into focus the issue of the relationship between Russian citizenship, Russian electoral policy, and the Transnistrian conflict.

Therefore, the lesson of the Russian elections in 2026 for Chisinau and Bucharest is broader than a simple comparison between two electoral systems.

Democracy does not just mean the existence of ballot boxes. It means the existence of a real, verifiable choice, protected from external pressures.

For the Republic of Moldova, defending this principle is inseparable from defending its own sovereignty. For Romania and the European Union, supporting this capacity represents, at the same time, an investment in the democratic security of Europe’s eastern border.

And the Transnistrian region perhaps most clearly illustrates why this issue cannot be treated as a mere electoral matter. In a space where borders, citizenship, identity, information, and security intersect, the ballot box can also become an instrument of geopolitics.

Disclaimer: This material is produced by the IPN Press Agency. The project – Close to Europe: Information, dialogue and cooperation – is funded by the Department for Relations with the Republic of Moldova and implemented by the IPN Press Agency. The content of this material does not represent the official position of the Department for Relations with the Republic of Moldova.