A New Europe of Security

The “State of the Union” address delivered on September 16, 2026, by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, marks a significant shift in how Brussels views the security of the continent. The proposal to establish a European Security Council, alongside a European mechanism for countering hybrid threats and a new European security strategy, shows that the European Union is trying to move from a predominantly reactive policy to one based on prevention, coordination, and its own response capacity.

For the Republic of Moldova, this evolution has a particular significance. Chisinau is not a NATO member and, according to the Constitution, proclaims its permanent neutrality. At the same time, the Republic of Moldova is already integrated into an increasingly deep process of cooperation with the European Union in the field of security and defense. Therefore, the issue for Moldova is not simply whether Europe needs to defend itself better, but how a neutral state can participate in the new European security architecture without this cooperation being confused with joining a military alliance.

This distinction is essential for Chisinau’s foreign policy. Neutrality cannot mean isolation, and international cooperation in the field of security does not automatically imply the abandonment of neutrality status. On the contrary, the experience of recent years demonstrates that a neutral state needs partnerships, institutional capacities, the protection of critical infrastructure, and early warning mechanisms precisely to be able to defend its sovereignty.

The Neutrality of the Republic of Moldova: Between Constitutional Norm and Security Reality

Article 11 of the Constitution stipulates two fundamental elements: The Republic of Moldova proclaims its permanent neutrality and does not allow the deployment of military troops from other states on its territory.

This constitutional status must, however, be interpreted in the specific context of European security. Neutrality does not eliminate the right of the Republic of Moldova to self-defense, nor the right to cooperate with other states and international organizations to strengthen its security capacities. On the contrary, in a strategic environment where threats are not limited to conventional military aggression, protecting neutrality involves the ability to identify, prevent and counter cyber attacks, informational interference, sabotage, energy pressures and other forms of destabilization.

This leads to a fundamental problem for Chisinau: a neutrality lacking its own resilience capacities risks remaining just a legal declaration.

In recent years, the cooperation between the Republic of Moldova and the EU has evolved precisely in this direction. The EU–Republic of Moldova Partnership for Security and Defense signed in 2024 provides for the deepening of cooperation in areas such as hybrid threats, cybersecurity, combating disinformation, and capacity building. Moreover, the European Union established in 2023 the Partnership Mission in the Republic of Moldova (EUPM), a civilian mission aimed at consolidating the resilience of the security sector, crisis management, cybersecurity, and combating information manipulation and external interference. Its mandate has been extended until May 2027.

Therefore, there is already a form of European cooperation compatible with the neutrality status of the Republic of Moldova. The new European architecture proposed by von der Leyen could extend this logic.

Moldova cannot afford isolated neutrality

For Chisinau, the real dilemma is not between neutrality or European cooperation. The dilemma is between an isolated and vulnerable neutrality and a neutrality capable of functioning within a European network of security and resilience.

The Republic of Moldova is already exposed to threats that do not fit the classic model of war. At the EU-Republic of Moldova summit in June 2026, the European Union and Chisinau condemned violations of Moldovan airspace, cyber attacks, information manipulation, external interference, ecological sabotage, and the use of energy as a pressure tool.

In such an environment, neutrality cannot be reduced to abstaining from participation in military alliances. It must be accompanied by the state’s ability to protect its institutions, infrastructure, informational space, and population.

This is precisely the area where the new European project could become relevant for Moldova. If the Union will create a common warning and consultation mechanism for threats that are below the threshold of armed aggression, the Republic of Moldova would have a direct interest for such instruments to be connected, in a form suitable to its status, with partner states from the eastern neighborhood.

A “Article 4” European and the problem of the Republic of Moldova

One of von der Leyen’s central ideas is the creation of a European mechanism to complement NATO’s Article 4. The goal is for European states to be able to respond in a coordinated manner to incidents that do not yet constitute an actual military attack, but which threaten national security.

For the Republic of Moldova, this idea has strategic importance precisely because the threats it faces often lie in this “gray zone”. A cyber attack on a public institution, an operation of informational manipulation, sabotage of critical infrastructure, or a violation of airspace do not automatically trigger traditional collective defense mechanisms.

Moldova cannot invoke Article 4 of NATO as a member state. But this does not mean that it should be left without a European solidarity mechanism in the case of hybrid threats.

Here appears one of the most important stakes for Moldovan diplomacy: the extension of European security mechanisms to partner states that are not NATO members, but whose security is directly linked to the security of the European Union.

The Republic of Moldova represents such a case. The European Union itself believes that the destabilization of Moldova has implications for the security of the EU’s external borders. In 2026, the EU Council reaffirmed that support for the resilience of the Republic of Moldova must be strengthened in the context of destabilizing activities attributed to Russia.

Moldova’s Interest: European security without losing neutrality

Here a distinction must be made between neutrality and passivity.

Constitutional neutrality does not oblige the Republic of Moldova to remain outside of international cooperation in the field of security. It establishes legal limits regarding the military positioning of the state. Cooperation in the field of civil defense, cyber security, infrastructure protection, crisis management, institutional preparedness, and combating hybrid threats is a different category.

This has already been demonstrated by Chisinau’s relationship with Brussels. The EU and the Republic of Moldova have agreed to continue Moldova’s integration into the European security and defense architecture and its participation in relevant cooperation initiatives and mechanisms.

In addition, the European Union has allocated funds to the Republic of Moldova, through the European Instrument for Peace, for the modernization and efficiency improvement of its armed forces. According to the EU Council, between 2021 and 2026, the support through this instrument has reached 317 million euros, including for air defense capabilities.

These developments show that the neutrality of the Republic of Moldova does not hinder the development of defense capabilities. On the contrary, the central issue is that their development should be formulated coherently with the country’s constitutional status.

Ukraine and Moldova: two components of European security

For Chisinau, the new European defense policy cannot be separated from the evolution of the war in Ukraine.

Moldova and Ukraine form, from the perspective of European security, an interdependent strategic space. Ukraine’s security directly influences Moldova’s security, and the stability of the Republic of Moldova contributes to the security of the European Union’s eastern border.

This reality explains why Ukraine is included by von der Leyen among the partners who could participate in the future European Security Council. The Ukrainian experience in the field of resilience, infrastructure protection, and dealing with hybrid threats could become an important element of the new European architecture.

For the Republic of Moldova, participation in this cooperation network should be pursued in light of its own interests: protecting sovereignty and territorial integrity, border security, strengthening the resilience of institutions and infrastructure, energy and cyber security, and reducing vulnerabilities that can be exploited from the outside.

At the same time, the status of neutrality remains for now a distinct element of the constitutional position of the Republic of Moldova. Cooperation with Ukraine and the EU should not be confused with entering a military alliance.

The Transnistrian region and the limits of the current security architecture

Any discussion about the security interests of the Republic of Moldova is incomplete without the Transnistrian issue.

The frozen conflict on the Dniester represents one of the structural vulnerabilities of the security of the Republic of Moldova. In circumstances where the region is tied to the Russian military presence and the war in Ukraine, the Transnistrian issue exceeds the strictly internal framework of the Republic of Moldova and becomes part of the security architecture of Eastern Europe.

For Chisinau, a potential consolidation of European security should also include a reflection on frozen conflicts and foreign military presences in the EU’s vicinity.

In this regard, the neutrality of the Republic of Moldova cannot be analyzed separately from the issue of its territorial integrity. The Constitution proclaims permanent neutrality, but the effective security of the state also implies respect for its sovereignty over the entire territory.

From this arises a contradiction that the new European security architecture will have to address, sooner or later: how can a neutral state be protected if there is a foreign military presence on its territory that the constitutional authorities do not control?

This question concerns not only the Republic of Moldova. It pertains to the credibility of the entire European security system.

From “neutrality” to “strategic resilience”

One of the main lessons of recent years is that the security of a state today can no longer be measured exclusively by the number of soldiers or the amount of military equipment.

For Moldova, strategic resilience implies energy security, protection of critical infrastructure, cybersecurity, institutions capable of managing crises, the ability to protect electoral processes, and combating informational interference.

EUPM Moldova is already working in these areas. The mission has supported the development of crisis management structures, cybersecurity, and the ability of institutions to counter information manipulation and external interference.

This model is important because it shows how European cooperation with a neutral state can work: by strengthening the state’s ability to defend itself and resist, without automatically turning it into a part of a military alliance.

What Chisinau Should Pursue

In the new European configuration, the interests of the Republic of Moldova can be synthesized in several essential directions: access to European early warning mechanisms; increased cooperation in combating hybrid threats; strengthening of cyber security; protection of critical infrastructure; development of crisis management capabilities; European support for modernizing defensive capacities; energy security and full integration into European resilience mechanisms.

At the same time, Chisinau is interested in its neutrality status being correctly understood by its European partners: not as an obligation for isolation, but as a constitutional status that defines the limits of the military commitments of the Republic of Moldova.

This approach would allow Moldova to participate more actively in the construction of European security without turning the defense debate into a premature debate about military alliances.

It is also relevant that the amendment of the constitutional provisions regarding permanent neutrality has a special legal regime. The Constitution provides that such provisions can be revised only after their approval by referendum, with the majority of citizens registered on the electoral lists. Therefore, any change in the neutrality status is, legally and politically, a distinct matter from deepening European cooperation in the field of security.

Europe needs Moldova, and Moldova needs Europe

The new European security policy creates a different situation for the Republic of Moldova than a few years ago. The EU no longer treats Moldova’s security merely as a problem of a partner state at the eastern border. Recent European documents explicitly link the resilience of the Republic of Moldova to regional security and the security of the Union’s borders.

Consequently, Moldova’s interests must be articulated more clearly in dialogue with Brussels. Chisinau needs a security policy that combines three elements: constitutional neutrality, national defense capability, and integration into European security and resilience mechanisms.

These three dimensions are not necessarily contradictory. On the contrary, they can function complementarily if they are legally and strategically defined with sufficient clarity.

For the Republic of Moldova, the objective should not be isolation from the transformations taking place in Europe, but participation in them under the conditions of its own constitutional status. A Europe that develops its ability to respond to hybrid threats can offer Moldova additional tools to protect its sovereignty. And a more resilient Moldova can, in turn, contribute to the security of Europe’s eastern border.

In this perspective, the proposal of a European Security Council is not just an institutional initiative from Brussels. For Chisinau, it opens up a much more important strategic question: can a European security system be built that is flexible enough to protect states that, like the Republic of Moldova, are not part of NATO, but are directly exposed to the security risks of the continent?

The answer to this question will matter for the future of European security, but also for the future of the Republic of Moldova. Neutrality alone cannot provide security. Neither can European integration replace it. What is emerging is the need for a formula in which constitutional neutrality is supported by real national capabilities and a European network of resilience, cooperation, and solidarity.

For Chisinau, this could become one of the most important foreign and security policy issues in the coming years.

I have deliberately retained the formulation “neutrality + European security cooperation”, without presenting the modification of the neutrality status as an objective. The current Constitution makes permanent neutrality a norm with special constitutional protection, and the EU-Moldova security cooperation is already underway.

Disclaimer: This material is produced by the IPN Press Agency. The project – Europe Close: Information, dialogue and cooperation – is funded by the Department for Relations with the Republic of Moldova and implemented by the IPN Press Agency. The content of this material does not represent the official position of the Department for Relations with the Republic of Moldova.