The opinion article is published by IPN Press Agency with the consent of the WatchDog Association and energy expert Sergiu Tofilat.

Over the past two years, the Republic of Moldova has stopped purchasing Russian gas, managing to meet the gas consumption needs of the right bank through European suppliers. Nevertheless, the country’s energy security remains vulnerable in the event of a disruption in Russian gas supplies to the Transnistrian region. The unconstitutional regime in Tiraspol has survived exclusively thanks to virtually free gas deliveries from Gazprom. This gas is used to generate electricity at the MoldGRES power plant on the left bank of the Dniester, which provides approximately 80% of the electricity consumed on the right bank.

These vulnerabilities continue to be exploited by the Kremlin as a tool of blackmail against the Republic of Moldova. To gain a deeper understanding of the situation and the objectives pursued by the Russian Federation's leadership, we will analyze the context in more detail.

Putin Fights to Maintain Gas Transit Through Ukraine

After Putin's energy blackmail against the EU in 2021–2022 failed, Gazprom has recorded losses for the second consecutive year: $6.9 billion in 2023 and $3.3 billion in the first nine months of 2024. Russian gas deliveries to the EU have dropped more than sixfold, from 183 billion m³ in 2019 to approximately 30 billion m³ in 2023. Gazprom continues to export gas to the EU through two corridors—Ukraine and Turkey—with almost equal volumes of about 15 billion m³ annually for each. Thus, with the cessation of Russian gas transit to the EU, Gazprom will lose approximately $6.5 billion in annual revenue, leaving Putin with fewer funds to finance his military aggression.

Putin's primary goal is to maintain Russian gas transit through Ukraine. For this reason, pressure is being exerted on Kyiv through various means. Recently, a group of companies from Hungary, Slovakia, Austria, and Italy sent a letter to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, requesting EU intervention to maintain Russian gas transit through Ukraine.

In an initial version of the letter, Moldovagaz was also listed among the signatories. Furthermore, in a letter sent in October 2024 by Moldovagaz to the Ministry of Energy, acting president Vadim Ceban stated it was “advisable to continue negotiations at the ministerial and sectoral levels between Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova regarding the transportation of natural gas through Ukraine after 31.12.2024.” The same message, that “Moldova must reach an agreement with Ukraine to continue gas transit,” is also echoed by other political actors in the Republic of Moldova, such as former President Petru Lucinschi.

Political Blackmail Against Moldova

The expiration of the gas transit agreement through Ukraine is merely a pretext used by Moscow to escalate tensions in the Republic of Moldova. In reality, Gazprom could have terminated its contract with Moldovagaz as early as May 1, 2022, but chose not to. According to clause 10 of the latest agreement signed in October 2021, there are four provisions that allow the Russian company to unilaterally terminate the contract and halt deliveries. One of these provisions pertains to resolving the alleged gas debt of the right bank. This aspect was specifically raised by the Russian side at the latest meeting with the Moldovan delegation in St. Petersburg.

Since Gazprom is contractually obligated to deliver gas at the border with the Republic of Moldova, it could use an alternative route through Turkey, where sufficient capacities are available. In this regard, the Russian company was supposed to participate in capacity reservation auctions on the trans-Balkan route (Turkey–Bulgaria–Romania) for January, but made no reservations. The last option remains the most expensive one—daily capacity reservations for the following day, starting January 1.

If Putin fails to maintain gas transit through Ukraine, he may “sacrifice” the Transnistrian region to escalate tensions in the Republic of Moldova ahead of the 2025 parliamentary elections. The left bank lacks resources to purchase gas and electricity at market prices, and the cessation of “free” Russian gas would mean imminent economic collapse, which would lead to migration and a humanitarian crisis. The right bank is more resilient in terms of gas supply but would have to resort to massive electricity imports from Romania at significantly higher prices. The cost of electricity on the Romanian OPCOM market is three times higher than the current price under the contract with the MoldGRES power plant.

Additionally, the Republic of Moldova will be able to purchase electricity from the Romanian market within a commercial limit of 315 MW, and any excess will have to be paid at even higher prices—attributed to FSkar, applied to imbalance regime deliveries. However, Romania is willing to cover Moldova’s energy deficit, and the commercial flow limit could be increased to 395 MW.

Potential Scenarios Planned by Moscow

1. Limiting gas deliveries to the left bank for internal consumption only, avoiding a humanitarian crisis by allocating additional resources. In this case, the MoldGRES power plant would operate at limited capacity, and the Republic of Moldova would be forced to import electricity from Romania and raise tariffs.

2. Halting gas deliveries for a short period (1–2 months), with effects similar to the first scenario.

3. Continuing deliveries under the existing regime of 5.7 million m³ per day to support the unconstitutional regime in Tiraspol and maintain Moldova’s dependence on energy produced on the left bank.

4. Completely halting deliveries for an indefinite period to provoke tensions in the Republic of Moldova and favor the rise of pro-Russian parties to power following the 2025 parliamentary elections.

Opportunities Amid Crisis

However, every crisis brings opportunities. In this case, the cessation of “free” gas deliveries to the left bank could pave the way for the reintegration of the two banks of the Dniester. This project could become feasible only with the support of external partners, especially to maintain stability in the region along the border with Ukraine.