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| Dionis Cenuşa | |
Moldova’s modernization is perceived by the community of foreign donors, especially after 2009, through the European integration process as well. Though the reformation of justice, improvement of public services, extension of social services, modernization of road infrastructure and other reforms are directly connected with the European agenda, these are also supported with non-European money. In fact, the foreign donors, in particular the U.S., consider that through the European integration process, Moldova can develop and modernize more dynamically and sustainably. There is no other development model for Moldova that the foreign donors, in particular the EU and the U.S., would support so strongly.
Furthermore, the European integration is regarded by the foreign donors as a method of bringing Moldova closer to the EU, as the negative influence of Russia is thus minimized. Since 2013, Russia has not only imposed economic sanctions, but has also employed schemes of territorial disintegration and armed conflicts, which produced results in Ukraine. However, in conditions of acute political crisis like that faced by Moldova since November 2014, most of the non-European foreign donors refrain from openly pressing the authorities in favor of the European agenda. Unlike these, the U.S. acts more categorically, having often a visibly trenchant rhetoric, which is even sharper than the EU’s, which is sometimes fully smooth or late. However, why does the U.S. appear often as a more active and tough promoter of the European agenda than the EU itself? Several arguments explaining why the U.S. adopts a pro-active approach and why the EU often refrains from reacting are presented below.
U.S is one country, while EU consists of 28 countries
It is logical that the political decisions of the United States are adopted only in Washington, not in the 28 + 1 capitals – an equitation in which Brussels is also the capital of the EU. This aspect influences a lot the character, content and tone of the rhetoric to which the Americans and the Europeans resort in the communication with Chisinau. The same reason explains why the messages transmitted by the Americans are faster, even if the U.S. is situated over the ocean, while Brussels – at about 8-10 hours of flying from Chisinau (with stopover). So, the political construction of the EU excludes automated unanimity, especially because the foreign policy of the EU depends on the national governments of the member states (28 in number), the EU presidency that assumed an agenda and particular priorities and on the European Commission and the European Council. From this viewpoint, the European External Action Service headed by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini is not as powerful and homogenous as the U.S. Department of State led by John F. Kerry.
Even if apparently, the Head of the EU Delegation to Moldova Pirkka Tapiola levels criticism at the authorities, especially after the discovery of the ‘theft of the century’, he is restricted in making statements whenever he considers it necessary to make them. His freedom to formulate trenchant statements is limited by the necessity of receiving approval not only from the European diplomatic service, but also from the whole EU machinery. In contrast, the U.S. Ambassador James D. Pettit is able to formulate harsher messages when he considers necessary, immediately after receiving the ‘green light’ from Washington. The American promptness could be seen after the dismissal of the Government led by Valeriu Strelet, when the U.S. Embassy in a press release said that “Moldova’s image at home and abroad is suffering due to continued machinations by political elites, and in some cases, private individuals (the phrase private individuals being used for the first time). It is time to put personal interests and animosities aside, as continued unpredictability negatively affects Moldova’s ability to move forward on its European path.” The EU Delegation to Moldova didn’t yet react probably because it didn’t get the approval to react or even didn’t ask it from Brussels. After so many episodes of political crisis, generated abundantly by the so-called pro-European parties, and the interminable games played behind the scenes, total unpredictability and unpredictable political volatility, the Delegation has to be more precautious and, consequently, is slower in its acts.
Objective and subjective motives
Evidently, the institutional and decisional aspects inevitably influence the speed of the European diplomatic service. Besides, Brussels and the European diplomatic service are increasingly consumed by the crises witnessed in the eastern and southern neighborhood of the EU since 2014. The refugee crisis interconnected with the war in Syria more seriously affect the situation in Ukraine and the profound crisis in the relations between the EU and Russia. Currently, the EU is alarmed by the fact that about 3 million refugees could reach Europe by 2017. This preoccupation consumes the European energy and capacities, including the diplomatic ones.
Owing to the overlapping of crises and their penetration inside the EU (refugee crisis), the political situation in Moldova becomes less significant for the decision makers in Brussels and in the European capitals. The EU Delegation in Chisinau knows well this and finds it more difficult to convince Brussels to react promptly to the permanent deviations witnessed in the political sphere of Moldova. The EU’s disinterest in Moldova is also fueled by the fact that the political forces widely discredited the European integration. An association with purported pro-European forces that lack credibility and that are accused of corruption and of taking control over the state institutions is regarded as a threat to the EU’s image. Therefore, the EU prefers to be more attentive and this diminishes its mobilization and re(action) speed. None of these constraints applies to the U.S. and this allows the Americans to be more active, including in promoting the European agenda.
Instead of conclusion…
Though the European reforms in Moldova are connected with initiatives that are decided in the EU, these are broadly supported by the whole community of foreign donors, but first of all by the U.S. The benefits implied by the European agenda are so evident that the U.S. allocates substantial financial resources to promote it. The multitude of crises that affect Europe, the European machinery in the area of foreign policy and the tiredness caused by the Moldovan political incoherence make Brussels to be more attentive and, therefore, more slow in the relations with Chisinau. On the other hand, the U.S. pleads more actively for the European agenda, criticizing openly and without reserve the Moldovan government for the erosion of the European course. This fact does not at all bother the EU, which can always count on the American promptness and motivation in promoting the European project in Moldova.
IPN publishes in the Op-Ed rubric opinion pieces submitted by authors not affiliated with our editorial board. The opinions expressed in these articles do not necessarily coincide with the opinions of our editorial board.
