The talks on the formation of the government coalition after the November 28, 2010 elections revealed a number of new features of the modern political process in Moldova. It is important to examine them in order to better understand the country’s development course for the next historical period and, respectively, for the chances for Moldovan society to have decent living standards. The emphasis in {Part I published on January 18, 2011} was on the fact that the talks marked the end of a unitary, authoritarian government era in Moldova and displayed two negotiation models – one that treated society like a ‘mob’ and another one that treated society like ‘foolish people’. {Part II published on January 19, 2011} centered on problems of emerging political culture that concern political hypocrisy and complete political mistrust at the level of inter- and extra-political relations. The given part analyzes the role and performance of the national and foreign players involved in the negotiation process. [PLDM: within a hair's breadth of death] The Liberal Democratic Party (PLDM) reaped most of the rewards after the center-right ruling alliance was formed, but it also bore the greatest responsibility for a possible failure of the talks. A related thesis that was included in the Info-Prim Neo analysis {“Who really won the elections?”}, published two days after the elections, aroused animosities among the politicians and experts, it is still valid. The analysis said “The PLDM will be the one that will contribute to the formation of the government coalition and will be in a better position if it succeeds, but it will also bear responsibility if is does not succeed”. In the period after the elections, the PLDM kept the people in suspense. The party presented its offers for the future government partners with delay and they were ‘less generous’ than those made by the PCRM to the PDM, which also were negotiating. The PLDM improved the offer gradually, during over a month as there were held 13 rounds of talks. From the general public’s viewpoint, it was a risky game because the documents on the constitution of the PCRM-PDM coalition were close to being signed. It was worth the risk as the PLDM, as a ‘conductor’, finished ‘the negotiations concert’ when projected. The talks are over, but there are yet two questions: {1)} Did the PLDM behave so because it was sure (possessed the information) that a center-left alliance will not be formed? Or {2)} Did the PLDM extend the talks on purpose and from the position of an ‘elder brother’ that has had more seats of MP than the PDM and PL together? The December 30 denouement – the signing of the agreement to constitute the Alliance for European Integration (AEI) – and the principle that the winners are not judged (criticized) incline the balance towards a 'yes' answer to the first question. The PLDM and its leaders deserve all the appreciation for their risky, but well-thought-out political game. But the echo of the feelings experienced by society during over a month and certain fragments of confidential information about the talks do not allow us fully ruling out the possibility of a 'yes' answer to the second question. For example, they say that in the period of the talks, the leader of the PLDM Vladimir Filat, in the discussion with a European official holding a high-ranking position, said something of the kind: “if there is somebody in this country who knows what it needs, this person is in front of You...” It is not excluded that the negotiation process was marked, to a lesser or greater extent, by this exaggerated self-assessment typical only of another Moldovan politician - Vladimir Voronin. This overrating or even political arrogance played a trick on Vladimir Voronin and his party, as well as Moldovan society in general for several times so that somebody be delighted by the re-adoption of the same method of tackling the country’s problems. Anyway, the PLDM will remain in history either as a party that in a crucial period inclined the balance of the country’s fate in its favor, or as one that played a risky game with what we called above “the country’s development court and the chances for Moldovan society to have decent living standards”. [PDM: ‘on two fronts’ or ‘feeding from two cows’?] The Democratic Party (PDM) carried out the widest and most “technological” talks that were at the same time rather transparent for the general public. Judging by their size and goals and by the professionalism in which they were conducted, they can be regarded as new political phenomena. The party held talks with the PCRM over the formation of a center-left coalition on the one hand and the PLDM and PL on the formation of a center-right coalition on the other hand. The PDM played ‘on two fronts’ at national level, but ventured into getting involved in a dual-purpose game at foreign level. It was a rather risky, complicated and ambitious political behavior that could and still can bring victories as well as serious political failures. In the case of the PDM, the crucial question is if the party and its leaders were resolute enough to really choose between two historical options or hope to maintain the status of ‘docile calf’ who tends to feed from ‘two cows’. In a way, it was the PDM’s behavior that introduced the element of danger in the negotiation process, whose ending could not be fully predicted. This behavior was new and correct from the perspective of political science as it offered the party the possibility of rather skillfully using the instruments of pressure on the dialogue partners on the left and the right segments. But the goal was not fully achieved. The dual-purpose game that could have been interpreted as non-resolve or political insincerity and the modest electoral score compared with the magnitude of the actions taken and means used did not bring the PDM the position they longed for in the center-right alliance, and destroyed the relations with the PCRM that remains an important political force in Parliament and in the country. Judging by the subsequent reactions, the PCRM will not forgive the PDM, especially Marian Lupu, for ‘this new betrayal’. It is not excluded that the PDM caused himself problems with its own electorate. It is natural for a center-left party, which was yet created on the basis of former right parties, to have members, sympathizers and voters with left- and right-inclining views, with pro-European and pro-Russian views. The supporters of such parties are not as homogenous as those of the Liberal Party for example. A large part of the supporters of the PDM may have not liked that this party ‘coquetted’ with the political left, while another part – that it ‘coquetted’ with the right. I referred especially to the PDM when I said in the last part of the analysis that if new elections took place next Sunday, it would be this party that would lose a large part of its supporters. The PDM would have lost more owing to this dual-purpose game if a center-left coalition had been formed, but this will be the theme of another analysis. It is yet certain that the PDM would have born a greater or equal blame as the PLDM if the AEI had not been created. We can also expect serious tensions in the relations of the PDM and Russia’s ruling party “Edinnaya Rossia” and this could cause great troubles to the AEI and to Moldova in general The leaders of the PDM often behaved as if they were belittled by the former partners from the AEI - 1 in the talks ...”. Such a behavior is liked not even by the compassionate people, even if they say that the leader of the PDM is liked especially by women... Anyway, the PDM tested a new model of talks that is worth being examined and developed in the future. [PL: reduced possibility of making mistakes] The Liberal Party (PL) had a reduced possibility of making mistakes in the talks and could not assert itself in a new and more important way. This is mainly because of the low number of seats obtained in the new legislative body and by its unchanged, even rigid position towards its partners and political opponents in Parliament. As improving the relations with the PCRM or shifting into the Opposition would have meant the party’s political death, the PL did not have another choice than to enter the AEI. Maybe that’s why the PL was the only party that openly declared from the very beginning that it is in favor of the reconstitution of the AEI. It was only once that the PL tried to attribute itself a more important role in the talks, but it happened practically at the end of the negotiations, when things were already settled. By demanding on the last 100 meters that the Ministry of the Interior is given in its responsibility and then accepting the administration of the Security and Information Service, the leader of the PL Mihai Ghimpu solved rather a personal than a state problem. The logic of such a move can be understood better if we remember that former Minister of the Interior, General Victor Catan, humiliated the then Acting President and commander-in-chief Mihai Ghimpu by not allowing him to examine the secret files. It happened in the public, before the eyes of the press. As Mihai Ghimpu is not the person that forgets easily, he asked for the management of the Ministry of the Interior, but satisfied himself with not much – the replacement of General Catan with General Roibu. The Ministry remained in the charge of the PLDM. It is clear that Victor Catan could not afford that gesture without the approval of the ‘superiors’, but this is already another topic. [PCRM] The Communists Party of Moldova (PCRM) had a totally new behavior in the talks: reduced the number of critical remarks and the attacks on the members of the PDM, which was a possible government partner, and its leader Marian Lupu. It offered practically everything it was asked for or what it thought may attract the PDM as the second horse of the center-left governmental cart. Vladimir Voronin paid a visit to Marian Lupu at the head office of the PDM, treating him as an equal partner in the talks and, possibly, in governance. Vladimir Voronin never behaved like this with other politicians in Moldova, including colleagues and partners, not speaking about political opponents. This shows that the PCRM and Vladimir Voronin started to realize and accept the macro-political changes that took place lately in the country, which require the immediate modernization, Europeanization and civilization of the processes inside the party and in the relations with other political players. A deeper understanding of such a truth would offer the country and society more chances of modernization, Europeanization and civilization. The time will show how well the PCRM did its homework following the post-electoral talks, in which it was unsuccessful. [Foreign players: two approaches] The foreign players' involvement in the post-electoral negotiations was discussed a lot. Some confirm that the European Union (or some of its member states) and Russia got involved, while others deny it. Some welcome their involvement, while others criticize it. There is nothing new in these facts. At the same time, the negotiation process revealed at least two new and very important things. 1. The negotiation process, as the last election campaign, for the first time confirmed that the Republic of Moldova holds interest both for the East and the West, as they showed this interest in a crucial period for the country. Both of them would like to have Moldova within their spheres of influence and this is the essence of the behavior of the East and the West in the relations with Moldova. Until recently, including in the last election campaign, one of the central messages said that “Moldova is a small and poor country and nobody needs it”. We do not examine now the reasons for such a behavior, but the Moldovan political class is to think well at least from now on how to use this fact for Moldova’s and the Moldovans’ benefit. 2. The talks showed the foreign players adopted two approaches towards Moldova. They are known in history as the stick and carrot policy. Traditionally, this policy is used by one and the same player towards another player that the first wants to have within its sphere of influence. In our case, the roles have been shared. The East prefers the ‘stick’, while the West the ‘carrot’. The fact that the head of the Russian presidential administration Sergey Naryshkin, during his visit to Chisinau, intentionally did not meet with one of the senior officials and most important politicians in Moldova other politicians’ favor shows that the East prefers the ‘stick’. The frequent bans on the import of Moldovan products into Russia are more than relevant in this respect. At the same time, the Western officials come to Moldova with money, promises that they will provide large sums of money in the future and that the visa regime and trade regime will be liberalized. It would have been abnormal if the Moldovans had preferred the ‘stick’ to the ‘carrot’. {The last part of the Info-Prim Neo analysis “Whither Moldova goes?” will focus on the effects of the post-electoral negotiations examined from the perspective of the country’s development course over the next period.} [Valeriu Vasilica, Info-Prim Neo]