Recommendations on the draft Strategy on the Reform of the Center for Combating Economic Crimes and Corruption

At the request of the Center for Combating Economic Crimes and Corruption (CCECC), Transparency International – Moldova (TI-Moldova) examined the draft Strategy on the reform of the CCECC. TI-Moldova welcomes the initiative to elaborate a draft Strategy, the intention to concentrate the activity of CCECC on prevention and combating corruption, as well as the decision to delegate some of its activities to other law enforcement agencies. Also, TI-Moldova supports the intension to protect CCECC from political influence. In this context, TI-Moldova would like to present a set of proposals to the existing draft Strategy.

• Taking into consideration that this is the ninth reform since the creation of the CCECC, we recommend to include in the introduction of the draft Strategy a succinct analysis of past failures to reform the Center;
• The draft Strategy references the three myths on the activity of the CCECC: political influence, use of the institution to eliminate economic competitors, and corruption. We do not consider these are mere myths, but real problems the Center needs to address. We believe that CCECC faces a number of important problems related to the its independence, delimitation of competences, difficulties in the prosecution process, activity evaluation criteria, etc., that require the development and adoption of the draft Strategy of the Center. In this context, we propose to complete the draft Strategy (section 1) with a brief description of the above, arguing that to overcome these problems the Center needs the development and adoption of this draft. We also propose to complete the argumentation to reform CCECC with several indicators to assess the overall effectiveness of combating corruption in the country, as well as the effectiveness of CCECC’s activity in this area, and CCECC performance indicators (that could be used as outcome indicators in the reform of the institutions).
• The draft Strategy provides for “the placement of CCECC under Parliamentary control” and “the exclusion of CCECC from Government subordination”, which, in the opinion of the authors, “would best protect CCECC from external pressures, including political pressure”. We consider that placing CCECC under Parliamentary control not only won’t lead to its independence, but on the contrary, will create the conditions to place CCECC directly under the control and pressures of politicians, particularly those that control the majority in the Parliament. Subsequently, the independence of this organ could be limited even more. Simultaneously, we consider that the norms outlined in the draft Strategy are in contradiction with the Constitution, and therefore, could be declared unconstitutional[1]. Thus, we propose to exclude the aforementioned provisions from the draft Strategy;
• The draft Strategy provides for the modification in the procedure of appointment and dismissal of CCECC leadership: the Director of CCECC to be appointed by the Parliament at the proposal of the President of the RM, with the approval of the Prime Minister, and dismissed by the Parliament at the proposal of the President of the RM, with the approval of all Parliamentary fractions. We believe that these norms contradict the Constitution[2] and cannot be accepted. The appropriate formula in this context would include the nomination of the director of the CCECC by the President of the RM at the proposal of the Prime Minister, which would not contradict the Constitution of the country[3];
• Although the draft Strategy emphasizes the “Increased Capacity” as one of the base elements of the reform of the Center, and the European institutions recommend improving the coordination and exchange of information between the law enforcement bodies, the draft Strategy does not provide for such activities. We would like to propose to supplement the draft Strategy with concrete norms that would include the coordination of activities and collaboration with other law enforcement organizations and public institutions;
• Since the draft Strategy does not sufficiently regulate the responsibilities of CCECC, and only talks about the “accountability/responsibility of employees”, we see a need to complete this paragraph and take into consideration the following:

-          The modification and completion of the Penal Code paragraphs on liability for acts of traffic of influence, abuse of authority, and obstruction of justice;

-          The enforcement of the legislation and prosecution for acts of corruption committed by outside individuals that intervene in the activity of CCECC, apply pressure and commit acts of corruption, as well as of the institutional employees that commit acts of corruption.

• Although the draft Strategy (section on “Increased Capacity”) provides that “CCECC only handles high profile files, the document includes a number of paragraphs that talk about “the counteraction of corruption at all levels”, “prevention and combating of corruption at all levels”, “suppression of corruption at all levels, including senior and political levels”. To exclude this contradiction and comply with the recommendations made by international institutions, we propose the following:

-          State that the activity of CCECC will concentrate on combating corruption at high levels (high corruption/top officials/political corruption) with the elaboration of criteria that would delimitate the competences of CCECC and of other institutions (Ministry of Internal Affairs).

-          Modify Annex 1 on the new competencies of CCECC and of other institutions, taking into consideration the said delimitations.

• Since a significant number of CCECC duties will be delegated to several other institutions, to increase the salary competitiveness of CCECC employees, we propose to reduce the staff of the institution by two third, doubling concomitantly the salaries of the remaining employees, and allocating the remainder of the obtained funds to the Center’s activities. It is assumed that the budged of the institution will remain unchanged for at least two years;
• Demilitarize CCECC;
• Use the results of the corruption risks assessment conducted within the MOLICO project, financed by the Council of Europe and the European Commission, in the elaboration of the new structure of CCECC;
• One of the main activities in the corruption prevention process is the verification of income and property declarations of public officials. Although this will be the prerogative of the Integrity Agency, we consider that CCECC possesses all of the resources and capacity necessary to conduct such controls, which should be taken into consideration during the elaboration of the new institutional tasks and structure;
• While transparency is one of the conditions necessary to prevent corruption, including decisional corruption, the draft Strategy does not include concrete actions to ensure transparency within CCECC. We propose to include these actions in the Strategy;
• The draft Strategy mentions that CCECC is the main actor in the fight against corruption and must become a promoter of institutional reform. To have the moral right to combat corruption in the public service, it would be natural to have more rigorous requirements from CCECC staff than from other public officials. This refers to the whistleblowers, the obligation to declare any acts of corruption and other abuses, declaration of income, declaration of personal interests, declaration of conflict of interests, and the work ethic of CCECC employees. It is proposed to elaborate concrete requirements/measures for CCECC employees in these areas;
• Since, according to the draft Strategy, CCECC will narrow the areas of its activity, we consider the expansion of territorial offices unsuitable. Moreover, we consider that expanding the number of CCECC territorial offices could increase the risk of certain conflict of interest actions that would increase the risk of corruption in these territorial offices. Also, the draft Strategy claims that CCECC offices will cover the entire territory of the Republic of Moldova, although there is no mention of Transnistria;
• The draft Strategy proposes to supplement the institution’s budget by transferring to it 20% of the money seized by the state through court decision on cases handled by CCECC. We consider that this could lead to an increased interest in handling “convenient” cases, and propose to either exclude this clause from the Strategy, or to considerably reduce the quantum;
• We consider it necessary to ensure decisiveness/finality in the process of monitoring the activity of CCECC by the Civil Council, which requires reporting and taking measures on the part of the chief authority.