The EU’s conditionality mechanism is a useful instrument for promoting difficult reforms that are not wanted by the government. After the failure of the conditionality applied to Moldova, which resulted in the introduction of the mixed system in 2017 and invalidation of elections in 2018, the European Parliament suggested that the EU should change its tactics, expert in political sciences Dionis Cenușa said in a feature article for IPN Agency.

According to the expert, firstly the focus of the EU’s conditionality was shifted onto the compliance of the elections of February 2019 with the democratic principles. This creates a new political and temporal framework for the EU to reopen the subject of financial assistance, possibly with a fully renewed government, even if this is highly improbable.

At the same time, the European side practically pledges to restore the dialogue with any government that will come to power, even if this consists of the DPM and its allies. In other words, the EU wants to obtain new political conditions for reintroducing the conditionality elements. In parallel, the DPM wants to regain by elections the legitimacy that it didn’t have in 2016-2018, unlike the similar oligarchic regimes in Ukraine (Piotr Poroshenko and others) or Georgia (Bidzina Ivanishvili).

Secondly, there is a tendency in the rhetoric that asks for the reallocation of the European financial assistance to other entities in Moldova than the central authorities. The MEPs noted that the European funds could benefit civil society, the mass media, the private sector and the local public authorities.

So, instead of Moldova losing access to critical European sources that can be reoriented to other countries and for other problems, such as the management of migration in Northern Africa or in Turkey, the financial assistance - both direct budget support and macro-financial assistance - can be turned into funds for developing the (non)governmental players at central and local levels, which want and can comply with the conditions imposed by the EU.

This implies the enhancement of the capacities of the EU Delegation in Chisinau and maximum decentralization and flexibility in the management of the reallocated funds. Such an exercise depends on the European Commission and, at operational level, on the European External Action Service.

Last but not least, the justice sector reform, fight against upper-level (political) corruption and reinvigoration of the government become key areas to which the EU makes reference, even if the financial assistance was stopped. As a matter of fact, the European institutions can only revert the conditionality elements. This means that it can restore the macro-financial assistance and direct budget support in a plenary way, if the government of Moldova fulfils several of the preconditions – fair elections, investigation of the banking fraud, justice sector reform and counteracting of grand corruption. These expectations can be met only after the elections and depending on the conjuncture of the future ruling alliance where the force of the Democrats is substantially reduced, the Socialists do not have the leverage of power, while the extraparliamentary opposition dominates the legislature.

The major emphasis of a new view on the improved conditionality mechanism should include the consolidation of other local players. Having more robust local public authorities, civil society or the mass media, any government will learn to share the power to influence the decision-making mechanism in the state, concluded Dionis Cenușa.