Op-Ed by Iulian Groza, Executive Director at the Institute for European Policies and Reforms
Attention to decision-makers, especially Parliamentarians!
This morning, Minister of Justice Veronica Mihailov-Moraru presented three policy options in a press conference, ahead of an extraordinary parliamentary session announced by the Parliamentary Secretariat. This session, convened following a recommendation from the Supreme Security Council, aims to examine legislative amendments focused on:Establishing a unified legal framework based on common principles for preventing and combating organized crime. Strengthening the institutional architecture of agencies responsible for fighting and preventing organized crime
First approach proposed by the Ministry of Justice – Two feasible options without structural reforms
These solutions can be implemented within the existing institutional framework of the General Prosecutor’s Office (GPO) and the Superior Council of Prosecutors (SCP), without major legislative or structural interventions, thus minimizing the risk of systemic imbalances:
1. Creating a specialized division within the GPO to better prioritize and monitor complex cases of political corruption and organized crime.
2. Operationalizing the Special Section within the GPO for combating corruption and money laundering by assigning additional prosecutors. This section could also be strengthened by creating joint investigative teams for complex cases.
This approach is supported by legal experts and was highlighted in recent consultations organized by the Ministry of Justice. It aligns with international recommendations, including those from OECD specialists, who are currently conducting a functional analysis of the General Prosecutor’s Office. This report is expected to be presented by the end of February 2025.
The proposed measures are short-term, directly enhancing prosecutorial efficiency in fighting organized crime and corruption. They do not require structural reforms that would demand additional time, impact assessments, and risk management. Given that the GPO is already undergoing reorganization, these solutions fit organically within the ongoing reforms and can be quickly implemented by the GPO and SCP with the Ministry of Justice's support if needed.
Second approach – Structural reform targeting specialized prosecution offices
This approach involves merging the two existing specialized prosecution offices (Anticorruption Prosecution Office – PA, and the Organized Crime and Special Cases Prosecution Office – PCCOCS). However, this hasty, risky, and unprepared measure could create more systemic problems than it aims to solve.
Despite some announced details, the public and stakeholders within the prosecutorial system know very little about this initiative. There is currently no clear justification, no impact assessment on institutional capacity and risks, and no concrete implementation strategy.
The way this reform is being advanced sidesteps legislative transparency principles and potentially conflicts with legal requirements for public policy formulation, including government regulations on the legislative process.
Moreover, this large-scale reform, introduced abruptly and justified by referencing models from other countries, cannot be blindly applied to Moldova’s specific context.
Additionally, this initiative is absent from any national strategic document, including:
The Justice Sector Independence and Integrity Strategy (2022-2025)
The Rule of Law Roadmap, which the government must adopt in the context of EU accession negotiations (directly relevant to Cluster 1).
Short-term consequences of a hasty reform
1.Deepening the crisis in the prosecutorial system
In the short term, especially during an election year, this initiative will not solve the key issue – increasing prosecutorial efficiency in combating organized crime and corruption.
Instead, over the next few months leading up to parliamentary elections, these chaotic changes risk further weakening the PA and PCCOCS, which are already handling several major ongoing cases, including election-related investigations from last year.
This could negatively impact the entire system, affecting ongoing investigations.
2.Risk to the general assembly of prosecutors on February 11, 2025
The disorder caused by this initiative could jeopardize the proper organization of the General Assembly of Prosecutors, a crucial event for electing vetted SCP members and making key decisions for the prosecution system.
3.Negative impact on Moldova’s EU accession negotiations
The non-transparent, unsubstantiated, and unconsulted manner in which this reform is being promoted could be perceived as a setback in Brussels.
Last year, the Moldovan government and the European Commission successfully completed the bilateral screening of Cluster 1 in less than five months.
Currently, the government is finalizing consultations on three Roadmaps (Rule of Law, Democratic Institutions, and Public Administration Reform), with the European Commission’s Cluster 1 report so far being favorable to Moldova.
If this structural reform of specialized prosecution offices moves forward in its current form, there is a risk that:
-The European Commission might revise its report and delay approval
-The political decision to launch negotiations on Cluster 1 could be postponed
-The opening of the first negotiation chapters, expected by summer, might be delayed
4.The real priority: Vetting commission No. 3
Authorities and development partners should focus on adjusting the work of Vetting Commission No. 3, which is supported by the INL (International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau).
Given the recent suspension of US assistance for three months, this period is critical for continuing the ethical and financial evaluation of prosecutors.
Final thoughts:
-Any major structural reform requires time, preparation, and in-depth risk analysis.
-Public policies and structural reforms must define the systemic problem clearly, rather than reacting to isolated issues.
-Accelerating such a process during an election year risks creating chaos and instability.
-Specific issues should be addressed through targeted measures, not through broad structural changes that could destabilize the entire system.
In this context, the first two options presented by the Ministry of Justice are far more viable and effective than an unprepared large-scale reform, which could jeopardize both the stability of the prosecution system and Moldova’s European trajectory.
Furthermore, the first approach does not require legislative interventions, aligns with the ongoing reorganization of the GPO, and, most importantly, falls within the legal mandate of the General Prosecutor and the Superior Council of Prosecutors.
Iulian Groza is the Executive Director of the Institute for European Policies and Reforms. He previously served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova and headed the European Integration Department. He also worked in Brussels at Moldova’s Mission to the EU. Groza was part of the team that led negotiations for the signing of the Association Agreement between Moldova and the European Union and headed the working group in the EU-Moldova dialogue on visa liberalization.
