Op-Ed
	The states that are part of the EU enlargement policy must adopt a clearly pro-European policy if they want to advance in the accession process. Otherwise, any form of multi-vector policy involving Russia and China can become an obstacle to achieving the conditions of accession...
Dionis Cenuşa, Senior Contributor

There is a preconceived idea that if a country joins the enlargement policy of the European Union (EU), its foreign policy becomes uniform and "Europeanized", becoming strictly pro-European. Thus, part of the transformation that the new and old EU candidate states (currently ten) must go through is related to the assumption of the EU's external action directions. Although the 27 European states have their own foreign policy, the EU institutions located in Brussels can suggest principles of external action. The development of an external agenda belonging to the EU depends on unanimity, on the one hand, and geopolitical circumstances, on the other. However, in most cases, the EU's external agenda is set on the basis of a causal relationship with regional and global geopolitical events (the war in Ukraine, the migration crisis, the terrorist threat, etc.).

However, unanimity is not always and necessarily the result of voluntary decisions, but is formed as a result of the influence of a strong majority on others. The majority influence must be behind Germany and France, including Italy and Spain, although to a lesser extent. Although the latter are the four main EU economies that have primacy, they must unite the other member states around them to galvenize cohesion in the foreign policy of the entire bloc. That is, on the basis of unanimity and cohesion, European institutions can introduce sanctions against third countries, making sanctions one of the most expressive and powerful instruments of EU foreign policy. From this point of view, the EU expects the candidate states (including Serbia, Moldova and Georgia) to take on European sanctions, thus aligning themselves with the European foreign agenda. This also refers to the EU sanctions against Russia, which in the last two years has become the most sanctioned country internationally. Between February 2022 and June 2024, the EU initiated 14 sanctions packages, which must not be omitted in the accession process of EU candidate states. However, this differs from case to case, as some candidate countries prefer to adopt a "multi-vector" foreign policy, refusing to align themselves with European sanctions even if they are in EU accession negotiations.

Serbia and Moldova: opposite cases of foreign policy

Alignment with the EU common foreign policy is a necessary condition in the EU accession process, as indicated in chapter 31 (out of a total of 35 chapters). According to this provision, the candidate states must bring their foreign policy closer to that of the EU, and the main way to do this is by assuming the restrictive measures (sanctions) of the EU and adhering to the geopolitical positioning of the EU (the statements of the diplomatic arm of the EU - European External Action Service). This chapter will open for Moldova after 2025, without a specific date, when the effective start of the negotiation process with the EU is scheduled. In the case of Serbia, even after 10 years since the start of negotiations with the EU in 2014, Chapter 31 has not yet been closed and is currently being evaluated by the EU Council (representatives of the national governments of the EU states). The chapter covers not only sanctions, but also actions in relation to international organizations (UN, International Criminal Court, etc.) and international treaties (non-proliferation of weapons, conflict management, etc.).

The attitude towards Russia's military aggression against Ukraine and compliance with European sanctions against Russia are currently central to the EU's assessment of Serbia and Moldova's progress in the accession process. In August 2023, Brussels emphasized that Serbian authorities had not taken up any of the EU sanctions against Russia, nor had they joined the EU in statements related to Russia and Ukraine. Belgrade has also refused to take on sanctions against China, Belarus and Iran, which are strategic partners of Russia. Despite the EU's efforts, Serbia allows civil air flights to Russia and has been suspected of circumventing sanctions on dual-use exports to Russia. The EU has openly raised the issue of Serbia's "strategic direction" in maintaining relations with both Russia and China. In other words, Brussels is concerned that Serbia is guided by a "multi-vector" foreign policy, even if it remains anchored in the EU accession process. According to the perception of the Euro-crats in Brussels, Serbia must choose only one vector, the European one, if it really wants to join the EU. With Aleksandar Vucici's party (Serbian Progressive Party – SNS) in the majority after the controversial early elections in December 2023, Serbia shows no signs of wanting to abandon its autonomous foreign policy of close ties with Moscow and Beijing, despite the objections of the EU.

While the EU assessed Serbia's progress in implementing Chapter 31 as "moderate", Moldova received a more positive assessment ("moderate to good" level). In August 2023, Moldovan authorities demonstrated a higher rate (74%) of alignment with the statements of the European External Action Service (the diplomatic arm of the EU) than Serbia (51%). Although Moldova did not align itself with sanctions against Russia (and Belarus), preventing countermeasures by Russia (inclusion in the list of "unfriendly states": about 50 states), the EU was lax in criticizing Moldova, as it does in the case of Serbia. The EU underlined the fact that Moldova committed to not allow violations of sanctions on its territory and committed to gradually and selectively applying certain sanctions: four sanctions packages would have been applied by November 2023. Reducing the level of bilateral relations with Russia to a level that has not existed since that country's independence (1991) and unconditional solidarity with Ukraine mean that the EU does not mind a limited alignment with sanctions against Russia and has left cases of sanctions violations with the involvement of Moldovan entities unchallenged. The EU sees in Chisinau's actions a total devotion to the European vector, although it is instrumentalized by the current government to help Maia Sandu obtain a better result in the presidential elections on October 20. More precisely, the government (Action and Solidarity Party) decided to organize a referendum on European integration, which would lead to the modification of the constitutional provisions to include European integration. Although this political approach of PAS entails risks, including for the image of the EU in Moldova, Brussels is not bothered by this attempt to politicize the European vector.

It appears that Brussels believes that the "yes" victory in the referendum on European integration in Moldova will eliminate the possibility of a "multi-vector" foreign policy, through which subsequent governments could resurrect relations with Russia. Despite all these EU calculations, they may be in vain, because Georgia, with the mention of European integration in the Constitution (along with that of NATO), has not prevented the current government from adopting a "multi-vector" stance similar to that in Serbia.

Georgia: horizontal "multi-vector" foreign policy

The relationship with Russia assumed by the EU candidate states will matter at least until 2029, when the mandate of the European Commission, currently under constitution, will expire. The future head of European diplomacy could be the current Prime Minister of Estonia, Kaja Kallas, who has become one of the main targets of Russian disinformation. Kallas is known for a robust and critical rhetoric against Moscow for its imperialist policy in relation to Ukraine, but also with the entire post-Soviet space. Given the future configuration of the European Commission, which will strengthen its geopolitical voice, including through Kallas's pragmatic diplomacy with Russia, countries like Georgia will find it difficult to implement "multi-vector" foreign policies.

Although it has been a candidate country since November 2023, Georgia risks losing this status following the approval of the law on "transparency of foreign influence." In June 2024, the EU Council warned the authorities in Tbilisi that the adopted law will have geopolitical consequences, which from autumn will allow civil society to be included in the category of "agents of foreign influence" if it receives more than 20 % of its financing from abroad (regardless of its origin). The EU does not make a direct reference to Russia, but those who protested vehemently in Georgia (youth, NGOs, opposition, citizens in general) interpreted the approval of the law (with aspects similar to that of Russia in 2012) as an attempt of "Russification". Brussels has stressed that Georgia's accession process could be halted if the law remains in force. However, the Tbilisi government (an oligarchic type regime due to the influence of Bidzina Ivanishvili) led by the "Georgian Dream" keeps repeating that the country's European integration is not canceled and that the goal is to achieve it (unviable) goal to the year 2030.

De facto, like Serbia, the Georgian authorities pursue a "multi-vector" policy, attempting to combine EU membership with a strategic partnership with China and the normalization of relations with Russia. Signs of a non-exclusionary pro-European positioning are illustrated in the EU's assessment of Georgia's readiness for Chapter 31. In August 2023, Brussels identified that the Georgian side had a 43% alignment rate with the EU's declarations. EU made by EU diplomacy, lower than in Serbia (51%) and almost twice lower than in Moldova (78%). Georgia has also not joined the EU sanctions against Russia adopted after 2022 (like Serbia and partly like Moldova) and is reluctant to align itself with human rights sanctions (the EU analogue to the "Magnitsky Act" ).

Although the Georgian authorities are open to adopting European legislation in various technical sectors (as they did within the framework of the 2014 Association Agreement), pursuing pragmatic economic interests, they prefer broad sovereignty in the field of foreign policy. Therefore, if the EU applies individual and political sanctions for legislation targeting civil society (some of which receives funding from the EU and Member States), the Georgian authorities will most likely respond by intensifying dialogue with China, Russia and Iran. The implementation of the Anaklia port construction project (critical infrastructure) by Chinese companies exemplifies the approach that the Georgian government could apply on a larger scale if it feels isolated by the West. The critical point that will establish new political conditions in the dialogue between Tbilisi and Brussels are the parliamentary elections of October 26, 2024. The opposition is taking steps towards a mobilization of pro-EU forces and the European institutions condition the future dialogue with Tbilisi on holding fair and free parliamentary elections.

The outcome of the elections will determine whether Georgia will move closer to Moldova (if the presidential office there remains in the hands of the current government after the Moldovan elections on October 20) or will reinforce its "multi-vector" position, Serbian style, by building selective relations with the EU in the accession process, maintaining in parallel close ties with China and at least normalized ones with Russia.

In lieu of conclusions…

The states that are part of the EU enlargement policy (ten in total) must adopt a clearly pro-European policy if they want to advance in the accession process. Otherwise, any form of "multiple-vector" policy involving Russia and China may become an obstacle to achieving the conditions of accession (chapter 31).

It is clear that the future European Commission will be as strict with Russia as the current one, even if Russian military aggression against Ukraine ceases for currently unknown reasons. Therefore, Serbia, Moldova and Georgia's EU accession negotiations, on the common foreign policy side (including alignment with sanctions against Russia), may influence accession progress. Finally, if these states adopt the policies associated with Russia, as is the case with Georgia, then the EU accession process could be put on hold, or at least slowed down as much as possible.

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