„...If we put together all the factors for and against the implementation of the five post-electoral coalition versions elucidated by the President, we will reach the conclusion that a government coalition between the PDM and the PSRM is the most probable one. This is actually an absolutely normal one, especially in the light of the common slogan: pro-Moldova! So, the main conclusion is that Moldova has a Future! It’s logical! Isn’t it?”
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Three weeks have passed since the parliamentary elections of February 24, 2019. Nevertheless, society is still waiting for an answer to the question – what will follow? High-ranking officials who represent different political parties, journalists and political commentators formulated all kinds of hypotheses concerning the post-electoral scenarios, some of which are more interesting than others. What really gladdens is the level of discussions on the given issue. The tone of discussions was set by President Igor Dodon, who publicly performed combinatorics exercises to show the whole range of coalition opportunities offered by the four parties elected to Parliament. As a politician, but also as a person proficient in math, Igor Dodon described the positive coalitions, excluding categorically the Shor Party from calculations, as follows:
- A broad coalition with the participation of three parliamentary groups – of the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM), of the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM), and of the bloc ACUM (NOW) – as an expression of national conciliation following the banking fraud;
- Three possibilities of combinations between the three groups by two;
- Snap elections.
Anyone can convince oneself that the President is right if we refer to the five variants. Igor Dodon excluded categorically the defections of MPs from one faction to another from the combinatorial calculations, making it clear that arrangements are possible only within the limits of the five scenarios. So, owing to the President, we have the whole combinatorial range in front of us.
History of the problem
We should admit that this abundance of post-electoral versions inflated the imagination of some of the politicians and opinion shapers up to the limit beyond which the versions risked turning into diversion. Surely, after the declaration of independence, we had nine parliamentary elections in the Republic of Moldova, the last one being that held on February 24, 2019. As a result of these elections, we had three to five parties elected to Parliament, but problems in the process of electing the Parliament’s executive bodies and of investing a government have never been met. It’s true that after four elections of the nine, parties that won absolute majorities came to power – the Agrarian Democratic Party of Moldova (PDAM) in 1994 and the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) in 2001, 2005 and April 2009. Evidently, problems in these cases could be avoided. After another four elections, we had parliamentary majorities and coalition government created with particular difficulties that turned out to be surmountable.
This way, after the parliamentary elections of March 22, 1998, in exactly one month, on April 23, the leader of the Movement for a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova (MpMDP) Dumitru Diacov was elected Speaker of Parliament. In another month, on May 22, there was invested the Ciubuc-II Government of the Alliance for Democracy and Reforms (ADR) that consisted of three parties. After the snap parliamentary elections of July 29, 2009, in exactly a month, on August 28, the leader of the Liberal Party (PL) Mihai Ghimpu was elected Parliament Speaker. In less than a month, on September 25, there was invested the Filat-I Government of the Alliance for European Integration (AEI-I) that consisted of four parties. After the snap parliamentary elections of November 28, 2010, in about a month, on December 30, the leader of the PDM Marian Lupu was elected Speaker. In only two weeks, on January 14, 2011, there was invested the Filat-II Government of the Alliance for European Integration (AEI-II) formed by three parties. Ultimately, after the parliamentary elections of November 30, 2014,in about two months, on January 23, 2015, one of the vice presidents of the PDM, Andrian Candu, was voted in Speaker. Respectively, in less than a month there was invested the minority government of Kiril Gaburici, which was voted by two coalition partners – the PDM and the Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova (PLDM), and was supported by the opposition Party of Communists (PCRM).
Exclusive situation and exaggerated concerns
So, during the independence years Moldova hasn’t witnessed situations when the election of the Parliament’s working bodies in a reasonable timeframe would have been impossible. The investing of the government, even if a minority one, was also possible afterward. Now, after the elections of February 24, 2019, why should we be concerned about an eventual impossibility of constituting a parliamentary majority and of investing a government, including a minority one? Surely, there are reasons for such concerns, but these seem to be exaggerated. First of all, after the last elections of February 24, 2019, we have a unique situation. The new Parliament includes a political force that actually held real power before the initiation of the dialogue and negotiations on the formation of a parliamentary majority. This is the PDM, which managed to promote persons loyal to the party in the administration of all the law enforcement and regulatory institutions and these persons have been irremovable throughout the mandate of the newly elected Parliament. In this connection, it should be noted that there is no doubt that the group of the Shor Party is a banal appendix of the PDM, which this way has the largest number of MPs. Indeed, any argument and evidence that the Shor Party and the three independent MPs are the ‘golden reserve’ of the PDM, which can by anytime used, but only in force majeure situations, are useless.
“The four apostles were three...”
That’s why the five versions of the President can be actually reduced to two: which of the other two parliamentary forces – the PSRM and ACUM – would accept or would be forced to become the government partner of the PDM? An eventual ad-hoc coalition between the PSRM and ACUM is less probable if not almost impossible owing to a series of factors: serious lack of confidence caused by the mishmashes staged by the PSRM, alongside the PDM, against ACUM; pursuing of opposite strategic goals by the two forces that, after an eventual ad-hoc coalition, would anyway become antagonistic, especially because the PSRM keeps the clause concerning the scrapping of the Moldova – EU Association Agreement in its political program; the very big risk that an eventual coalition between the PSRM and ACUM, at a time when the law enforcement and regulatory institutions remain loyal to the PDM, will end immediately after it is announced owing to criminal cases against some of the leaders, including informal ones.
So, we will yet see how the dilemma of a coalition between the PDM and one of the two forces can be solved given that the bloc ACUM, according to its official documents, was created to free the captured state from the oligarchic regime established by the PDM. It is thus hard to believe that the leaders of ACUM can accept a government coalition with the PDM. On the other hand, for the PSRM there is no taboo as to the formation of a coalition with the PDM. There can be only the fear not to be devoured by this, as it happened in the case of the PCRM, PLDM, the Liberal Party (PL), the European People’s Party of Moldova (PPEM), especially because the law enforcement agencies are under the effective control of the PDM.
For fear and/or voluntarily?
However, things should not be regarded only through the angle of fears. There are a series of factors that make the formation of a coalition between the two parties – the PDM and PSRM – absolutely normal as they have many things in common: claim they are of the left and share the social-democratic and, respectively, the social doctrines; promote the pro-Moldova slogan insisting on the working out of a state doctrine on the consolidation of Moldova’s sovereignty, including before the recommendations of the Venice Commission, and this was proven by common agreement; plead for building the civic nation in the Republic of Moldova that would dilute the ethnic-linguistic factor that divides Moldovan society; plead for transforming the Republic of Moldova into a bridge between the East and the West, without approaching a pole or another one too much, the given bridge probably serving as the “fourth path”, to the South, which is to Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, etc., where applicants for nationality by investment, etc. could be found. These affinities between the PDM and PSRM are more than sufficient for President Igor Dodon, who is considered the informal leader of the PSRM, to admit a reconciliation between the two parties, ignoring the robbing of the national banking system in 2014.
Ultimately, the PDM has several more ‘trump cards’ that could be used to persuade the PSRM to accept a government coalition. For example, the PDM could use the party’s international prestige to be more convincing before the PSRM. In this regard, we should not forget that the leader of the PDM Vlad Plahotniuc is also the vice president of the Socialist International. He was elected to this post only two years ago, in the 25th Congress of the organization held in Cartagena, Columbia, during March 2-4. As the vice president of the Socialist International, the task of the leader of the PDM is to promote the socialist values in the Commonwealth of Independent States. And the best opportunity to report success to the central body is to persuade the Socialists from the PSRM to promote the socialist values together, forming a government coalition -- Here, at Home, in Moldova!. What can be more natural in this sense? Indeed, how can the PSRM, as a party that shares the socialist doctrine, reject a coalition with the PDM that already achieve results internationally? Moreover, the PSRM could benefit from a coalition with the PDM, which, for its part, could eventually support the entry of the PSRM into this international organization. Besides, if distrust still exists between the two parties, they could both resort to the mediation of the disagreements by a common partner. In this regard, we should not forget that both the PDM and the PSRM signed cooperation agreements with the ruling party of Russia – United Russia – the PDM on September 16, 2010, while the PSRM on June 9, 2017. Such mediation would be really opportune given the experience of the PDM that already resorted to such a service in December 2010, only several months after signing the given cooperation agreement.
In conclusion, we can say that if we put together all the factors for and against the implementation of the five post-electoral coalition versions elucidated by the President, we will reach the conclusion that a government coalition between the PDM and the PSRM is the most probable one. This is actually an absolutely normal one, especially in the light of the common slogan: pro-Moldova! So, the main conclusion is that Moldova has a Future! It’s logical! Isn’t it?
IPN Experts
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IPN note:
The reason for which the given OP-ED was signed as it was signed can be seen in the IPN Note for this commentary.
