Hybrid war // Russia’s propaganda and disinformation methods, techniques, channels in Moldova

The processes of integrating into the European Union and of cooperating with NATO for strengthening the national defense and security of the Republic of Moldova made so that the Russian propaganda, as part of the hybrid war, became a major state security issue. The goals of the propaganda, disinformation and manipulation are to thwart the foreign policy course of the Republic of Moldova, to keep the energy and economic dependence on Russia and to replace the current government with political parties loyal to Moscow (PSRM, PP “ȘOR” and replacement parties like “Revival” Party), and to also keep Transnistria as an element of regional blackmail and blackmail against the administration in Chisinau.

This way, the propaganda and disinformation benefit from support and coordination right from the Kremlin, covering a number of stages of compilation and dissemination of narratives by different distribution channels, from Tik-Tok to TV channels or social networking sites. This “effort” by the Russian Federation, which covers not only the Republic of Moldova, but also other countries, involves also Vladimir Putin or Alexandr Lukashenko, which is not at all surprising.

According to the evolution of the narratives analyzed the past year, three active phases of the propaganda and disinformation started in the Russian Federation against the Republic of Moldova or its development partners can be identified.

The first phase includes the main narratives generators that distort the reality, trying to offer legitimacy to the assertions. We can find here Vladimir Putin and Aleksandr Lukashenko, assisted by “experts” in ideological/spiritual manipulation in the persons of Aleksandr Dughin, Patriarch Kirill, and Konstantin Malofeev.





This first phase also comprises the representatives of the authorities: Dmitri Peskov, Valentina Matviyenko, Veaceslav Volodin, Dmitri Medvedev, Maria Zakharova, and Sergei Lavrov, and also operational representatives who include both military representatives and leaders of subjects of the Russian Federation, leaders of separatist regions or of temporarily occupied territories: Sergey Shoigu, Ramzan Kadyrov, Yevgeny Prigozhin, Denis Pushilin, Vladimir Saldo, Yevgeny Balitsky, and Leonid Pasechnik.



The second phase consists of the application of propaganda techniques and sharing of updated disinformation narratives. Within the second phase, there were identified two coordinators of the Presidential Administration. The first is Alexey Gromov, first deputy chief of staff in the Putin Administration. He manages and supervises work with the mass media, especially federal TV channels, radio stations and news agencies, attracting so-called propaganda media influencers and foreign pro-Russian experts under foreign colors. This category includes: Vladimir Solovyov, Olga Skabeyeva, Margarita Simonian, Andrei Norkin, Dmitry Kiselev and Yevgeny Popov, who were joined by foreign pro-Russian propagandists: Yakov Kedmi from Israel and Scott Ritter from the U.S. The second coordinator of the Kremlin administration is Sergey Kirienko. He is responsible for internal political issues, including elections at all levels, interaction with political parties, different organizers and the youth policies. He is also in charge of “NEW MEDIA”. The propaganda tools he manages are: bloggers, artists, social media influencers, including the use of Telegram and Tik-Tok. Here, we can find as propaganda vectors Grigori Leps, Sara Shor “Jasmin”, Semion Pegov, Timati, Olga Buzova, Zahar Prilepin, and a number of Telegram and Tik-Tok channels.

The third phase is coordinated by the intelligence services of the Russian Federation, respectively FSB and the Center for Psychological Operations of GRU. Within this last phase, the propaganda narratives and propaganda elements are injected into the information space of the Republic of Moldova, through agents and elements that are loyal to the interests of Moscow.

The third phase consists of the distribution of fake news and propaganda elements in the information space of the Republic of Moldova. Six main groups are involved at this phase to amplify the impact of false narratives:

•           Instruments for disseminating FAKE NEWS, Telegram channels, Tik-Tok accounts: Pridniestrovie, Gagauznews, Sputnik, TSV, Pervyi Pridnistrovskii, Novosti PMR;

•           Pro-Russian mass media: NTV Moldova, Komsomolskaya Pravda, TV6, RTR Moldova, Accent TV, REN Moldova, GRT, Sputnik;

•           Official institutions/organizations: Embassy of Russia., Russian Center of Science and Culture (Rossotrudnichestvo);

•           Pro-Russian Transnistrian politicians and propagandists: Vitali Ignatiev, Vadim Krasnoselski, Andrei Safonov;

•           Pro-Russian activists, journalists and influencers from the Republic of Moldova: Ilan Shor, Bogdan Țîrdea, Alexandr Nesterovski, Dumitru Buimistru, Valery Demidetskii, Mihail Ahremtsev, Alexandr Kalinin;

•           Pro-Russian propagandists from ATU Gagauzia: Irina Vlah, Victor Petrov, Nikolai Kostyrkin.

Conclusions:

Russian propaganda, as it can be deduced from the aforementioned data, represents not only a challenge for the security of the Republic of Moldova, but also a problem that, if it is not addressed on time, can affect the state on the whole and its proper functioning. In fact, President Maia Sandu repeatedly warned about and condemned the Russian Federation’s actions in the Republic of Moldova and its attempts to destabilize the country. In the “European Moldova” Assembly of May 21, President Sandu said that the Republic of Moldova chose the path of European integration so as to no longer live under Russian blackmail, in poverty and corruption. “During 34 years, they have tried to block out future, to divide us, to keep us in poverty, to blackmail us; they wanted us to be dependent, to freeze, to fall. But we resisted!” stated then Maia Sandu.

This article was originally published on the portal Deschide.MD



Fazele propagandei ruse by Igor Liubec

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