Almost nine months before the future parliamentary elections that are expected to take place in December 2018, there is no clarity as to the profile of the future government – the political forces that associate themselves with the European course or those that incline towards the Eurasian direction.

It is yet certain that the parties that will enter the future Parliament will need coalitions to govern the country after 2018. None of the parties considered able to pass the election threshold has enough political capital to repeat the success of the Communists in 2001-2009. It is also certain that the geopolitical narrative about the country’s external orientation will have an enormous impact on the election outcome. For now, only the Democrats and the Socialists maximally exploit, even if with variable success, the association with one of the two integrationist processes in which Moldova already takes part (implementation of Association Agreement with EU or entry into Eurasian Economic Union).

The extraparliamentary opposition tries to mobilize the voters, broadly using the anti-oligarchic and pro-reform agenda, without laying special emphasis on the importance namely of the European course for the country’s development. Other parties with pro-Russian views than the Party of Socialists (PSRM) diminished considerably their visibility, with even the Party of Communists (PCRM) that 17 years ago held 71 seats of MP of the 101 being to the limit of survival.

How will the votes be distributed?

The high unpredictability of the elections of the end of 2018 is mostly due to the mixed voting in single-member constituencies, which will produce 51 of the 101 MPs. Contrary to the calls of the EU and the U.S., which are presented as partners, the Democrats adopted the mixed-member electoral system with the assistance of the pro-Russian Socialists. Even if this is pragmatic, the Democratic Party’s reason is kleptocratic in character and runs counter to the common interest of developing a strong and sustainable democratic multiparty system. Actually, the mixed electoral system risks further ruining the public confidence in the local public authorities, repeating exactly the legitimacy crisis between the citizens and the central authorities (Parliament, government etc.), which became more acute after 2012.

After the mixed electoral system was introduced, polls practically lost a large part of the previous relevance. As polls show the popularity of parties at national level, these help to anticipate the distribution of votes for 50 of the 101 seats, which is for the constituency where they vote according to the old model, based on party lists.

The last polls showed an increase for the Democratic Party (PDM ) and the European People’s Party of Moldova (PPEM) and a diminution in the voting preferences for the Party of Socialists (PSRM), the Party “Action and Solidarity” (PAS) and the Party “Platform Dignity and Truth” (PPPDA) (See Table 1)

Table 1. Electoral preferences of citizens, %

Source: IRI.org

In another way than by forming an electoral bloc with the PAS, the PPDA risks not entering Parliament based on party lists. Overall, the votes garnered by the PAS and PPDA in an eventual bloc and the votes of the PDM could rise to 33%. This will enable the three parties to surpass the Socialists, who are expected to gain 30% of the vote. This mechanical cumulating of votes, depending on the geopolitical views, is improbable in practical terms as so far the PAS and PPDA refused any type of cooperation with the PDM, which is regarded as the main political opponent.  

Polls reveal that half of the 50 seats decided based on party lists could be obtained by the Socialists and the future electoral bloc between the PAS and PPDA. (See Table 2). The number of their seats could rise correspondingly following the redistribution of the votes of parties that would not pass the election threshold of 6%.

Table 2. Parties that can pass the election threshold and estimated distribution of votes for 50 seats

There is maximum uncertainty as to the way in which they will vote in single-member constituencies. The results of the local elections of 2015 were favorable for a number of parties, including those that have slim chances under the party-list system. Thus, the Democrats are the only force associated with the EU that can pass the election threshold and has considerable representation at the local level. Among the pro-Russian forces, the Socialists are the most popular political force. (See Table 3)  

Table 3. Seats according to results of 2015 local elections for parties that can pass election threshold in 2018, %

According to the results of the local mayoral elections of 2015, the Democrats and the Socialists have the most advantageous positions. At the same time, the PLDM possesses huge resources that, if they are correctly channeled, can offer substantial support to the candidates of the future electoral bloc between the PAS and PPDA, which were registered as parties in 2016. Also, the Communists and Our Party, which are outside the race only under the party-list system, have considerable chances of being represented in Parliament.

Additionally, in single-member constituencies the Socialists will most probably be able to gain two seats based on the votes of the citizens from the Transnistrian region, two seats based on the votes in the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia, by one seat in Taraclia district and based on the votes of the Moldovans who settled in Russia and other CIS states. Another two seats in the single-member constituencies for the diaspora from America and, respectively, Europe, will be won by those who will be supported by the PAS – PPDA duo. There will be an active struggle between the Socialists and Our Party for the seats in the municipality of Balti. Also, most of the political parties will try to gain the 11 seats intended for the capital city.

Goal of geopolitics in future elections

The geopoliticization of electoral rhetoric will be an indispensable attribute in the election campaign.

President Igor Dodon and the Socialists are predisposed to use the relationship with Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union, the church and the pro-family conservative movements and also the supporters of the Eurasian integration. Their actions will be aimed mainly at the rural voters who speak Russian and are older than 30.  

The Democrats will continue to use the polarization that was slightly caused in society by anti-Russia speeches that intensified since 2017. This way, they aim to attract varied categories that support the European course. The powerful and ramified local bodies can help them gain votes in single-member constituencies and based on party lists.

The pro-European extraparliamentary opposition feels the safest in towns and in the capital city. Evidently, the voters of the PAS and PPDA will consists of pro-European voters who have yet a very harsh attitude to the government that is associated with political corruption, banking frauds and  capturing of state institutions.   

Table 4. Geopolitical options of the citizens, %

Source: IRI.org

As the poll shows, the young voters have an oscillating view as to the participation in elections. These represent the most important pillar of the pro-European voters and their reduced participation can disfavor first of all the pro-European opposition forces (See Table 5) Therefore, the young people will be practically stimulated to vote based on party lists, without going to their native places where they can vote both in single-member constituencies and based on party lists.

Table 5. Geopolitical options by age versus interest in taking part in elections

Source: IRI.org

At least three scenarios

The post-electoral scenarios will depend on a number of factors. Firstly, the situation will be influenced by the exact number of seats that will be won by the Socialists, the Democrats and the PAS-PPDA duo. These scenarios will also depend on the presence of other parties that will enter the future Parliament through single-member constituencies. At least three scenarios can be anticipated as a result.

According to the first scenario, the Socialists will win the elections, but will be able to form a government coalition only by attracting other pro-Russian parties that will enter Parliament based on the votes cast in single-member constituencies, such as the PCRM and Our Party. The Socialists could also persuade independent MPs strictly for forming the government and avoiding early elections.

Under the second scenario, the Democrats need to obtain a more favorable position by winning at least 10-15 seats. They will use this to exert pressure on the PAS-PPDA duo so as to make this accept an eventual pro-European government coalition. This component is yet inacceptable for the anti-oligarchic forces. Even if Vladimir Plahotniuc abandons the PDM, the position of the PAS and PPDA will not change radically. The failure of this scenario will produce early elections if the Socialists also do not manage to form the government (first scenario).

Under the third scenario, the Socialists and the Democrats will form a coalition. The avoidance of rerun elections will be the only explanation for such cohabitation. This scenario is extremely vulnerable because the Socialists will have to face the reaction of Russia, which in 2017-2018 was regularly targeted by the Democrats. If the Socialists are ready to sacrifice the good relations with Moscow and, respectively, their political future by entering an open partnership with the PDM, the suspicions about the existence of cooperation between the PDM and PSRM will be confirmed. 

Instead of conclusion…

The parliamentary elections of 2018 are among the most unpredictable elections in the last decade. Therefore, there are multiple scenarios as to how the events will develop immediately after the elections.

The Democrats are for now on the position of criticizing the rules of the game, while the Socialists try to maximize the own benefits. The extraparliamentary opposition parties are the most disfavored. These must bank on the assistance of parties that have efficient local bodies (PLDM).

If the Socialists win the elections, they will avoid making fast moves towards the East so as not to cause “Euromaidan” protests in Chisinau. At the same time, the promises made in Moscow could not be abandoned without particular consequences. The Democrats will exploit the danger of losing the European course so as to form a coalition with the PAS and PPDA, but the latter will be reticent. Ultimately, which of the scenarios is put into practice and what the country’s external orientation will be starting with 2019 will depend on the quality of the Moldovans’ vote.