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| Dionis Cenuşa | |
Moldova’s European course was more dynamic in 2016 than a year ago. The concentration of the political power and almost integral subordination of the state institutions, including political decisions, enabled the government to generate appearances of increased political stability and faster reforms. However, the political stability in Moldova was ensured through the monopolization of the political power by one political-oligarchic group that gravitates around the Democratic Party and this is the major problem. Consequently, the political-economic reforms initiated in 2016 were tailored to the interests of the government rather than the public ones.
Neither the reformist anti-system opposition nor the non-governmental sector were able to incline the system powerfully enough to obtain major concessions. The weaknesses materialized in the impossibility of stopping the conversion of losses as a result of the bank frauds into state debts or maintaining of the prosecution service in the government control equation (appointment of Eduard Harunjen). The public opinion appreciates, but anyway remains unsatisfied with the way in which corruption is fought and by other attempts by the government to protect the public interests and end the narrow criminal ones. Society is waiting for results from the slow investigation of the banking frauds or the sentencing of judges and public functionaries who were arrested for acts of corruption. But no such results were witnessed in 2016 and it is highly probable that this fact will be partially exploited in 2017, especially to influence the public opinion before the parliamentary elections of 2018.
The political transformations of 2016 were connected to the European agenda. The ruling alliance led by the Democratic Party focused on the regaining of the European partners’ confidence. The necessity of restoring the positive dialogue with the EU resulted from the importance of the European assistance and of regaining public legitimacy among the people with pro-European sympathies.
In general, the European integration of Moldova in 2016 was marked by a series of challenges and opportunities that started to produce results and will have a greater intensity in 2017.
The three challenges
1. Emergence of pro-Russian President
The winning of this year’s presidential elections by Socialist Igor Dodon is a starting point for different challenges to the European integration in Moldova, which can appear in 2017 already. Even if Dodon’s victory was anticipated by public opinion polls, this was achieved through numerous violations of the legislation, including the involvement of the church and manipulation of public opinion, and through the instrumentalization of the vote in the Transnistrian region and obstructing of the vote in the diaspora. The new pro-European forces were not very far from the victory (about 4% or slightly over 70,000 votes), but the current government created the conditions needed for the presidency to be gained by the pro-Russian candidate Igor Dodon. The impact of the pro-Russian President in 2016 was seen mainly at the level of statements because the new Head of State will officially take up his duties at the end of December 2016.
For now, Igor Dodon does not have the political power needed to review the European agenda, being first of all limited by the prerogatives of his office. That’s why Igor Dodon focuses on the gradual diminution of the European integration process and its replacement with the Eurasian course. Such a scenario is possible if Dodon’s Socialists obtain very good results in the parliamentary elections of 2018 (IPN, November 2016) and form a majority government together with other pro-Russian forces. By then, Dodon will tend to exploit the mistakes of the current government. This will put the European partners that offer support to Moldova in a negative light. The new President also promised to strengthen the dialogue with Russia, which, for its part, is interested in having a political ally in the Moldovan state institutions.
Dodon will avoid the risks that can stem from the diminution of the European factor until this can be substituted, at least partially, by the Russian factor. That’s why besides restoring the Moldovan-Russian commercial and economic relations, a favorable European context is needed, where the European sanctions against Russia are lifted and the populist forces win the elections in France, the Netherlands and Germany in 2017. In the medium and long run, Igor Dodon wants to combine the keeping of the European assistance for difference reforms with the gradual integration of Moldova into the Eurasian Economic Union.
2. Moldovan-Russian ‘roadmap’
The second challenge to the European agenda in Moldova derives from the Moldovan-Russian protocol signed in Moscow in November 2016, which contains a plan of action for developing the commercial and economic relations with Russia in 2016-2017 (IPN, December 2016). This plan of action was negotiated in a non-transparent way and wasn’t made public even after it was signed by the Ministry of Economy of Moldova. The opacity of the document can be partially due to the fact that it favors the Russian interests rather than the Moldova ones. Under the ‘roadmap’, the Moldovan side will maintain its presence and will implement the commercial measures adopted within the CIS institutions (GOST standards, recognition of metrological measures, etc.).
In point of fact, the ‘roadmap’ gives priority to Moldova’s commitments in the Commonwealth of Independent States, which is a regional organization put on the top of the priorities of the Russian foreign policy. This causes confusion among the public opinion and also transmits contradictory signals to the European partners. On the one hand, Moldova meets with difficulties in delivering concrete results based on the commitments made to the EU, which were included in the Association Agreement (implementation of European standards, transposition of the European commercial regulations). On the other hand, it makes promises to Russia as to the participation in the CIS bodies. Evidently, the relations with the East are important, but these must be tailored to the national priorities, where the European integration is now given precedence.
3. Monopolization of political power by one oligarchic group
In 2016, the intensity of the phenomenon of ‘captured state’ didn’t decrease. This was just transferred to the control zone of one political force – the Democratic Party. This affects the public’s attitude to the EU, even if to a smaller extent than in 2015. But the EU’s image will always be associated with the ruling parties, even if the European assistance is provided for concrete projects (loans) or the public budget (rather through direct budget support). The situation can improve only if the EU becomes more operative, principled, precarious and pragmatic in relation to any of the Moldovan authorities (IPN, September 2016). Concomitantly, the EU should condition the reforms that diminish the monopoly of the political-oligarchic groups by stimulating political, economic and media competition. For now, the European integration remains a useful instrument for the corrupt governments. In the absence of political alternatives and of the risk of pro-Russian forces coming to power (IPN, December 2016), these political-oligarchic groups impose themselves before the EU, showing that they are ‘useful oligarchs’ and are thus compatible with the European course (IPN, October 2016).
The three opportunities
1. Unlocking of European assistance
The EU’s decision to unlock the European financial assistance by the end of 2016 is the major event on Moldova’s European agenda. It was determined by the signing of a memorandum with the IMF. This not only enabled to amplify the conditions, but also diversified the risks. As a result, the European officials approved the disbursement of €45 million in direct budget support in 2016 already, with about €100 million in macro-financial assistance to be allocated in 2017. The unlocking of the European assistance was presented as a success of the government, but in reality was a ‘lifebuoy’ given that the public budget is tight.
2. Transition to ‘more efficient’ conditioning
The EU’s obligation is to more efficiently manage the assistance offered to Moldova. This was suggested by the European Court of Auditors in September 2016. In this connection, the EU decided to renounce the direct budget support. During the next few years, all the efforts will be concentrated on the financing of projects. This could stimulate structural reforms (justice, public administration, energy sector, combating of monopoles) and actions with tangible effects on the people. At the same time, the more concrete are the projects supported by the EU, the more efficient will be the applied conditionality. The success of the European assistance depends both on the political will of the authorities and on the communication with the people, to which the EU Delegation to Moldova started to devote greater attention than earlier.
3. Global EU Strategy
In 2016, there was published the new EU strategy that defines the foreign policy priorities (Global Strategy). This document reconfirms the EU’s interest in its Eastern neighborhood and its objective to strengthen the resistance of the states from the neighborhood (IPN, July 2016).
Under the Global Strategy, the EU will contribute to the implementation of the Association Agreements with the Eastern Partnership countries, including Moldova. It is also envisioned more powerful interconnection with the countries that signed Association Agreements at economic, energy, digital and other levels by interhuman contacts. Last but not least, with allusion to Russia’s interferences, the strategy provides that the EU will support the rights of the countries that sovereignly agree bilateral relations with the EU.
Instead of conclusion
The challenges that crystalized in 2016 will become much more pregnant in 2017, with the presidency of the pro-Russian Igor Dodon to be particularly prominent. It is definite that Russia’s visibility will increase and the Eurasian course will increase together with this.
The European integration could advance only if the EU manages to impose more efficient conditionality and harsh pragmatism in relation to the government, which continues to be dominated by political-oligarchic groups.
Ultimately, without improving the political and economic governance, alongside reforms with tangible results for the people, and without adopting a critical attitude to the failures of the government, Moldova’s European agenda risks losing value in 2017.
IPN publishes in the Op-Ed rubric opinion pieces submitted by authors not affiliated with our editorial board. The opinions expressed in these articles do not necessarily coincide with the opinions of our editorial board.
