[Info-Prim Neo analysis] Somebody has kept us closed in a vicious circle that looks like a trap. That somebody does everything possible to convince us that there is no other solution, that it is better like this or that we ourselves are to blame for this state of affairs, when the rat got into a trap... [Two in one] The head of state cannot be elected for a rather long period of time. This means lasting political instability that generates immediate and long-term noxious social and economic effects that compromise every person’s chances for a better live and the country’s chances for better geopolitical prospects. The political forces represented in Parliament accuse each other of the created situation, but all they play tricks and make shows because such a state of affairs is convenient to everyone. But the people and the country suffer the consequences. The elementary logic says that if something happens or does not happen, it should be established who profits from this. For example, we can inquire if it’s true that a day in power brings the representatives of the Alliance for European Integration fabulous profits of millions and the millions are not only in Moldovan lei. The profits come no matter whether the country is in crisis or not. In times of crisis they come easier. We can ask ourselves why the Communist opposition didn’t do some simple things until now in order to elect the head of state if they say they promote the country’s interests. [One:] to vote in the ruling alliance’s candidate, as the opposition voted in the Communist candidate for the presidency in 2005, in order to ensure stability, prevent the chaos and mass disorder, as the then government and opposition assured. [Two:] to field its own candidate for the presidency, who should have gone through the non-election procedure for several times so that the legislature could be dissolved directly and legally and early legislative elections could be called. [Three:] to appeal to the Constitutional Court so that it confirmed what the opposition named ‘usurpation of power’ by the AEI so that early elections could be announced this way. The Communist Party (PCRM) did none of these things. Moreover, it seems that after January 12 it launched an ultimate attack on the Constitutional Court in order to remove any possibility of it appealing to the Court from now on, misleading thus society. The conclusion is that the current crisis is convenient and favorable both to the government and the opposition. The power and the opposition are not interested in holding early parliamentary elections and do not risk causing them because the same political forces may enter Parliament as a result of them, as it happened two times. That’s why the PCRM chose to return to power not by elections, but by the revolt of the masses that they incite against the ‘usurpers of the state power’ even if they risk becoming themselves real usurpers. The AEI chose to obtain a delay by legal, semilegal and illegal methods, until better times. Both of the camps sometimes leveled reproaches at the voters, accusing them of not wanting or being unable to make the correct choice, being thus responsible for the ‘permanent parity’ between the power and the opposition. But this is not the only common interest that the current government and the opposition have in the present situation. Their conclusion is that the configuration in Parliament as a result of new elections would be practically the same and this is not right as the preconditions are wrong, if not speculative and egoist. [Current MPs believe they will not be replaced in future Parliament] The political players represented in Parliament have the right to believe that nobody can replace them in the future legislative body, not because they are the best, but because they hold the legislative bread and knife that they use not to allow other political players, both parties and political personalities, to enter Parliament. The long political crisis points among others to the inability of the political players to unlock it. What do the given political players do? The perpetuation of the crisis is justified by the imperfection of the Constitution, but they are unable to amend the Constitution. At the same time, there is another efficient solution – to substitute the MPs with better lawmakers who are able to overcome situations of the kind and return society the chances that it loses now. But this cannot happen as the governments and the oppositions during many years take steps not to allow ‘intruders’ into what they consider ‘an internal, almost family matter’. We can say that the preservation of the status quo in Parliament, including in times of crisis and at unreasonably high costs paid by society, represents a common advantage managed by the power in concert with the opposition. The assertion that the two camps signed an informal pact may be true. Under this agreement, a situation will be ultimately created when there will be only two great political players that will alternate between the power and the opposition. At least this explains many of the behaviors of the current political parties that prefer to perpetuate the political crisis instead of allowing other political actors to come to power. There are two ways whereby the Moldovan political class may be renewed: a) to reduce the election threshold so that more parties could enter Parliament, and b) to finance the parties from the state budget so that the political monopoly established in Moldova disappears or diminishes. [Decrease in electron threshold is beneficial to everyone] The election threshold for independent candidates is now 2%, for political parties – 4%, while for election blocks – 7% if they consist of two parties and 9% if they consist of two and more parties. While in power, the PCRM increased these thresholds mainly in order to make sure that it will remain in power, allowing other political segments to enter Parliament with reduced representation. In fact, the party never wanted and was never able to cooperate with the then opposition. The last two years showed that the current election threshold is used for the same purpose. The disappearance of the Our Moldova Alliance from Parliament and the political arena in general, after the last legislative elections, is a convincing argument in favor of the thesis concerning the goals pursued by the ‘large’ parties that entered Parliament. This tactic led to the serious blocking of the situation in Parliament and society. The unblocking is possible only if the circle of participants in the legislative process is widened and this can be done by reducing the election threshold. Problems will be caused by the parliamentary parties that will oppose such a move, if they do not realize that this is necessary and is for the benefit of society and for their own benefit. If the election threshold is deceased and the number of players in Parliament increases, society will only benefit from this as it will be better represented in the legislative body. The electoral battles fought since the proclamation of Moldova’s independence are between the Communist and non-Communist options and this narrowing of views becomes a serious brake that results in blockages similar to the current one. Currently, Moldovan civil society is more varied, differentiated and richer in political orientations and predilections than its image in Parliament. A lower election threshold would encourage the people to abandon the principle of ‘smaller evil’ used when voting and to choose parties and personalities of different political orientations in Parliament, if they trust them and know them better. Thus, there can appear more political offers for society, much larger than those formulated according to the Communist - non-Communist criteria. A more varied Parliament offers more possibilities of constituting larger government coalitions, including by the number of seats. This would reduce, on the one hand, the dictatorship tendency witnessed among the components of the ruling alliance and, on the other hand, the blackmail used by the parties with fewer seats during many years, basing on the so-called ‘golden vote’. Consequently, a coalition consisting of a number of parties with fewer seats, but jointly with a larger number of seats than now, will represent society better, will be more democratic and functional and will ensure the renewal of the Moldovan political class and the overcoming of the multilateral division of society in general. Even if it seems strange, the opposition and the current government will only benefit if more political players enter Parliament. The PCRM must understand that owing to the irreversible variedness of society and, respectively, the social basis of the political parties, it will never be able to return to the status of only ruling party. This means that they can return to power only if they have in Parliament coalition partners whose political platform is similar to theirs. Otherwise, the PCRM will never win power even if it has the largest number of seats in Parliament for many decades on. The PCRM’s partners can appear in Parliament only if the party votes in favor of reducing the election threshold and accepts to diminish the monopoly that they hold on the left segment of the political sphere in Moldova. After so many reciprocal attacks and harassment, the components of the current ruling alliance cannot hope to remain for a long period in power, in the current configuration and with the current weight in Parliament. In the possible early elections, each of them risk losing seats rather than winning more seats and this is the general fate of the parties that are in power for a period. Every party wins a new chance only when new players appear in the legislative body. But they cannot appear if the current government does not realize the necessity of decreasing the election threshold. [Political-financial monopole made of ‘concrete’] The appearance of new political players and, respectively, of new chances for society remains impossible until the current system of party functioning is in force. Everybody knows that the party life in Moldova is managed by the party leaders who direct the financial flows inside the party. The money spent on party activities, especially the electoral ones, increased significantly in recent times and only a very narrow group of rich people, who are now called oligarchs, can cover them. They control the parties and the political and economic life of the country and do not allow many persons from outside to enter their spheres, if only they allocate large sums of money. This money often comes from illegal sources and taxes to the state are not paid on it. Those who invest this money usually want to get back more money, mainly from budget resources and money that do not reach the budget. The political life is monopolized by the oligarchs of every party, on the one hand, and by the oligarchs heading several parties, either in power or in the opposition, on the other hand. This vicious circle can be broken only by implementing legislation on the financing of political parties from the state budget. The current government, when it was in the opposition, recognized the necessity and importance of financing the parties from the budget, but did nothing to change the situation. If the election threshold is reduced, there will be a certain interest pursued by the parliamentary parties. If the parties are financed from the budget, we can count only on influence coming from outside the parties and even outside Moldova. Civil society sounded the alarm as regards the control held by the oligarchs over the political life and submitted proposals for changing the state of affairs and some of them were heard at official level. The financing of parties from the budget was envisioned in the amendments to the Law on Parties that was adopted while the PCRM was in power. But their implementation was postponed until 2012 and the current government postponed it further. Practice shows that most of the important reforms can be implemented in Moldova only at the insistence of the county’s foreign partners, according to the formula “money for reforms”. Though they earlier spoke about the necessity of financing the Moldovan parties from the budget, the topic did not enter officially the list of priorities of the development partners in the relations with the Government of Moldova. But there are signs that the situation may change because the last group of EU experts, who visited Moldova recently, tackled this issue when discussing the liberalization of visas. We should hope that the foreign partners will find more powerful levers than the current interests of the Moldovan political class to break this political and financial vicious circle made of ‘concrete’. [Valeriu Vasilica, Info-Prim Neo]