IPN Analysis: In a few months, the Gagauz autonomy will have a new governor, or Bashkan. What political and geopolitical perspectives will this change in power bring along in Comrat?

The Formuzal era

In politics, eight years is a significant period of time. Imagine that you are having a baby as a new government is installed in the country. Now as the term of that government comes to an end, your kid is already attending primary school. The point is, eight years is more than two four-year terms. Measured by the scale of independent Moldova's history, this is a whole era.

Aside from the level of local authorities, Moldova has had just two politicians whose tenures could qualify as an “era”. It's easy to guess that the first one is “the Voronin era”, whose party governed the country in 2001-2009. The second “patriarch” of the Moldovan political top flight is none other than Gagauz Governor Mihail Formuzal, who has been at the helm of the autonomy during 2006-2015.

As a rule, the replacement of a long-serving power is accompanied by significant changes, in terms of both political course and political landscape. We already know how Moldova has changed after Vladimir Voronin. Now let's try to envision what awaits Gagauzia after Formuzal.

“Stars” and novices

The governorship of the outgoing Bashkan is due to expire on February 15, and already on March 22 the Gagauz will go to the polls to vote in the first round. To date, two candidates have officially voiced their intention to run: the leader of the Gagauz Democrats Nikolay Dudoglo and the senior deputy of the outgoing Governor Valery Yanioglo.

It has also been reported that a third candidate could be Dmitry Krojtor, who governed the autonomy in 1999-2002. This has been confirmed by Ivan Burgudzhi, a vocal member of the Gagauz parliament, who expressed his readiness to support Krojtor.

The Communists' traditional nominee Irina Vlakh hasn't made any official statements yet, but her political and “charitable” activity indicates she will most likely enter the competition. However, after her controversial refusal to form part of the Communist group in the Moldovan Parliament, it is to be expected that Vlakh will run independently in the gubernatorial race.

The aforementioned names are more or less known in Moldova, and their participation in the race could be foreseen even a year ago. But this year, the list of candidates is expected to add some “novices”, too, who despite having certain political experience at the level of the autonomy, have never shown such ambitions before.

Such potential candidates include Dmitry Konstantinov, the incumbent Speaker of the People's Assembly and also one of Gagauzia's largest businessmen; Sergey Chimpoesh, a deputy of the People's Assembly and a widely admired Communist member among the Gagauz; Oleg Garzian, a former Gagauz deputy; the long-serving head of Chadyr-Lunga district Sergey Buzadzhi; and other activists and successful businessmen of the autonomy.

Faithful readers could expect this analysis to based on the premise that all the political processes in Gagauzia are being shaped by the competition between three main forces: “the Fromuzal camp”, “the Dudoglo camp” and the Communists. In this case, however, even a superficial look at the pre-election configuration reveals a situation totally different from what we've seen in the last few years.

In the next four years at the least, Formuzal is out of the public political arena. Other top league stars, Nikolay Dudoglo and Irina Vlakh, have lost significant part of their influence and popularity among the Gagauz. They have earned a reputation of being Formuzal's main opponents, but with his departure, they risk fading into obscurity as well.

Today, the names of Dudoglo and Vlakh sound like Bragish and Urekean in Moldovan politics. And their odds of becoming Bashkan are no higher than that of Urekean becoming President.

With Formuzal's departure, the Gagauz politics will become more intricate and unpredictable. To understand the new anatomy of the local politics, the expert community will have to learn lots of new names, study new biographies and research new relationships.

Balancing between conflict and war

The specifics of the Gagauz politics are to a great extent influenced by the relationship with the central authorities. Mihail Formuzal is far from being what one would call a loyalist. There were dozen of cases when he adopted attitudes or made statements that were met with criticism by the central government, but were in line with the dispositions of the autonomy's people. But he also refrained from going into open confrontation, until early 2014. Since he took office in 2006, Formuzal has worked under four Prime Ministers and in every case Gagauzia had social programs financed by the state budget. Subsidies, while being criticized for being inadequate, were always transferred on time.

The next Bashkan, like Formuzal early in his governorship, will unavoidably face a dilemma: wholly obey the machine of government, or act in line with the requests of the local community, whose vision of Gagauzia's status and role hardly coincides with that of Chisinau.

In the last eight years, we've seen that there is a way to avoid this conundrum: to constantly balance between a state of conflict and a real political war. It may seem that this option does not satisfy both the Gagauz society and the country's government. However, this line of behavior, with all its defects, is at the same time a condition for some sort of political stability in the autonomy.

A Bashkan that is too loyal to Chisinau won't be popular among the Gagauz, who will oust such a governor after the first term if not earlier. Conversely, an overly independent Bashkan who does not give consideration to the central government's position, won't be able to retain power for too long, this time because of Chisinau.

If the winner of the spring election fails to solve this dilemma and adopt a mutually satisfying course of behavior, the autonomy will be sentenced to political unrest.

Geopolitical dramaturgy

The third aspect of Gagauzia's political future concerns the existing geopolitical tendencies, global and regional. With the escalating conflict between the West and Russia, in particular the local “battle” for influence over Moldova, the Gagauz autonomy may become one of the hotspots of this struggle.

In practical terms, this will translate to a deepening of the openly pro-Russian course that the Gagauz leaders adopted after the local referendum on foreign policy. Regular visits by Gagauz delegations to Moscow, promises of exclusive discounts on gas, negotiations to push Gagauz wine and food through Russia's import restrictions, and many other issues intended to influence Chisinau into participating in Russia's geopolitical projects, all this will likely play a big role in the activity of the future autonomy government.

And even if as a result of Russia's current economic woes many of Moscow's promises could remain just promises, such a profound leaning towards the East will probably not remain without response from Moldova's western partners. Through various programs, Gagauzia could get access to European funds. Meanwhile, the authorities in Chisinau will likely link the Eurointegration slogans to a real improvement in the autonomy's financial situation. This won't go unnoticed, especially since from all the grants received by Moldova in the past, Gagauzia would only get disproportionately scanty amounts.

If we are to apply the laws of dramatic structure to geopolitics, after the rising action of the geopolitical struggle we are now witnessing, sooner or later there will a climax and a resolution. The play's main intrigue is whether Gagauzia's foreign orientation will change. Perhaps the next few years hold the answer.

Vyacheslav Krachun, IPN