IPN analysis: Does the recent meeting of Gaburici and Shevchuk represent a new start for really resolving the Transnistrian conflict that has been frozen for about 25 years or we witness another déjà vu in addition to the several others seen in this period?
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A rapprochement between the two sides of the Nistru happened last Saturday. After a pause of about one year and a half, Moldova’s new Premier Chiril Gaburici and the Transnistrian leader Yevgheny Shevchuk had a meeting in which they signed a number of documents, including an accord to extend the agreement on the movement of freight trains through the Transnistrian segment, and discussed particular problems that have waited for a solution for a long period of time. What should we expect from these gestures of good intent, how and at what pace will things concerning the Transnistrian conflict that has been frozen for about 25 years develop?

“Additional step for stimulating process…”

Prime Minister Chiril Gaburici was the first to answer this question, immediately after the meeting, through his press service. “We managed to take an additional step for stimulating the Transnistrian conflict settlement process,” he said, using a careful and equally appropriate formulation because the relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol become more active every time there is a new administration on one side of the Nistru River or another. In fact, this refers more to Chisinau as the Transnistrian region had been governed by Igor Smirnov for about 20 years. The only exception from this rule is the period when the administration on both sides of the river changed almost simultaneously - Vlad Filat was elected Prime Minister, while Yevgheny Shevchuk as the leader of Transnistria. The bilateral relations saw than unprecedented rapprochement, based both on institutional and personal contacts. This exception confirms the rule that the relations are re-set every time the administration is replaced in Chisinau and in/or Tiraspol.

Two components of a rule

The less noticeable component part of this rule shows that the relations in a period cool down again, returning to the temperatures typical of frozen conflicts. These days we may witness the start of the third cycle in the last 15 years. The first déjà vu occurred during the mandate of the Communist President Vladimir Voronin, while the second in the mentioned Filat-Shevchuk period. The political-psychological explanation for the beginning of these cycles should be looked for in the wish of the new politicians from both sides of the Nistru to deal with the serious problems generated by the conflict. This works for a period, until they are not burdened with actions and statements that the other side can consider hostile.  

However, regardless of their good intentions, the given politicians cannot make great progress in this respect for reasons that are beyond their control. The most relevant example is the behavior of the Transnistrian politicians, who whould disappear together with the definitive settlement of the conflict, and this is not in their interests and in the interests of their sponsors from abroad. The real and definitive settlement of the Transnistrian conflict runs counter to the purpose of the Transnistrian separatism, which is caused and fuelled by Russia. That’s why the regular ‘thaws’ have the same ending and the current ‘thaw’ is expected to end in a similar way.

The ‘Trojan-Transnistrian’ horse and establishment of ‘new world order’

Now, after a number of years, following the steps taken by Russia in Ukraine and in other areas covered by the so-called ‘Russian world’, the theses of the IPN analysis “Secret ‘Transnistrian book” of Russia, which was published on September 6, 2010, become clearer.

Then, Russia for the first time articulated the role it gives to the so-called Moldovan Transnistrian Republic and, respectively, Russia’s goals in this region of Moldova. In the festive meeting dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the breakaway republic, held in Tiraspol, Russia’s ambassador to Moldova thanked the ‘residents of the republic’ for their contribution to the new historical processes in the post-Soviet area. These processes develop and will continue in close interdependence with the laying of the fundamental basis of the multipolar world order that has not been yet fully established,” he said, noting that the congratulation formula was coordinated with the Russian foreign minister, which is the official position of the Russian state at the highest level possible. Thus, Moldova is sentenced to halved statehood, conditional stability and selective neutrality, when some of the countries are allowed to keep troops on their territories, while others are not. The main instrument used by Russia to achieve its goals in Moldova is the ‘Trojan-Transnistrian’ horse in Tiraspol, which is similar to the instruments used in Ukraine, Georgia and other areas of the former USSR.

Therefore, the relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol cannot improve too much as long as Russia didn’t achieve its goal to establish the new ‘multipolar world order’. Moreover, the relations between the two sides of the river cannot improve until the conflict is not resolved for good and not even after that desired ‘multipolar world order’ is established, because, why should Russia want to become ‘pole’ if it will have to renounce its influence on areas that it already controls?

Chisinau without alternatives

However, Chisinau does not have alternatives to the policy of dialogue, improvement of the general situation and solving of problems in certain areas of major interest because the actions of the Moldovan authorities are aimed not at the political circles of Moscow and Tiraspol, but rather at the people living on the two banks of the Nistru. It’s yet true that the Transnistrian conflict cannot be settled by the country’s reunification now and in the near future. However, for the reunification to be possible in a more distant future, the spirit of community of relatives, country and common society must be kept. If the two sides of the river distance themselves considerably, this would be a very difficult tax, if not impossible already. But an alternative to the rapprochement and building of confidence by supporting the free movement of people, money and goods does not exist if we want to protect ourselves from military aggression similar to that witnessed by Ukraine and take into account the final goal.  

The most beneficial circumstances

However, the current ‘thaw’ in the relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol occurs in much more beneficial circumstances that allow coming closer to the final goal. Here are several signs that show this:

1. Last Saturday’s meeting took place rather shortly after the installation of the new Government of Moldova and this points to the Transnistrian administration’s high level of preparedness for dialogue. Given that there wasn’t much time available for preparing a number of documents for signing, the ‘unconditional” meeting is the fact that counts the most. Furthermore, the meeting was held in Chisinau, not in Tiraspol, and not in a neutral zone. Given that the announcement about the place of the meeting was made several hours after the meeting itself was announced, we can deduce that serious negotiations on the issue took place and Tiraspol ultimately accepted Chisinau’s arguments.

2. Now the Transnistrian administration is in the most difficult political, economic and social situation since the appearance of the conflict, which is much more difficult than that of the Government of Moldova, even if this also works in conditions of profound and multilateral crisis. Tiraspol faces an unprecedented budget deficit. The strategic investors leave. The benefits, pensions and salaries are cut and paid with delay. The first signs of social revolt appear, but such a thing was unimaginable in the conditions of the Soviet-type control on the part of the militia and special KGB-like services.

3. The direct financial support provided by Russia, without which the Transnistrian regime will fall immediately, was reduced considerably and is transferred with delay;

4. Russia itself faces the  biggest system problems in the post-Soviet period at all the levels, generated inclusively by its involvement in the war in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, the almost full international isolation, the economic sanctions on the part of the U.S. and the EU, the profound financial crisis, the considerable decrease in oil prices, etc., etc., etc.. No matter how much Russia banks on the Transnistrian regime, it does not really care now about it And it’s not know when it will care about it, at least to the same extent as before the current crisis whose end is not yet seen. The Transnistrian regime lost a part of the support and of confidence in tomorrow;

5. On the other hand, the relations with the West, especially the massive exports to the EU, represent a safe source of income and certainty for the Transnistrian regime, but the continuation of the relations with the EU is possible only through Chisinau;

6. However, despite the profound internal crisis and the doubts it arouses in the development partners, the Government of Moldova was able to keep the consistent political and financial support of the EU and the U.S. and this is indirect support in the despite with Tiraspol, and with Moscow too;

7. The Government of Moldova only gains from the serious dispute between the EU and the U.S. on the one side and Russia on the other side, caused by Russia’s defiance of the international coexistence norms of the contemporary world, with or without its interest in a ‘new world order’. It is the economic potential of the opponents that counts the most in a long-lasting dispute and the result of the confrontation is sufficiently predictable in this respect. A small component of this ending could refer to the Transnistrian conflict in a settlement variant acceptable to Moldova.

Reunification under the EU umbrella

The Moldovan Government’s behavior, which is without alternative in fact, derives from all these: the continuation and deepening of the dialogue with the Transnistrian administration, maintaining and strengthening of Transnistrians’ confidence by offering real and multilateral support, maintaining and strengthening relations with the development partners, especially the EU, by implementing the real reforms stipulated in the Association Agreement. In fact, things can be formulated more succinctly: the country must be modernized by improving the living conditions, with the help of the Europeans, so that the people from the left side of the Nistru, who do not have such chances with the current separatist regime, want to reintegrate into an area where life is much better. All the circumstances are now in favor of this solution and it would be a pity to miss them.

Valeriu Vasilică, IPN