[Info-Prim Neo article from the series “20 years of the start of the war. When should we expect peace?”] The 20th anniversary of the civil war over the Nistru/Dniestr is approaching. This year witnesses, incidentally, a much more round, 200th anniversary of 1812 when the Russian Empire gained the Eastern part of historic Moldova that came to be also called Bessarabia, from the Ottoman empire in the Treaty of Bucharest. This also compels us to look at the historical events to get understanding and inspiration toward settling the so-called frozen Transnistrian conflict. In the last two decades people on both banks of the river lived with simplistic narratives of the short civil war over the river that for millennia used to be a frontier of cultures. Smirnov and his team, Litskay, Maracuta, Antyufeeev and many in their generation tried to build a Transnistrian national ethos from it; in their reading President Snegur aggressed, with the purpose of annexation towards Romania, the “heroic Transnistrian people” in March 1992 that defended its motherland with the blood of thousands and thus earned the right for independent living. Another layer of their founding myth is that of an equally heroic frontier role for the glorious Russian culture. Whereas it is not difficult to see from the right bank the manipulative character of this narrative that is thought in Transnistrian schools and is beamed in the media there, we need to understand that this indoctrination has had a strong effect on people in the left bank and also that it was based partially on certain crucial elements that are worth considering when thinking of how to solve the conflict. As an illustration for the role of the self-imposed ideological view on viewing the left bank, let me recall my quite recent talks with the Transistrian official in 2010 when we negotiated the freeing of Ernest Vardanyan. The several meetings we held gave opportunity to also discuss other issues and I vividly remember how truly delighted my interlocutor was of the situation in Moldova that elevated Mr. Ghimpu to the position of temporary President at that time. Any statement that came from Chisinau that could be interpreted (more often than not misinterpreted) as a sign of desire of belonging to Romania was taken with enormous pleasure. It is critical to the Transnistrian narrative to maintain that the Moldovan state has no future and it would be swallowed by Romania. In that context it is also important that they call the version of the Romanian language on the left bank, written with Cyrillic, the “true” Moldovan language and interpret the shift in 1990 to the Latin script as a sign of ultimate commitment to reunification with Romania. Perhaps to many it my seem paradoxical, but in this sense the interpretation of history by the Transnistrian leaders and ideologues does not differ much from the Great Romanian version of history of the region. Both versions want to stick to the perceived role of the Nistru as an impregnable dividing line of “two cultures”. Whereas it is easy to depict the manipulativeness of the above narratives of the events, it is important to realize that the interpretation in Moldova is often also simplifying and schematic. One needs then to take into consideration the complexities of the historical events that unfolded from 1987 and whose thorough interpretation with scientific honesty is still lacking also on the right bank. It is true that when President Snegur responded to the frequent violations of the official status quo with ordering the full scale attack in March 1992 it was already clear that Moldova started on the road of independent state building and the majority opted not for reunification. It is also true, however, that in this incredibly turbulent historical period when an empire dissolved (and dissolved largely peacefully to the credit of the historical actors of the last days of the Soviet Union) this trajectory was not clearly visible on the left bank. As my above example shows this development remains unclear even today to many there. Most crucially, when the conflict started in 1989, in Chisinau the Popular Front still enjoyed large popular support and itself escalated demands towards unification. That radicalization of demands opened later the political space to the formation of the Agrarian Party with an independent state building agenda. This element is missing from the Transnitrian narrative but the fact that the conflict started when the dynamics pointed to reunification is forgotten from the dominant right bank understanding of the events. In this context one also needs to understand the complexities of Transnistria where in 1989 certainly the plurality of the people were Moldovans and were clearly a majority in the villages. However, the most industrial towns of the region were heavily russified in the sense that both, the Russians and Ukrainians used Russian as their first language but also, given the importance of the military industry there, their point of reference was Moscow and not Chisinau. On top of it, in the heavily prejudiced and simplistic environment of the Soviet Union they looked down to the “agrarian” right bank. In sum, whereas the status quo is clear, the historical process leading to the stalemate lasting more than two decades is complex in which it is vital to understand each other’s perspectives and fears if one wants to solve the conflict. Things are, of course, not equal: Moldova has lived in democratic circumstances in the past more than 20 years and lately it has evolved into being the most democratic country in the post-Soviet space (after the Baltics that are by now deeply integrated members of the European Union). On the right bank thus interpretations of 1992 are pluralistic and most people rather escape into lack of interest than to succumb to any interpretation. But even here the honest investigation of this tectonic historical process is missing. In Transnistria the whole process of “creating” historical consciousness needs painful revisions. It could only happen in the context of a broad reconciliation and confidence building. Some opportunities now are there with a younger generation of Transnistrians taking over from the main actors of 1992. But this revision will not be simple and it can not come first. People, including elites, from the two banks of the river will have to start speaking at some point to each other on a broad front and have to be aided by honest, well-intended historiography generated on both sides, together, with the support of international scholars of similarly non-partisan, good intentions. What it needs on the right bank is patience and empathy that now, after the changes in Tiraspol, got a new chance. A wonderful and so far lonely example of what is needed is the Transnistrian Dialogues as Andrei Popov constituted it in 2006. It is exactly this kind of approach of bridge building that can bring people closer to each other. This kind of approach needs now to be widened and strengthened by donor support. Various “Transnistrian dialogues” need to take place. I took very seriously the Dialogues while in office exactly because I thought this, gradual rapprochement, is the only realistic way to achieve lasting settlement of the conflict. It is thus a deep experience for me as well as for all who participated how easily and naturally the understanding between the participants happened, almost regardless of their political colors. There will always be people on both sides who will not want to reconcile either because personal wounds are too deep or simply some enjoy controversy; but the large majority of people have a natural cohesion in spite of all the propaganda, often external, that tries to divide them. That is the basis for settlement and that should be now the starting point - reconciliation on the widest possible front. After 20 years of economic mismanagement and self-isolation, Transnistria by now needs this reunification even more than right bank Moldova. The population of Transnistria decreased from over 700,000 to about 500,000 with a disproportionate share of pensioners and soldiers and the region is now poorer than right bank Moldova – thus the sometimes condescending comments one heard in Tiraspol about “rural” Moldovans sounds more and more hollow. But reunification will only happen if the approach from Chisinau becomes even more one of tolerance, democratic rights and generous support, expressed in concrete initiatives in the confidence building working groups. The fear is there in Tiraspol about the fate of the Russian language; Moldova should signal openness for a future language policy in the region. The conflict started in 1989 on the basis of fear of loss of the mother tongue in public use of native Russian speakers (who wrongly also promoted at the time the idea of a kind of “natural superiority” of their language for public use). Whereas there needs to be clarity about the non-negotiability of the role of the state language, the specificity of the region needs to be taken fully into account. On the other hand, Tiraspol needs to signalize the dawn of new, tolerant policy towards the schools with Latin script on the left bank and it needs to do it now. Successful settlement negotiations with sustainable results can only happen on the basis of a wide process of confidence building between Chisinau and Tiraspol. Especially the young Transnistrian leader, Evgeny Shevchuk, will need courage to conduct this since not everyone and everywhere is interested. But he has to know that only this way, through reintegration into a Moldova that itself is integrating with Europe, his beloved region will be able to raise economically in order to improve the welfare of the population, impoverished in two decades of self-isolation. Chisinau has to ease this path through tolerance, good-faith negotiations and by treating people on the left bank as truly equal whose well-being they care about. Europe has its responsibility in this. It has to support the dynamic European integration of this poorest nation in our continent that in the last 20 years has shown so much European tolerance and wisdom in a broader region littered with much more violently played out conflicts than the Transnistrian one. [Kalman Mizsei, former European Union Special Representative to Moldova for Info-Prim Neo]