"After almost three decades of independence, Moldova seems to have a greater need in the diaspora than vice versa ..."
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Moldova celebrates 28 years of independence in the summer of 2019. During almost three decades of independence, the mood of the population has had a predominantly pessimistic inclination. The domination of the feeling of distrust continues to boost the survival instincts of Moldovans not only within national borders, but also beyond them. For these reasons, the role of the Moldovan diaspora is only increasing. Following the political changes of 2009, when the Communists were replaced by the Alliances for European Integration, the political class began to gravitate around this enlarged segment of the population for very utilitarian reasons, ranging from electoral activism to, more recently, the search for professional and integral human resources.

The priorities announced by the government concerning the diaspora fall into three dimensions. According to the ranking of Prime Minister Maia Sandu (Gov.md, August 16, 2019), the assurance of political rights, namely the right to vote, is in first place. The second dimension refers to the exploitation of the human potential of the diaspora, accumulated due to the professional and educational interactions, abroad. The third priority is focused on facilitating the return of the diaspora. Unlike the political rights that can be easily arranged, the other objectives require a strong will of the Moldovans from abroad to return, but also a capacity of Moldova to enchant. In other words, the evolutions related to political democratization and modernization of the economy, but most of all to fight corruption, must remove the existential fears currently felt by the citizens.

The Moldovans who left - economic migrants or diaspora?

Viewed as a whole with all Moldovan emigrants, seasonal or permanent, the diaspora is often defined as a large and homogeneous group of (about) 1 million people. This represents the third part of the country's population of 3,5 million, which due to migration and negative demographic factors has shrunk to 2.9 million, based on the 2014 Census’s estimations (See Table 1). The official, verifiable sources, however, divide the diaspora into the exponents of definitive emigration (101 thousand people) and participants in temporary (109 thousand people) and permanent (411 thousand people) migration. All these categories total 512 thousand people (“Diaspora-2025” Strategy, February 2016).

Table 1. The demographic dynamics of Moldova, millions

Source: Statistica.md. Starting with the 2004 population record, the Transnistrian region is not calculated.

In the policy documents adopted so far, the profile of the diaspora is strongly generalized. Meanwhile, the academic literature offers a narrower and more accurate view of the diaspora. Theoretically, primarily, the representatives of a true diaspora become those who are settled outside the primary place of living, symbolized as "homeland". Secondly, they are equally connected to the adoptive state and to the "homeland". And, thirdly, they are distinguished as a separate but integrated group within the adoptive society (Rima Berns-McGown, 2008). Therefore, a correct estimation of the size of the Moldovan diaspora does not exceed the figure of 101 thousand people. The remaining 400 thousand people are in the category of temporary or permanent Moldovan migrants.

Legal, deep or, conversely, calculated links with the neighboring state (Romania), built by Moldovans with dual citizenship, triples the identity of most Moldovans who live abroad. In addition to the diaspora or Moldovan economic migrants, they combine the status of Romanian citizen, with whom they receive the right to integrate into the Romanian diaspora. The exact statistics of Moldovans with Romanian citizenship have never been requested or calculated by themselves by the Moldovan authorities. According to politicians' speculations, dual citizenship is widespread among at least 1 million citizens (Radio Free Europe, April 20, 2019). Therefore, technically speaking, 1/3 of the country's population can easily join two diasporas at the same time.

The societal disposition versus the political-financial potential of the departed Moldovans

The persistent reluctance towards public institutions, caused by the quality of public services or the poor administration of state property, inevitably distanced the citizens from the state. Ever since the declaration of independence on August 27, 1991, according to existing surveys, Moldovans have not predicted the future of the country with an absolute encouraging sentiment of 50 + 1%. And the maximum positive was registered in 2005 (43.9%), during the ruling of the Communist Party, while it was shifting to the West. At the same time, the negative perception reached a worrying historical level in 2015 (88.1%), when the “theft in the banking system” overturned the political scene and propelled the oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc to power (See Table 2). Otherwise, the negative attitude towards the evolution of the country prevailed constantly - between 45% and 88% (between January 2001 and January 2019).

Table 2. Citizens’ confidence in institutions and the mood concerning country’s future, %

Sourse: IPP, Barometrul Opiniei Publice

The major drivers representing the interests of citizens – the political parties - operate with a bankruptcy credibility that has a demobilizing effect on voting presence (See Table 2). The indicator of participation in parliamentary elections fell to 50.5% in 2019, being the lowest in the history of the Moldovan participatory democracy (in 2014 - 57.2%, 2010 - 63.7%, 2009 - 58.7% and 57.5 %, 2005 - 64.8%, 2001 - 67.5%, 1998 - 69.1%, with the most representative vote in the first elections in February 1994 - 79.3%). The presidential election from October to November 2016 also remained below the level of electoral optimism of the 2000s, with 50.9% registered in the first round and 53.4% ​​in the second round. The electoral manifestation of Moldovans settled abroad, with live there permanently or are in economic migration, was always smaller than the number indicated by official statistics. Thus, out of the more than 510 thousand citizens who can vote abroad (the figure from the "Diaspora 2025 Strategy"), less than 100 thousand exercised their right to vote, and the most active vote was in the ballot for the president of the country, restored in 2016 - about 138 thousand votes (See Table 3). Based on the current electoral methodology, the differentiation of the vote offered by Moldovan migrants and members of the diaspora is impossible.

Table 3. The degree of participation of Moldovan citizens from abroad during the elections

Sourse: Central Electoral Commission

The dynamics of voting abroad could be improved, due to the return to the proportional vote, carried out by the parliamentary majority formed from Socialists and the ACUM bloc, in August 2019. And the idea of "voting by correspondence", multiplying the polling stations in the densely populated geographical locations by Moldovans (Italy, Russia) and the elimination of other restrictions, will supplementary test the limits of electoral participation of the Moldovan diaspora and migrants.

With or without capitalizing on the political rights, the Moldovan from abroad continuously pump financial resources into the country's economy, through money transfers, without which the income of many remaining families would become unsustainable. In 2018 alone, these flows (1.2 billion USD) constituted the eleventh part of the country's GDP - 11.3 billion. USD (See Table 4). These resources reach Moldova, both from the diaspora and from the migrants, integrated in all the statistical calculations of the authorities into a single group.

Table 4. Money transfers by the Moldovans from abroad

Source: National Bank of Moldova. Transfers in Moldovan Lei are excluded.

Expansion of state policies towards the diaspora and Moldovan migrants

The governments that worked between 2012-2016 intensified the policy towards the Moldovan diaspora. The program “PARE 1+1”, consisting of parallel granting of finances by authorities and external partners, for the new businesses initiated by the Moldovan migrants, returned to the country, was launched by the Government of Vlad Filat in 2010 (GD of 18.10.2010). Subsequently, the same government established the Diaspora Relations Bureau by reorganizing the State Chancellery (GD of 19.10.2012), distributed the responsibility for the diaspora, horizontally, to the central public administration (GD of 7.06.2013) and repealed the old structures dedicated to diaspora, created by the Party of Communists in 2005 (GD of 21.10.2014).

The attitude towards the diaspora remained on the rise during the governing of the Democratic Party (PDM), when the Days of the Diaspora (GD of 9.06.2016) and the Diaspora Strategy -2025 (GD of 26.02.2016) were established. However, a serious decline in the PDM's approach to the issue of the diaspora occurred in 2017-2018, when the rights and political potential of the diaspora were affected, due to the adoption of the mixed vote and the limitation of political-electoral activism - insufficient polling stations, the ban on financing the parties or prohibiting the use of expired passports (IPN, February 11, 2019).

The ruling coalition of the PSRM-bloc ACUM intends to remove all restrictions for Moldovan voters from abroad. In parallel, Prime Minister Maia Sandu proposes to create a mechanism "of cooperation between the representatives of the diaspora and the central and [...] local public administration bodies" (Gov.md, August 16, 2019). The renewed management of the Diaspora Relations Office (Gov.md, August 23, 2019) is to identify mechanisms that could transform the experience of the diaspora into practical benefits for the administration of public affairs in Moldova.

The triple need in the diaspora: political agent, "uncorrupted talent" and human capital

Called "diaspora" by the Moldovan governors, the group represents a valuable community, which has adapted to austere conditions and has accumulated professional and cognitive skills, without any help from the state of origin. However, this group was treated in the period 2009-2016 as a source of votes and a determining factor in the formation of the governing coalitions. The status of "political agent" conferred on the members of the diaspora was also visible in the political-electoral processes of 2017-2019, when the extra-parliamentary opposition explored relations with the diaspora to build external legitimacy. Maintaining this tendency is inevitable with the complete liberalization of the right to vote.

The search for "talent" among Moldovans who left the country is not a novelty, with a small exception. In the period 2012-2018, the policies for attracting the "Moldovan brains" from abroad targeted, limitedly, the graduates of the western educational institutions. Today, the approach to the diaspora goes through a subtle, though essential, revision. Specifically, when reforming the state institutions, Prime Minister Sandu expressed her interest in attracting "key professionals in key positions" among the diaspora representatives (Jurnal.md, July 4, 2019). The bloc ACUM has taken the first step in this direction, when it has included representatives of the diaspora in the composition of the government – the Minister of Economy and Infrastructure, Vadim Brînzan (the USA), the Minister of Finance, Natalia Gavrilița (the United Kingdom) and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, Nicu Popescu (France). The scope of this initiative for the time being is small in size, although the government feels an acute deficit not so much of trained personnel, as of uncorrupt persons. However, attracting the diaspora with political sympathies to the bloc ACUM can become a hidden hindrance to the true de-politicization of institutions.

The return of the diaspora to the country is of major importance for the restoration of human capital. However, while the economy is underdeveloped, economic migration must be viewed as an indispensable source of income for a large part of the population. For now, living standards and low wages feed the exodus. Education and health are among the vital services, but not the only ones, which determine the citizens to abandon Moldova. However, there are certain services, such as medical ones, which, because of the price-quality ratio, attract members of the diaspora, dissatisfied with bureaucratic constraints and other barriers existing abroad. The positive practice of the medical services can be spread to other sectors to trigger the re-connection of the diaspora with the “homeland”, preparing the ground for a possible return.

Instead of conclusions ...

After almost three decades of independence, Moldova seems to have a greater need in the diaspora than vice versa. Generally defined, the Moldovan diaspora unites several identities, including the association with the Romanian state. Besides, the Moldovan governments since 2010 have emphasized the role of the diaspora, but their concern was motivated rather by its electoral power.

In addition to the ability to produce votes and influence the power equations in Moldova, the diaspora is also gaining other types of importance. The government seeks professional and uncorrupt staff within the diaspora to make up for the non-discredited staff at home. Finally, both the return of the diaspora and the slowing down of migration will signal the crystallization of an attractive model of country development, which depends very much on the democratization of politics, the modernization of the economy and the elimination of corruption in all spheres of public affairs.

Dionis Cenușa