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| Dionis Cenuşa | |
With the investiture of the new President Igor Dodon on December 23, 2016, the European integration in Moldova enters an exceptional complementary stage. This is due to a geopolitical schism where the presidency has an external geopolitical viewpoint distinct from that of the parliamentary majority and the Government.
What happened in Moldovan politics until 2016 was rather uniform at the level of behavior of political institutions. In the period of the Communist government (2001-2009), there was a multi-vector political agenda, but this was always supported on the vertical by all the branches and institutions of the power. The period of pro-European governments (2009-2014), which was seriously shaken after the split of the oligarchic duo Filat-Plahotniuc, focused on the European agenda. Dodon’s presidency goes against this legitimacy and reveals a visible geopolitical dichotomy in the Moldovan political system. According to this, the President is Euroskeptical, while the government and the parliamentary majority are pro-European. This geopolitical pressure will influence the quality of the country’s European integration in 2017. The pro-European forces of the political institutions and those from outside the political system, namely the non-governmental sector, the mass media and others, will be tested to see how solid their pro-European convictions are. Evidently, nothing can change radically until the parliamentary elections of 2018, but the trends will take a more definite shape in 2017.
At the same time, Moldova’s European agenda must not be regarded separately from the ups and downs in the European integration inside the EU or the situation in the neighboring states Romania and Ukraine.
Ten main forecasts for 2017
1. Geopolitization of internal inter-institutional conflicts
President Igor Dodon will launch concerted actions together with the Socialist opposition in Parliament, against the pro-EU government. His mission will be yet impeded by the limited powers of the Head of State. The few powers can generate significant political dividends only if they are exploited effectively and at maximum intensity. Dodon will tend to block bills that are harmful to Moldova, in his opinion. He accuses the European/Western institutions of imposing these on Moldova. The presidency will clearly become the weapon of the pro-Russian forces. Dodon wants to definitively monopolize the electoral segment that sympathizes with Russia. The best way is to show that Dodon’s presidency restores the things destroyed by the pro-European governments. Dodon consciously ignores the fact that namely Russia shattered the relations with the pro-European governments of Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia.
2. Resuscitation of ruling parties
We refer strictly to the Democratic Party, which will use the geopolitical dichotomy crystalized with the election of Dodon as President in order to strengthen its positions and political image. It is yet unclear how synchronized the actions of Igor Dodon and Vlad Plahotniuc are or can be, but it is already evident that these will often be interdependent and will permanently influence each other. Furthermore, the Democrats force the extra-parliamentary opposition to de-monopolize the criticism that was earlier aimed mainly at the government coordinated by Plahotniuc.
3. Forming of coalition consisting of pro-European and non-system forces
Before the real or imaginary risks generated by Dodon’s presidency, the pro-European forces will have to combine forces against two enemies already. So, the extra-parliamentary parties with pro-European views will have to oppose the government led by the oligarchic groups and to challenge Igor Dodon’s presidency. The degree of attracting voters with clear anti-Dodon views, including the unionists, will depend on the success of this reorganization.
4. Geopolitical mixture of the public discourse
The public discourse will increasingly include images and information about the processes taking place inside the Eurasian Economic Union, presented in a positive light. Dodon’s presidency will ensure a permanent communication channel (political discourse), which the public opinion will be unable to ignore by sympathy or by disappointment and hostility. All the roads will no longer go to Brussels, but to Moscow. Such a perception will be imbued in the public opinion, in contrast to the daily realities where namely the Europeans offer support and seek reforms at internal revel, together with other European partners.
5. Intensification of dialogue with the East
An increasing number of contacts will be established with the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union as a result of Dodon’s presidency. The latter will be unable to obtain too much from the EU and will thus have to compensate with promises and different bonuses obtained from Vladimir Putin, Aleksandr Lukashenko and others. In fact, as long as the EU supports the necessary reforms in Moldova, Dodon will try to restore the Russian influence that is often incompatible with the spirit of reforms inspired by the Association Agreement.
6. Multiplication of Russian propaganda
Owing to the pro-Russian President, the Russian propaganda will become more accentuated as it will always exploit the episodes of inter-intuitional geopolitical conflict. Until now the information war coordinated from Russia, being focused on the criticism leveled at the corrupt pro-European governments. The presidency by the pro-Russian Igor Dodon will contribute to making the Russian propaganda more targeted and, consequently, more complex and efficient. Moldova will no longer be talked about as a whole, while the emphasis of the pro-Russian propaganda will focus on the parties, opposition and nongovernmental sector that promote the European agenda and its components.
8. Unbalanced European integration
It is hard to forecast a smooth road for the reforms related to the European agenda. Besides the existing structural deficiencies (lack of human, financial resources), the European integration process will be influenced by the pro-European governments’ attempts to cheat under the European colors (e.g. controversial law on capital ‘liberalization’) and Dodon’ attacks accompanied by increased Russian propaganda.
9. Parallel relations with neighboring states
Moldova will develop parallel relations with the countries from the neighborhood. The Government and parliament will have their dialogue with Romania and Ukraine, while Dodon will have another dialogue that will be fully distinct. The problem does not reside only in the fact that the presidency is taken over by a different political party, but in the fact that Dodon has (geo)political views that are significantly different from those of the government managed by the Democrats. Namely in this connection will the relations with Romania and Ukraine be directed. They will have different communication channels as importance, content and dedication with Moldova.
10. Cold friendship between the EU and Russia
The results of next spring’s elections in France will have a significant, but not radical impact on Russia. If Angela Merkel wins in Germany, there will be a balance as the Russo-skeptical countries prevail yet within the EU. Anyway, a cold friendship between the EU and Russia is possible if the U.S. unties the knot of sanctions, while the government in Ukraine does not deliver the reforms asked by Brussels. But the EU’s sanctions against Russia cannot be efficient if the U.S. leaves the equation or if Ukraine goes through the “Moldovan scenario”, characterized by the discrediting of the pro-European forces. Moreover, a cold friendship between the EU and Russia can be also forced as a result of the situation in Syria and on the market of hydrocarbons, where Moscow maximizes its benefits.
Instead of conclusion
The winning of the presidency by Dodon is not at all accident. It is a consequence of the failures of the pro-European governments. Regardless of the authentic and abundant support of the EU, the pro-European governments didn’t renounce the corrupt practices that they improved and adjusted to the realities, tailored to the new principles (transparency, accountability, etc.).
Igor Dodon’s presidency is also the result of a geopolitical reality where the Euroskepticism embraced by Dodon and his supporters gains more ground. The Russian propaganda, accompanied by the aggressive and even violent policy of Russia, contributed directly to the inflammation of the anti-European spirits in the neighborhood and in the 28 political hearts of the EU. But this is mainly due to the fact that the old political systems in Germany, France, Austria or the Netherlands are late in rapidly reconnecting to the changing and unfriendly local and European realities.
Moldova’s European integration will be put in front of a maturity test the next few years. The first tests will be taken in 2017 already. That’s why the EU must communicate more efficiently and be a reliable supporter of civil society in Moldova. The nongovernmental sector and media outlets will show their real face to the EU. The European integration of Moldova is possible only if this has sufficient local allies and supporters. Ultimately, owing to Dodon, Russia reenters the competition in order to win the minds and hearts of Moldovans in which the EU, despite the advantages, didn’t manage to gain strong support.
IPN publishes in the Op-Ed rubric opinion pieces submitted by authors not affiliated with our editorial board. The opinions expressed in these articles do not necessarily coincide with the opinions of our editorial board.
