IPN Analysis: The November 30 parliamentary election will be either crucial or catastrophic for the Moldovan state and society, and this is the first and most important feature distinguishing it from other elections. It includes a host of other particularities, such as the geopolitical overtone, the influence of the regional factor, the foreign interference, the emergence of new types of political actors, an electoral confrontation by the principle “all against one”, the unpredictability of the outcome and of the potential configuration of the government, the intensive use of political manipulation, the contrast between an overall peaceful campaign and fears of potential violent outbreaks, or worse, of a regional hotspot like the one seen in Ukraine.
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The first two parts of this analysis, published on November 25 and November 26, discussed the similarities and differences between the proclamation of Moldova's independence in 1991 and the 2014 parliamentary election in view of their momentous importance; the influences exerted by Ukrainian factor and the Romanian one; the specifics of the foreign interference and the emergence of a new type of politicians. This part will discuss certain distinctive aspects of the electoral competitors' behavior, potential configurations of the future coalition and how they can affect the continuation of the European course or ruin it.
Roles and plays
As remarked earlier, the campaign has been overall peaceful (at the time of writing). To what extent they were free and fair, this is a subject for another time. The political actors have plaid their roles in their own plays, and the common show has had little deviations from the script. Except maybe for some specific particularities that we'll examine from the perspective of the European prospect.
The Communist boulder
On the left side of the political spectrum, the upcoming election has caused significant changes in the most important opposition party, which is also one of the most influential parties overall – the Communist Party. Let me emphasize, without the November 30 election, with its extremely high bets, these changes wouldn't have happened or would have been less significant. Some call this process disintegration, and others call it purification and consolidation. And both are right. The first opinion is shared by those who think that the heaviest “boulder” should remain in the “political yard” of the country to dictate the rules of the game across the household, be it in the government or the opposition. The second opinion is shared by those who think that the era of PCRM's political monopoly is over and this is a natural process in a society that gets increasingly diversified and where each social group needs its own representatives in the political class and in government. All the Europe-oriented countries with a Soviet or socialist past went through such a process. The pluriparty principle arose precisely from the need for an adequate representation, and Moldova merely follows these objective processes. Better late than never.
The process is beneficial both for the party itself and for the society, because the defecting factions and politicians are now considered more radical, more “Taliban” than the previous Communist average. The society is lucky that these factions are less numerous and more dispersed, and to realize this is exactly so, it's enough for one to imagine the reverse proportion: the “Taliban” are many and making up the party and the moderates are few and dispersed. Sure, the Communists lost in numerical terms, but they won in terms of political maturity, earning the chance of survival and even development under the new social conditions that objectively will further change.
Those processes within the party were probably prompted by internal confrontations over what style and instruments to use in this campaign. We can judge by the recent defections – but also by the recent police arrests of people linked to former Communist leaders for their alleged involvement in subversive actions related to the elections – which point of view won. In this respect, Vladimir Voronin's merit can be compared to that of Mikhail Gorbachev, who ensured that that giant with feet of clay – the USSR – collapsed in a relatively peaceful manner. Without a Gorbachev, that process could have put the entire world in chaos, because after we've seen how the world developed in the following years, we can't imagine a USSR still together.
If not after this election, after the next one, and after all the natural modernization processes within the party will gave ended, the Communists – if they don't change their name in the meantime – could be considered a potential partner in a Europe-leaning government.
“European” chicanes and rivalry
It's possible that the rather calm atmosphere in the second half of the electoral campaign is due, among other things, to growing internal awareness and mutual understandings between the pro-European politicians, in particular among those in government, on the risks and threats of a more aggressive behavior.
Today, the direct threat to Moldova's European cause is coming from those who oppose it openly. During the campaign, we could witness signs and manifestations of all kinds from this direction, and the threats are still in the air and will remain so in particular after the election. One example is what yesterday prosecutors said was an averted attempt of “a violent takeover of the government”.
But a considerable threat to the European cause also comes from within the governing pro-European parties themselves. It has been talked on many occasions about the ill services done to the European idea by the brawls and settling of scores between the leaders of these parties. The political crisis that ended in the Filat Government's dismissal is a relevant example. True, the politicians say they have learned their lesson now. But the rivalry remains, it can be sensed, it only migrated to the subsurface and comes out to the public through agents. This is how things stood until recently, and the fact that the reciprocal accusations have practically stopped now, when they would have actually been the most opportune, demonstrates without doubt that those attacks were coordinated. Let's just hope it's not too late, because many wrongfully associate those brawls with the image of the European idea.
“All against one”
We won't discuss here how truthful those reciprocal accusations were, or about the right of other candidates to criticize and even slam the leaders of the coalition parties, we'll just talk about the impact of the unproven allegations on society's perception of the European cause, which they profess to be championing. Also from this perspective, we should examine a particular phenomenon seen lately. Until recently and for quite some time, we witnessed a strategy that could be called “All against one”. That “one” was a leader of one of the coalition parties and “all” were, albeit some covertly, basically all the rest: politicians on both left and right, “friends” and foes, clergymen, bloggers, analysts, journalists – all and everyone. Without giving names, IPN wrote on several occasions about this phenomenon, and tried to hold a public debate about the threats to the society's political culture caused by such behavior, inviting the leaders of the pro-Europe Coalition, which was successful only partially.
Again, without giving names, we could admit that that politician might be partly or fully guilty of everything he is accused of, in which case this must be proved and prosecuted. But we should equally admit that he is permanently under fire for being a powerful and determined figure who leads an influential political party. The easiest way to diminish the influence of such a party is to demonize its leader. The politician I'm thinking of gives the impression of a person very determined about Moldova's pro-European orientation, perhaps the most determined among those with capacities to promote the cause. Maybe we should ask ourselves if that politician is aware that coming closer to Europe would actually harm him if the allegations are true? Maybe we should also ask ourselves if those who want him out of politics understand that without his determination the European dream would take longer and be harder to achieve, if they dream about this at all?
Real and suicidal coalitions
The ongoing campaign has apparently failed to resolve in any favor the parity of the pro-European idea and pro-eastern one discussed earlier. This makes it very difficult to predict the outcome of the November 30 election. Difficult, but not impossible. It's likely that this parity will be replicated in the next parliament and then the fate of the European idea will depend on the capacity of the pro-European parties to negotiate and govern in a coalition.
This is also because at this point it's very hard to imagine a pro-eastern coalition. The Communist leader stated on many occasions he would not enter into a coalition with the “traitor” Igor Dodon and, as far as we know Voronin, we must be certain that's how it's going to be. Without Dodon, it makes no sense to talk about a coalition between the Communists and Renato Unsaty's Motherland, which Voronin also ruled out as a coalition partner. First, because Voronin said he wouldn't enter in a coalition with anyone, and second because Usatyi would be the first person for whom Voronin would definitely not make an exception. They are so different that such a coalition would be suicidal for Voronin himself. Such a coalition would be possible only if Voronin is forcibly removed from the helm of the party, but that would happen only in the event which the prosecutors called “a violent takeover of the government” with the clear purpose of reversing the country's European course.
A Communists-Democrats coalition would be suicidal for the latter, because they have the ambition to grow into a bigger and more influential party, and the pool from which they can get more voters and members is that of the Communists. Allowing the Communists, with Voronin at the helm, into government would be thus a suicide. For about the same reasons, a PCRM-PLDM or PCRM-PLDM-PDM coalition is also unlikely. Besides, such a coalition would affect progress towards European integration, because the Communists would not be both willing or able, given the specific of their electorate, to allow Moldova getting too close to Europe.
The more likely configurations are those already known: PLDM-PDM-PL, plus potentially PLR, PPRM, PAD, PDA, PVE or any other pro-European party that could make it into the Parliament. On the condition that these listen more to their self-preservation instinct and will be more serious about their promises to modernize and Europeanize the country.
And on the condition that we all can avoid the destructive scenarios…
Valeriu Vasilică, IPN
