"In the end, it would be possible to hope that the major objectives of the country and the existence of extreme dangers related to the war of aggression waged by the Russian Federation against neighboring Ukraine, but also the real concern for the fate of the people of Moldova, induce a plus of reasoning within the Moldovan political class, which makes it avoid internal destabilizations, but also not cut the ground that can ensure its access to power from under its own feet, which is a natural objective in a democratic and stable society. In Ukraine, gripped by war as the highest form of destabilization, elections are forbidden by the Constitution..."
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Contradictory opinions formulated by important opposition political actors on the benefits and risks of antigovernment protests for the internal stability of the Republic of Moldova have appeared in the public space. The divergences also refer to the capacity of protests as a method that the opposition can use to achieve its legitimate goal of gaining power in the state following the ordinary parliamentary elections that could rather take place this autumn, also taking into account the current regional conjuncture, influenced by the Russian-Ukrainian war in the immediate vicinity. In the article below, we will try to understand how much "reasoning" and how much "politics" are there in the announced positions.

PSRM: predominantly politics

The protest staged last Saturday, February 22, was announced and prepared in advance by the leadership of the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM), but the initial idea underwent significant changes, presumably also due to the "signs of political reasoning" that we will talk about lower. For now, we remember that the PSRM wanted as many opposition parties as possible to participate in the protest, but also in many other protests that it intended to organize "starting with February". For the purpose, the Socialists announced that they were holding discussions with potential partners. As far as we can see, not even by February 19, when this announcement was published, did the PSRM have confirmation of the participation of other political parties with weight. So, it had to limit itself to only a strictly "PSRM-ist" face of the first protest. That is why it was not getting ready to raise the party flags in the square of the Presidential Palace, where the protest was to take place.

We will return a little later to the provided explanation as to why an important part of the opposition parties did not accept the invitation. Until then, it would be useful to examine the proportion between "political" and "rational" typical of the main organizer.

Part of the failure to unite the opposition forces can be attributed to the general concept of the protests, which does not seem sufficiently clear, attractive and bringing particular political benefits. This also refers to the main slogans proposed by the PSRM: "We want justice and snap elections!"; “Down with the hypocrites, irresponsible persons and thieves from the Government!"; " No party symbols. We protest together, as a common social force"; "All citizens who want snap elections and a government that works for the people, not against them..." etc. The slogans seem to be too general, formulated in sophisticated and unclear language, but also insufficiently argued.

For example, why snap elections? Snap parliamentary or presidential elections? Moreover, the presidential election was held only three months ago and only about half a year remained until the ordinary elections. What is the reason and legal basis for the early removal of the current government? What is happening to the country and the population in a period of transition, marked by an acute energy crisis, for which the current government identified particular solutions and provide support to both the population and the economic agents? Will these mechanisms still work during the transition period and after the elections, if another government comes, especially one represented by the PSRM? Will the EU still offer funds for compensation in this case? Does the PSRM have guarantees that it will be able to replace these funds with others or with cheaper natural gas and electricity, under the current internal and external conditions? Do the sad events experienced by a part of the territory of the Republic of Moldova, when the Russian Federation did not want or could not supply gas to the Transnistrian region, suggest anything to it? Can the risk of a humanitarian crisis on the entire territory of the Republic of Moldova return in the event of a power vacuum in a transition period, caused by snap elections? Has the PSRM calculated well the results of the recent snap parliamentary elections and has it taken into account its own failure in case such elections are held?

And some political reasoning

Ultimately, it was only during the protest rally that it turned out that the PSRM pleads for a snap presidential election simultaneously with the ordinary parliamentary elections, but other opposition parties, as will be seen, knew almost nothing or even nothing about this. How do you invite potential partners without telling them what you're inviting them to? These are just some of the questions without clear answers, which other opposition parties, invited by the PSRM to participate in the protests, could put to themselves. They may also wonder if there is enough political reasoning in these political plans of the Socialists.

It is true that the PSRM also seems to realize the need for political reasoning in support of or outside the protests. For example, exactly one week before the protest mounted in front of the Presidential Palace, it announced extensive "political information" activities, during which it is presumed that they provided answers to some of the questions that the slogans prepared for the protest can generate for the population. During the Political Information Day, the party members distribute to all those interested the publication "Socialists", where there are underlined the party's position on the topics of major importance that concern the citizens, such as the increase in prices, and the PSRM's proposals to reduce inflation, social support measures, the situation in the health system, according to a press release of the party. Only that, other parties could naturally have an interest in another segment of the electorate, as well as other visions on the current state of affairs in the country and on recovery solutions. How much is it possible and useful for them to formulate them on a platform shared with a potential election competitor, after all?

The alternative: protests can bring internal instability, state of emergency and external risks

On the other hand, the representatives of the Alternative political bloc, one of the potential partners of the PSRM in the issue of protests, are skeptical about their necessity and efficiency and even point to risks both for the state of affairs in the country and for the political goals of the opposition to win the ordinary parliamentary elections.

Recently, this position was formulated by one of the bloc's leaders Ion Chicu, chairman of the Party for Development and Consolidation of Moldova (PDCM). According to him, the eventual finality of such activities as large-scale protests must be weighed very well ("rationally"?). "There are six months left until the parliamentary elections and I would not like scenarios that would maintain what is happening in the country or, even worse, would create conditions for destabilization and the declaring of the state of emergency to be applied," said Chicu.

It is presumed that this is the common position of the newly formed political bloc, and also that Ion Chicu could have the main arguments in favor of it. It may be that Ion Chicu learned better than others the lesson of his voluntary withdrawal from the position of prime minister with the declared purpose of creating the possibility for holding snap parliamentary elections, after which he personally found himself out of the political decision-making process, perhaps, for good. And maybe Mr. Chicu also learned the lesson of the irrational political behavior that characterized him previously, when he did not take into account the rational norms of political conduct and about which IPN wrote earlier as well. In fact, until recently, another leader of the bloc, Ion Ceban, chairman of the National Alternative Movement (MAN), could also not be suspected of observing too many norms in political communication. Now the political, internal and external situation makes them become more rational, at least in terms of the protests, which can also pose risks and dangers:

"Taking into account the regional conjuncture, of war, all the opposition has to do now is to convince the people in elections to remove this government," Chicu said, referring, perhaps, in private, to as many lessons of "political information" as possible so that the citizen can make their choice as consciously as possible.

And (geo)political considerations

This rational behavior could also be dictated by particular, not-yet-formulated direct political interests. For example, the Alternative bloc could avoid joining the protests initiated by the PSRM in order not to leave the impression of a second violin in the future electoral context, but also because it eventually sees itself not only an alternative force to the current government, but also to the PSRM, which in recent years has balanced between the first and second political force in the Republic of Moldova.

In addition, the leaders of the Alternative bloc referred only to the possibility of snap parliamentary elections, not to a snap presidential election. Perhaps because they did not know anything about this component of the long-term protest movement, planned by the PSRM, but perhaps they intentionally left it unattended so as not to facilitate the start of an early election campaign of the leader of the PSRM Igor Dodon, who could be one of the main contenders for the highest office in the state, but also challengers of the Alternative, now or in four years. 

This refusal to cooperate in the protests could also have geopolitical connotations, which have been accentuated even more in recent days. For example, last week the leader of the PSRM Igor Dodon was officially congratulated by the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on the occasion of his birthday, by a message in which the Russian leader recognized his "courage" and capacities of rational judgment "even in the most difficult situations". This move may denote that Igor Dodon is back in the Kremlin's good graces, after this role was held by the definitively convicted fugitive Ilan Shor, but also that he is attributed a more important role than before in promoting Russian interests in the Republic of Moldova. In fact, the paid protests had been Shor's specialty so far. Will Igor Dodon manage to get rid of this obligation that is somehow effective for the given interests? However, the Alternative bloc, for rational and political reasons, cannot resort to affiliation with the PSRM, including in protesting, because the leaders of the bloc stated from the beginning that they plead for "European integration as a major objective of the country", that they know that "we speak Romanian" and that "we have a war on the border".

In the end, it would be possible to hope that the country's major objectives and the existence of external dangers related to the war of aggression waged by the Russian Federation against neighboring Ukraine, but also the real concern for the fate of the people of Moldova, induce a plus of reasoning within the Moldovan political class, which makes it avoid internal destabilizations, but also not cut the ground that can ensure its access to power from under its own feet, which is a natural objective in a democratic and stable society. In Ukraine, gripped by war as the highest form of destabilization, elections are forbidden by the Constitution... In Great Britain, no elections had been held between 1935 and 1945 because the country was involved in World War II...