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| Dionis Cenuşa | |
With the victory of pro-Russian Socialist Igor Dodon, Moldova’s foreign policy risks having a zigzag-like trajectory. Even after almost two weeks of Election Day (since November 13), Igor Dodon continues to disseminate confuse and incoherent messages related to the foreign policy, which this will promote as Head of State. On the other hand, Igor Dodon promises to keep the relations with the EU intact, in particular not to undermine the Association Agreement. On the other hand, he confesses that he has a pro-Russian and pro-Eurasian attitude that he wants to extend and to implant in the public opinion in Moldova. For this reason, an uncertain attitude prevails in Brussels and other Western capitals as to Moldova’s foreign course and, respectively, the durability of the European integration (IPN, November 21, 2016).
In practice, no matter how pro-Russian Igor Dodon is, the constitutional provisions limit his pro-Russian geopolitical instincts that are consciously inhibited. Even with such limitations, he can initiate processes to gradually de-Europeanize Moldova. These can fully and forcefully materialize during his presidency, especially if the Socialists strengthen their position in the next electoral cycles.
The incoherence of the geopolitical aspirations expressed by Igor Dodon must also be examined through the angle of the balance of forces at the underground level of Moldovan politics. For now, the hypothesis that Igor Dodon’s victory is a product of strategic calculations of the current government remains valid. As, by using a very active pro-Russian President as a geopolitical antipode, the de facto coordinator of the government, oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc, can cement his image of defender of Moldova’s European course.
Igor Dodon’s opposition to the European project cannot be immediate given the leverages and links formed in the relationship with the EU in 2009-2016. The pro-Eurasian and pro-Russian objectives of Igor Dodon are thought up for the medium and long-terms and will be transposed when favorable internal and external contexts appear. By then, Socialist Igor Dodon will be in the process of political preparations, exploring the practical aspects of the EU-Moldova relations, without which the functionality of the state would be in danger. Socialist Dodon openly declared that Moldova must ‘profit’ (TVR, November 25, 2016) from all the assistance provided by the European partners.
The goal of the transformations, supported by the EU and acceptable to Igor Dodon, is not to join the EU, but to survive and to strengthen the state. This is crucial for avoiding the frenetic spread of the pro-unionist sympathies among the people, which now make up about 20% already. The final goal pursued by Igor Dodon is to convert the country into a close ally of Russia, while in the long-term – into a member state of the Eurasian Economic Union. Only in such conditions can Igor Dodon secure political power and, respectively, can ensure immunity and economic opportunities.
The possibilities and deviance angle of the European project in Moldova after Igor Dodon is invested President will depend on several essential circumstances: 1) bringing back of Russia to the forefront; 2) efficiency of the European agenda of the government; 3) weight of the anti-European populists inside the EU; 4) results of the ordinary parliamentary elections of 2018 in Moldova.
Bringing back Russia to the forefront
In 2009-2014, the Russian authorities took a series of actions by which they tried to punish the Governments of Moldova that developed the relations with the EU (initialing of the Association agreement in 2013 and its signing in 2014). In this regard, Russia maximally reduced the political dialogue with Chisinau, not vice versa, and included the European integration of Moldova in the agenda of the Russian propaganda. At the same time, the access of Moldovan producers and exporters to the Russian market was restricted, while the Moldovan products were constantly disqualified. As a result, the share of exports to the Russian market fluctuated depending on the politicized decisions taken by the Russian authorities, reaching in 2015 12.2% (US$241m) of the total exports. The volatility of exports to Russia was determined by the internal socioeconomic conjuncture in this country and the reduction in incomes caused by the decline in the price of oil, and the Western sanctions imposed for Russia’s actions against Ukraine (Crimea, Donbas region).
Given that Russia diminished its influence leverages through trade, by unilateral and deliberate decisions, Igor Dodon intends to create a favorable context for the return and strengthening of the Russian influence in the country. The most suitable method for Russia is for Igor Dodon to become the main intermediary, not the Government of Moldova that is associated with the EU and corruption scandals. Russia is itself interested in restoring the leverages that existed earlier so as to be able to support the possible geopolitical reorientation of Moldova when the pro-Russian forces take over political power.
Furthermore, Igor Dodon wants to pave the way for creating a trilateral front where the EU, Moldova and Russia would reach a compromise on trade-related issues. Igor Dodon was inspired by a similar format used in the case of the EU – Ukraine Association Agreement in 2014-2015. But its efficiency was null owing to the hostile position and approaches of Russia, which violated the sovereignty of Ukraine and the provisions and spirit of the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement.
So, before Igor Dodon, the Socialists and other pro-Russian forces could gradually renounce particular elements of the European integration, these need a more effective and substantial presence of Russia in Moldova. Any rapid move in the direction of Russia will be to the detriment of these plans and will provoke harsh public reactions. This thing was evoked by Igor Dodon (Interfax, November 21, 2016), who wants to avoid a pro-European and anti-Russian ‘maidan’ in Chisinau.
Efficiency of government’s European agenda
Socialist Dodon will have to capitalize on the failures of the current government related to the implementation of the European agenda. The more efficient the government is, the stronger will be the public legitimacy of President Igor Dodon, who ideologically is very close to the ideas and values promoted by Russia (traditional anti-West values, conservative society, tendencies of nationalism, liberal democracy).
However, from geopolitical viewpoint, Dodon, even if he is rather pro-Russian and pro-Eurasian, prefers to adjust himself to the existing context and this enables him to have access to European funds and know-how. It is evident that Igor Dodon tends to borrow the behavioral model of Belarus and/or Armenia, where there is a double game in the relationship with the EU. The same duplicity cannot be yet applied by Dodon in his relations with Russia because the latter will harshly penalize him and his party, using other pro-Russian parties of Moldova.
Weight of anti-European populists inside EU
The number of anti-European governments also counts for Igor Dodon. In the case of a more negative background in relation to the EU and the European project outside, his pro-Russian rhetoric will take deeper roots. Consequently, the possible victories of the anti-EU forces, first of all France and Germany, as a result of the elections of 2017, will create favorable conditions for the actions of Igor Dodon and other pro-Russian forces against the European integration.
Socialist Dodon noted on a number of occasions that he supports the reforms needed to rehabilitate the justice sartor, the economy and other areas without which the state can collapse, including under the pressure of the attractiveness of the unionist project. At the same time, this consciously separates the reforms from the European integration process related to the Europeanization of society, including by implanting the European values related to gender equality, protection of minorities etc.
Thus, the deeper the anti-European opposition penetrates into the European giants (France, Germany), the bigger will be the anti-European propagandistic resources that the pro-Russian forces will obtain in the European neighborhood, in particular in Moldova.
Results of parliamentary elections
The parliamentary elections, most probably the ordinary ones, of 2018, matter enormously for the feasibility of the actions aimed at bringing back Russia to the forefront, at tempering the European integration and, in the long term, at ensuring the entry into the Eurasian Economic Union. Before the elections, Igor Dodon’s mission will be to resuscitate the Russian factor in Moldova at the level of rhetoric and actions (bilateral meetings, political and diplomatic dialogue). Igor Dodon didn’t exclude the possibility of initiating consultative referendums on the country’s foreign course. Their organization will be yet synchronized depending on the share of his party in Parliament, which could increase after the elections of 2018. The initiation and advancing of the project to federalize the country will also depend on this. Without a majority of seats or a favorable majority coalition in Parliament, the discussions about a future federalization will lack weight.
Namely the federalization of the country, proposed actively by Socialist Dodon, can stop the European integration process. For the purpose, we need a set of mandatory conditions. First of all, Russia should get rid of sanctions and benefit from higher oil prices. Secondly, Dodon and his party should become the leader and the party with the biggest popular support. This means that the pro-European forces will be in minority. Thirdly, the EU should be weak enough to make concessions to Russia, including at the level of the relations with the Eurasian Union and with regard to the Eastern Partnership countries.
Instead of conclusion
Igor Dodon’s capacity to reverse the foreign orientation of Moldova depends on a series of factors. The presidential institution only is insufficient for making radical changes. That’s why the increase in the influence in Parliament and popularization of the pro-Russian and pro-Eurasian ideas are imperative.
Moreover, without a preliminary restoration of the Russian influence leverages in Moldova, any move against the European agenda will affect Igor Dodon’s positions, creating unjustified risks. In his opinion, the EU should be kept as a partner, but through the angle of the assistance provided for the country’s needs. The reforms supported with European money are no way regarded as a part of the European integration process as the entry into the EU is associated by Igor Dodon with the termination of the Moldovan state.
The de-Europeanization foreign and domestic policy objectives pursued by Igor Dodon are set for medium- and long-terms. These are strongly connected with the subsequent ascent of the Socialists, the general position of the pro-Russian forces in the country and Russia’s power in relation to the EU and the situation in Ukraine.
Ultimately, the political agenda of Igor Dodon is not isolated from the regional and local contexts. That’s why Dodon’s maneuvers will be measured by the internal political players (government and Vladimir Plahotniuc, pro-European forces) and categorized according to the foreign conjuncture (EU, Russia, situation in Ukraine).
IPN publishes in the Op-Ed rubric opinion pieces submitted by authors not affiliated with our editorial board. The opinions expressed in these articles do not necessarily coincide with the opinions of our editorial board.
