IPN analysis: Everyone has now their eye on the parties and politicians that launched a new series of actions aimed at forming a new pro-European government coalition in Moldova, including a new government. Many people want the new coalition and the new government to be better than the previous ones. In order to understand how many chances are there for things to happen this way, we should analyze the criteria used by the politicians. In general, there are only two criteria: the national interests and the party interests.
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It should be noted from the very beginning that the national interests and the party interests do not mandatorily exclude each other. In particular circumstances, their correct, honest combination can generate benefits both to parties and to society. We don’t know if this is true also about the historical period through which Moldova’s national interest goes now, as there is no certainty that the current parties and politicians have the capacity and will to create such circumstances. To realize what can happen as a result of negotiations that are to be opened this week and why, we must more attentively examine ‘the national interests and the party interests’.

From the whole range of national interests of the country, the most important one is now the need to adjust the standards in the economic, political and social spheres to the European ones so that the people enjoy living conditions comparable to those in the EU, including from similar salaries, pensions, rights and freedoms. Nobody says that the EU is the ‘heaven on earth’, but the European model now, at this historical stage, guarantees in fact some of the highest living standards for a large part of the population. The American model cam compete with the European one, but only partially because both of the models are based on the same ides. The difference is that America us far away and not only geographically, while Europe is close and not only geographically. It is so close that many people already understand that ‘we are in Europe and Europe is in our country too”.

The other model, the Eastern one, which we had used for over 200 years, had enough time to prove its utility, but was unable too. Actually, no country in Eastern Europe has living standards comparable with those in the countries of Western Europe and there are no signs that they will ensure such standards at least during a lifetime. We now reached the current stage mainly due to the old system. This is an evident fact that an increasing number of Moldovan people will accept in time, regardless of their ethnicity, spoken language and political and geopolitical orientations. The achievement of the European interest can contribute to the accomplishment of other national needs, like those concerning the country’s reunification and security, so that the European integration becomes an incentive-interest for other interests too.

PLDM, PDM, PL – committed or conjectural supporters?

The Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova (PLDM) seems to be sufficiently committed to promoting the European integration idea. There are a number of primary and secondary arguments in favor of such a conclusion, namely:

- it fuels its status of ruling political party and of leading pro-European party almost exclusively from the mass of pro-European voters. Such a behavior is a suicidal one and the problems faced lately by the PLDM are principally related to the shortage of confidence on the part of its supporters, who suspect the party of causing or of being unable to solve the serious problems confronting Moldovan society. The ‘stealing of the US$1 billion’ is the most relevant example. Thus, the party is punished for the ‘insufficiency of Europeanism’ or ‘deviations from the European model and pro-European promises’.

- In the context of the European integration, it went the furthest among the ruling pro-European parties in the rapprochement with the U.S. and NATO, to the extent to which this is now possible in Moldova. It should be noted here the establishment of the Strategic Dialogue between Moldova and the U.S., which was launched in March 2014, in Washington, by ex-Premier Iurie Leanca, who then represented and had the support of the PLDM.

- At the initial stage of the Russian-Ukrainian war, it had the most trenchant pro-Ukrainian position among the Moldovan ruling parties. The leader of the PLDM Vlad Filat travelled to the ‘Maidan” in Kiev as part of a delegation of European institutions and parties. It is evident that the PLDM made a clear choice in favor of the pro-European idea at geopolitical level, with the related risks that can come from Russia. In that period, IPN wrote “PLDM: Built bridges to the West. Burned bridges to the East?”

- The univocal pro-European position of the PLDM partially explains the less ‘noisy’ relations of the party with the PDM in the recent past and its ‘sometimes’ ‘very noisy’ relations with the PL. This happens because the PDM targets a larger mass of voters, including those of the PLDM, while the PL aims at a narrower, pro-European mass that is under the sphere of influence of the PLDM. Surely, the disagreements between the three parties are based also on other reasons, but the criterion of ‘common pro-European voters’ should also be taken into account.

- Though the results of the local elections of last month confirmed the pro-European mandate to rule of the PLDM, the fact that it lost positions in the capital city is probably the most serious warning that existed so far, including as regards the quality of the promotion of the European idea.

The Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM) continues to keep its centrist position in terms of the stake of the vote of a large mass of people, which is now under the influence of other parties. At the same time, its pro-European message became stronger and more distinct.

- The newest and most convincing argument is the status of associate of the Party of European Socialists, which the PDM obtained recently. In this regard, it outstripped the PLDM and PL, which have only the status of observer in the families of their European parties. The clear movement of the PDM towards the EU is probably even more relevant than the obtaining of this status at a time when the partnership with the ruling party of Russia becomes less noticeable. Such a centrist party as the PDM probably does not make such moves at foreign level accidentally.

- The main strategy by which the PDM attracts voters is based largely on the social projects promoted by the party. For example, the stake of the family as a value and condition of existence was the PDM’s ‘trump card’ in the last election campaign. However, the social projects necessitate a lot of money, but the country and the parties, including their leaders, are short of funds. For instance, we haven’t heard about the benefactions of the charity foundation Edelweiss, which is run by the first deputy chairman of the PDM Vlad Plahotniuc, for a long time because not even the richest people of the country can substitute the state in solving the social problems and should not do it because the danger of corrupting society is very great in such a case. In fact, it is a truth that the fresh mayors of Balti and Orhei, who promised to fill the local budget gaps with their own money, should realize swiftly. Surely, the gaps are so large that the money of the new mayors will be enough not even for ‘patching up’.

Now, only the European partners have a lot and concrete money, including for social projects by which the electoral promises can be delivered and the goal of keeping power can be achieved. But the Europeans demand reforms aimed at adjusting the living standards of the people to the EU’s in exchange for funds, based on the ‘more for more’ principle. It may be true that some of this money is appropriated by the rulers, and not only those from the PDM, by different schemes. In general, it is created probably the most powerful stimulus for the PDM to build up its devotion to Moldova’s European course. No money came from the East for Moldova’s social projects and will not come ever because those from the East also live much below the living standards of the EU member states.

- The local elections confirmed, in the case of the PDM too, the legality of the pro-European mandate, but the results achieved in the capital city represent a last warning concerning the real and efficient promotion of the European course, which is possibly a more serious warning than in the case of the PLDM. The PDM is also suspected and accused of complicity and inability to elucidate the ‘theft of the century’ and not only. This warning refers directly to the PDM’s capacity to ensure concordance between the party interests and the national ones.

The Liberal Party (PL) is the ‘most pro-European’ party of the three parties taking part in the negotiations and this is what their power as well as their weakness reside in.

- Since 2007 until now, the PL has obtained more or less stable results in elections, no matter whether it was in power or in the opposition. This means that it has a more or less stable, reliable, conscious, pro-European or pro-Unionist element. It is supported rather by the voters who abandoned the Christian Democratic People’s Party (PPCD) after this party’s leaders in 2005 cooperated openly with the Communists, betraying the democratic, European and unionist cause, as their supporters considered then. In these conditions, the PL cannot make too serious deviations from the European course without the risk of repeating the fate of the PPCD and its leaders. It is true that the altercations with the Civic Platform “Dignity and Truth” before the second round of the local elections could have contributed to the free fall of the PL in the eyes of its voters, if there hadn’t been the geopolitical stake of the elections, with the confrontation between the pro-European and pro-Russian vectors, and if the ruling parties hadn’t been suspected of being involved in the ‘stealing of the US$billion’.

- The PL continues to manage the capital city both through the mayor general and through the Chisinau Municipal Council, where it has the largest number of seats among the pro-European parties. It thus has the privilege and responsibility of forming the pro-European coalition at municipal level. This creates additional chances for the European cause not only at the level of the capital city, given its status applying to the whole country. It’s true that the chances do not turn into reality automatically and there is the danger that they will not become prominent reality during the third tenure of the PL either as things over the last eight years didn’t change much. Many of the supporters of Mayor Dorin Chirtoaca and the PL made such assertions before and after the elections held in Chisinau. In this regard, the PL’s victory in Chisinau has increased value as a symbol in the geopolitical confrontation, which is not less, but it is yet not enough for the European option to become deep-rooted in Moldova and in its people’s minds.

In fact, the PL’s pro-European preference brings less surplus value to the Europe integration process, no matter whether it is in power or not. The leaders of the PL may be right when they harshly criticize the leaders of the two ruling party, somehow selectively, but this act returns as a boomerang to the PL, and its performance in achieving the cause of European integration is also assessed because, in some cases, it didn’t have the capacity to influence the government from inside, while in other cases it didn’t want to become part of the government or didn’t have the capacity to do this  so as to influence things in the wanted direction. But maybe this was the party interest of the PL…

Negotiations as confrontation between party interests

The supreme political interest of the parties, including the Moldovan pro-European ones, is to obtain and/or keep power. They all want to govern and any other declared goals are either intermediary stages or political propaganda or perversion.

PL: the strongest and weakest position

From this perspective, the PL’s position will be the strongest one in the future negotiations and the party has the biggest chances to achieve its goals, for several reasons:

- the PLDM and PDM didn’t manage to go far, including on the path of European integration, within the minority coalition they formed. The PL kept the pause after the conditions it put forward in the previous negotiations weren’t accepted and the time turned out to be on its side. Form these positions, the PL’s slogan in the negotiations will be ‘everything or nothing’ and would be replaced in parts only with ‘a lot’ because the party or rather its leaders feel as comfortable in power as in the opposition. Mihai Ghimpu himself confirmed that he does not need to be in government as he anyway secures his presence in Parliament with a minimum of seats, with all the favorable and unfavorable consequences deriving from this.

- the harsh  precondition was already formulated: the PLDM and PDM should negotiate with the PL only, not yet with the Party of Communists (PCRM). The ‘major anticommunism’ of the PL may be justified by ideological reasons, but also by party motives too. In a narrow coalition, of only two parties, the role of the PL and, respectively, the possibilities of satisfying the party interests increase in geometrical proportion up to ‘everything or nothing’. In a broad coalition, involving the PCRM, if this accepts the pro-European course publicly, the PL’s possibilities diminish significantly. In fact, these return to their normal proportions for a party with the fewest number of seats of MP.

- There are signs that the PL can give up the previous demand to appoint a ‘European prosecutor’ , at least for the benefit of the country’s budget, which will be unable to bear a salary of €200,000 a year, as Mihai Ghimpu admitted himself. But the same signs show that the PL will be categorically in favor of distributing the post of head of state, with this being elected in Parliament. The party and personal interests reside in the fact that only this way can the PL claim to have its representative in the post of head of state. This cannot happen by direct election of the President as the ‘minimum’ of seats here is not sufficient. Without the PCRM, the head of state cannot be elected in Parliament, while the PL would reject the PCRM as a negotiation partner, not speaking about this party in the role of a government partner. Even if the next coalition is formed, it is easy to anticipate that this position of the PL will lead to a situation when the ‘motherland and the European course’ will be again in danger in less than a year, when presidential elections will take place.

PDM has no variants to lose

There are also no reasons for the PDM to make is position milder for two reasons.

- First of all, the PDM would feel as comfortable, if not more comfortable, in a coalition without the PL, which behaves like a capricious child. The PCRM-PDM-PLDM format would ensure a greater degree of psychological comfort to it, while the discomfort in the less unachievable, but not unreal coalition between the Party of Socialists (PSRM), PCRM and PDM may not be very great too. By the capacities is possesses, the PDM will be anytime able to shift the blame for the thwarting of the European course onto the PLDM and PL. For now yet, the biggest interest of the PDM can be satisfied by a clear pro-European coalition.

- Secondly, the PDM sees itself as the most important party in Moldova – a kind of mega-party or PCRM-2 - in the not too distant future, and the concessions made to the PL, even if for a short period of time, would run counter to these goals. Making concessions by the PLDM, in terms of ‘spheres of influence’, would be the only fact that the PDM would accept.

PLDM aspiring for better times

The PLDM’s position will be dictated by the goal of going through the coming period without other losses, up to better times. The PLDM can thus have to concede in the negotiations what the PDM is unwilling to concede and what the PL may ask directly or even asked for – to allow the not yet registered party of Iurie Leanca to take part in the talks and to distribute posts to it, evidently also from the PLDM’s ‘portfolio’.

For the aforementioned reasons and because the PLDM bears a greater real responsibility for the fate of the European integration, the future pro-European coalition could be formed mainly based on the PLDM’s concessions. Maybe this was what the author of the set of theses entitled “Sunday. Mission impossible”, which was published by IPN before the runoff vote in Chisinau and which contains all the possible variants of the PLDM’s decimation, meant.

Valeriu Vasilică, IPN