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| Anatol Țăranu | |
In accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Moldova, a presidential election is to be held this autumn. According to estimates made by experts in electoral legislation, the presidential election will take place in mid or late October, taking into account the date of December 24, when the tenure of incumbent President Maia Sandu expires. The precise date of the ballot is to be set by the Parliament and a constitutional referendum on the European integration of the Republic of Moldova is to be held concurrently.
Unexpected advances and obvious rating declines
The presidential election and the referendum will take place against the background of the Republic of Moldova’s spectacular progress on the path of formalized accession to the EU, with the government in Chisinau reaching the stage of opening of accession negotiations. Three years ago, such a performance wouldn’t have been part of even the most optimistic expectation. At the same time, this institutional success is not correlated with the improvement of the population’s living standards. In these three years of governance by President Maia Sandu and the pro-presidential PAS party, the Republic of Moldova’s economy has been severely affected by the pandemic crisis, but even more by the consequences of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, and energy security challenges have put even more pressure on the authorities in Chisinau and the social condition of most of the state’s citizens.
The major economic and social problems amplified by the delay of the justice sector reform, by the precariousness of the staff policy, combined with poor public communication, have led to the situation in which PAS, the government and with them the President pay the bills at the price of reputation and declining political ratings. Even if President Sandu continues to fully enjoy the reputation of incorruptibility and modesty, her team is blamed for the fact that the country was forced to buy expensive gas due to poor management of the energy sector, but also for poor competence in administering several other areas. Even the dismissal of Natalia Gavrilița’s Cabinet didn’t radically change the public perception of governance. According to the latest polls, only 20-25% of the electors are now ready to vote for the ruling party, while in 2021 the party won the elections with 53% of the ballot. The categorical decline in the government’s rating is obvious.
Unguaranteed supremacy and rival from pro-Russian camp
Under these circumstances, President Maia Sandu announced her participation in the competition for a new presidential term, all polls showing her to be the favorite of the upcoming election. However, the multiple and complex developments on the Moldovan political arena suggest that Maia Sandu’s “supremacy” in the presidential election of this autumn is not guaranteed. This finding remains valid even though an opponent capable of seriously challenging her success in the presidential election hasn’t yet appeared.
Maia Sandu’s principled rival in the upcoming election will obviously emerge from the camp of pro-Russian political forces, which for now are still trying to combine forces in order to conquer the Moldovan presidency and propel the thwarting of the Republic of Moldova’s European course through this path. But now these forces remain dispersed and are fighting each other to become “the Kremlin’s electoral stake” in Moldova in view of the presidential election of 2024, but especially the parliamentary ones of 2025. Among the candidates of the pro-Russian and anti-European parties, former President Igor Dodon, former Bashkan of Gagauzia Irina Vlah and former Dodonist Prime Minister Ion Chicu are most often mentioned. Polls say that at the moment none of these potential pro-Russian candidates poses a critical electoral danger to Maia Sandu.
In the community of experts, but also in the general public, the current mayor of Chisinau, Ion Ceban, is often mentioned as a potential candidate of the pro-Russian presidential parties since he has more and more insistently disguised himself in pro-European clothes in the recent past. The accusations of being a “Trojan horse” in the pro-European camp, made against the mayor of Chisinau, seem to be plausible if we remember Ion Ceban’s tacit cooperation with the pro-Russian parties in the Chisinau elections, when they did not put forward any strong opponent against the current mayor, thus guaranteeing his victory in the first round. A repeat of this tactic at the presidential election will put in the ‘useful idiot’ situation the European Social Democratic Party, which politically flirts with mayor Ceban’s party, but also decision-makers in Romania, who are engaged in polishing the image of this controversial political actor from Moldova beyond the Prut River.
Necessary electoral debates
The major unsolvable economic and social problems faced by Moldovan society during the independence period create the necessary preconditions for launching electoral debates in both of the national elections – the presidential election of 2024 and the parliamentary elections of 2025 - on the ways for Moldova to join the European Union. It goes to the Euro-sovereignist path that can be put into practice by opening accession negotiations and by subsequently joining the EU as a sovereign state or the option of accession to the EU on a ‘shortcut’ (the Euro-unionist path) by restoring Romanian national unity through the Union of the Republic of Moldova with Romania. In both cases, a national consensus is needed, but this is now absent at the societal level. This consensus cannot be achieved without a broad debate in society, the elections being one of the most prolific paths for launching such debates.
The Euro-sovereignist option at this year’s presidential election is politically represented by Maia Sandu and the PAS party, but the emergence of alternative contenders launched within the “triple alliance” – PPDA – LOC – Party of Change – is expected on this segment. For now, the newly formed political alliance of pro-European parties in opposition to PAS hasn’t clearly announced its way of participating in the presidential election and is to identify its own candidate for the election. In this connection, we should remember the public statements that were previously made by Octavian Țâcu, who together with two of his colleagues announced the creation of a unionist platform in support of PPDA and who made clear his determination to field himself as a presidential candidate from unionist positions. We will see if the alliance of parties to which PPDA belongs will also agree to support a unionist candidate.
Other possible candidates
The leader of the CUB party Igor Munteanu can appear as a presidential candidate on the Europeanist line, in opposition to Maia Sandu. He is one of the most vocal critics of the incumbent President, who even speaks about her accidental election as head of state. Former foreign minister Tudor Ulianovschi, who recently made a tour on TV channels and presented himself with a message on the need for a major improvement of governance, could also enter the presidential campaign on the same segment.
Particular indices point to increased but not yet publicly announced efforts to create and strengthen a Euro-unionist political pole, which will most likely also aim to contend in the presidential election with its own candidate. Polls talk about the presence in Moldovan society of a segment of over 30% of citizens with assumed Romanian identity consciousness and supporters of the Republic of Moldova’s accession to the EU through the union with Romania. The lack of direct political representation of this segment is already becoming exasperating for the natural manifestation of the representative democratic process in Moldovan society.
Only exemplary mobilization of Europeanist electorate
In the previous presidential and parliamentary elections, the unionist electorate, disappointed by the lack of a unified Euro-unionist political force and a charismatic leader, voted in a mobilized way for Maia Sandu and the PAS party. However, given the erosion of the electoral image of the current government, there is disappointment on this electoral segment with the results of the policies pursued with the risk of increasing electoral absenteeism.
In these circumstances, an aspirant to the office of President with a trenchant and assumed political unionist message is expected to appear on the Romanian identity segment of Moldovan society. The presence in the election campaign of a strong and credible Euro-unionist message will guarantee the robust mobilization of the unionist electoral segment in the first round of the presidential election, as well as the victory of the Europeanist candidate in the runoff vote. Only an exemplary mobilization of the Europeanist electorate in the Republic of Moldova, a considerable part of which is represented by Euro-unionists, is able to stop the rise of anti-European forces operating according to the scenario of Moscow’s hybrid war against the Moldovan state.
IPN publishes in the Op-Ed rubric opinion pieces submitted by authors not affiliated with our editorial board. The opinions expressed in these articles do not necessarily coincide with the opinions of our editorial board.
