"Without such an information and consultation process to ensure broad support for future actions or inactions, the current government has an uncertain future, just as the country's European path..."
The topic of the participation of residents from the eastern region in the general elections of the Republic of Moldova is not new, as it dates back to the initial period of the establishment of the separatist regime in that area, with the illegal and multilateral support of the Russian Federation. However, since then, the two general frameworks in which the discussion takes place - whether this participation constitutes a benefit or, on the contrary, a danger for the fate of the Republic of Moldova - have undergone a significant evolution, or rather, a pronounced involution, both in parallel.
About the benefits
On the one hand, this participation seems to be an obvious benefit, as it remains one of the few official manifestations of the relationship between the people in the region and the "Motherland," the Republic of Moldova. Unofficial, individual relations are more numerous and span various areas throughout the Transnistrian conflict, which demonstrates the strictly political or, more precisely, geopolitical nature of the conflict. Breaking even these few official relationships seems detrimental to the reintegration process of the country, even in a more distant future.
At the same time, participation in elections reflects but may also stimulate certain qualitative changes within the society in the region over time. Thus, if in the 2020 presidential election Transnistrian voters cast 74.25% of their votes for the self-declared pro-Russian Igor Dodon and only 13.34% for the pro-European Maia Sandu, in last year's presidential elections the gap between the "less pro-European" candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo and the pro-European Maia Sandu significantly narrowed: 35.41% for Alexandr Stoianoglo vs. 25.21% for Maia Sandu. Trends can also be seen in the fact that in the 2024 presidential election, more voters from the Transnistrian region participated than in 2020, and more than in all previous elections since Independence. Also, in the referendum, voters from the region supported the inclusion of the European option in the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova with 37.44%, surpassing the level of many districts on the right bank of the Dniester, whose population has benefited from numerous social projects funded by European money for several decades.
It is true that these trends are more significant in terms of quality than quantity, as the pro-European votes of Transnistrians last year oscillated between five thousand and six thousand voters, out of a total of over one million six hundred thousand participants in the elections last year, for example.
Why the danger?
On the other hand, the participation of Transnistrian voters seems to represent a risk or even a major danger, as it compromises the electoral process, which involves not only placing the ballot in the box on election day but also many other components to which they do not have access: to truthful information about candidates and their electoral platforms, to media that reflect electoral campaigns, to electoral debates and displays, and to many other components of a quality electoral process according to international standards. These standards are established in the official acts of the Republic of Moldova, as well as by international bodies, such as the "Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters" by the Venice Commission, which insists that democratic elections must be necessarily free, fair, secret, and universal.
Thus, electoral rights, as the foundation of democracy, remain unknown, unrecognized, and unrealized by the vast majority of citizens of the Republic of Moldova, residents of Transnistria, partly also for those who do manage to reach polling stations. And all of this happens because the secessionist administration prohibits any electoral activities on the territory of the region within elections organized by the constitutional authorities for over three decades.
This form of "blind" voting compromises the quality of governance in the Republic of Moldova and the overall quality of the state. But the degree of compromise is one if we assume that this category of voters votes independently, based on intuition or by consulting relatives more versed in electoral matters from the right bank of the Dniester, for example. And it is entirely dangerous when a large part of the region's voters is transported to polling stations in an organized manner, but contrary to electoral legislation, in exchange for money and with precise instructions on whom to vote for.
The case on the bridge between Rezina and Rîbnița, reported by the press on the second round of last year's presidential election, is relevant enough, but not the only such instance. In such cases, we can certainly talk about compromising national security in all its manifestations, including social, political, economic, defense, civilizational, etc. This is a reality confirmed by almost all national and international election monitoring missions in the Republic of Moldova for at least a decade, a reality confirmed by the Constitutional Court, in particular, after the 2016 presidential elections.
Unprecedented cumulative attack
The level of such danger has significantly increased in recent years, peaking in the presidential elections and constitutional referendum last year, when a cumulative attack occurred on the electoral process in the Republic of Moldova, both from within and outside the country. Along with the illegal, organized transportation of voters, including from the Transnistrian region, there were external interferences "from the Russian Federation, which negatively influenced the electoral process in the Republic of Moldova".
According to the Civic Coalition for Free and Fair Elections, which gathers a number of NGOs specialized in electoral matters, these actions manifested through "illegal financing of electoral campaigns, voter bribery, and disinformation campaigns, all intended to influence the electoral behavior of citizens. The clandestine support offered to a subversive network and the involvement of an unregistered political organization in electoral mobilization activities had a major impact on the fairness of the electoral process." To complete the picture, we would also add the mass illegal transportation of Moldovan voters from the Russian Federation to polling stations in Belarus, Turkey, and Azerbaijan, according to authorities and the press.
Last year's attack reached unprecedented proportions, demonstrating the existence of major obscure interests of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Moldova. Authorities and experts suggest that Russia is preparing for the upcoming parliamentary elections in Moldova, which will take place this year, the next episode of interferences with the same goal of destabilizing the situation in the country. At this stage, the "fragment" of the interruption of gas supplies to the Transnistrian region, in violation of contractual provisions and international regulations in this field, is brought into focus. The goal of this "fragment" is to trigger large social discontent on both banks of the Dniester, which will strike the current government and facilitate the rise to power of pro-Russian political forces, thus halting the European path of the Republic of Moldova and bringing the country back under Russian influence.
As can be concluded, the action takes place in full collusion with the leaders of the separatist regime in Tiraspol, who have been assigned the role of executing Russia's plans in relations with the constitutional authorities in Chișinău, but also with the population of the region to channel its dissatisfaction "in the right direction." In such an ambitious scenario, it is expected that the leaders in Tiraspol will provide full assistance for the organized transportation of an unprecedented number of voters from the region with Moldovan citizenship, as well as various incentives and instructions on which electoral actors to vote for. This assumption is supported by the authoritarian nature of the regime, under whose control no one has succeeded in organizing Transnistrian voters to reach polling stations in the Republic of Moldova until now.
At a crossroads of decisions
In such conditions, the authorities in Chisinau are obliged to anticipate and counter such scenarios. For this, they have two options: reactive or proactive. The reactive option is more familiar, being used more often, including to avoid conflicts and destabilizations greater than those they would seek to avoid.
However, the increased level of threats at this stage forces them to more strongly accept the proactive option. One of the ways suggested by certain experts is to suspend the right to vote for residents of the Transnistrian region to counter the scenario of their organized transportation in unprecedented proportions, for example, from 100,000 to 200,000, compared to the maximum number of voters from the region, which has been around 16,000 until now.
This proposal has both supporters' praise and opponents' criticism. Therefore, it is appropriate to analyze both the pros and cons or, according to the title, the benefits and dangers.
Before examining these, a few general clarifications that may be useful to readers less familiar with the situation surrounding the Transnistrian conflict. As mentioned, the separatist regime prohibits any electoral activities on the territory controlled by the Republic of Moldova. Since the majority of the approximately 300,000 residents of the region also hold Moldovan citizenship, Chisinau has always organized polling stations in the territory controlled by the constitutional authorities, where Transnistrians can exercise their right to vote. Naturally, these polling stations are located at greater distances, so voters are forced to use various means of transport to reach them. Certain actors interested in influencing the election results take advantage of these circumstances by violating Moldova's electoral legislation in at least two ways: they organize the transportation of voters and bribe them with certain rewards, usually financial. Since it is expected that Russia will be heavily involved in this process for the upcoming parliamentary elections, through the instrument of the secessionist administration in the region, the proposal to suspend the voting right should be considered in the broader context of Russian interferences and threats. Consideration should also be given to recent threats with the disintegration of the Republic of Moldova made by Nicolai Patrusev, currently an adviser to Russian President Vladimir Putin and former Secretary of the Russian Security Council.
About the legal aspect
First, regarding the legal aspect of suspending the vote. International norms stipulate that elections cannot be held in occupied territories, and the Transnistrian region is recognized as occupied by the Russian Federation, which maintains military troops in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova without the host country's consent (not to be confused with Russian military forces that are part of the peacekeeping mechanism, legally present in the Security Zone of the conflict). This qualification was assigned by the Constitutional Court through its decision in 2017, a status confirmed by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and the European Court of Human Rights, which has repeatedly confirmed Russia's role as a party guilty of many unlawful acts committed by the separatist administration in the region. Both the Constitutional Court and the Venice Commission admit that in such cases, the right to vote is not absolute and may be restricted.
There is only one legal path for such a restriction. The Parliament must introduce amendments to the Electoral Code. This might conflict with the norm according to which changes can be made no later than one year before the elections, which are expected to take place this summer or autumn. Parliament and the authorities as a whole have the right to use national security threats as an argument to override this norm. However, even from a legislative perspective, things must be viewed in their entirety. Eventually, the amendments should include references to the dangers posed by the Russian-Ukrainian war in the country's immediate vicinity, as well as Russia's hybrid war against the Republic of Moldova, which is frequently mentioned but does not yet seem to be present in the legislation.
Action and adverse reaction
Also in the context of foreign dangers and from a legislative perspective, the proposal to suspend the opening of polling stations in the Russian Federation and Belarus deserves consideration, as there are sufficient arguments for it. Russia is a country at war, and although it does not officially acknowledge this, many states, including the Republic of Moldova, which has been harmed by Russia, do. Even in such a volatile context, the state of Moldova has the right to protect its electoral process from interference. Thus, international law offers an opportunity for Moldova to carry out a legal intervention. The same option applies to polling stations opened in the Republic of Belarus, a country that is an ally of Russia and that supports its actions, including against Moldova.
Therefore, there is a real danger of foreign interference in the electoral process, which could pose a threat to national security. The authorities' responsibility is not to avoid the decision but to follow the necessary legislative and executive steps to protect Moldova's sovereignty, including in the electoral process.