IPN analysis: As the regional and geopolitical circumstances influenced the November 30, 2014 parliamentary elections, the current internal circumstances can in the same way influence powerfully the results of the June 14, 2015 local elections. How exactly?
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In almost two weeks, Moldovan society will have to solve an important problem – to choose the local public authorities of the first and second levels, namely of villages-communes and of districts–municipalities. In general, society and every voter apart have to examine two important sets of data of this problem so as to make a conscious choice. The first set refers to the performance of the current mayor and council of the settlement of the voter and to the credibility of the election runners. The second refers to the performance of the political parties in general, including the image of the ruling parties and of the opposition parties. If the first set of data can provide different solutions, the second set can ensure predictable results for a large part of the country’s territory. I will focus below on the national symbols of the local elections.

‘Theft of the century’ and mass protests

At national level, the current elections will be definitely marked by what is known as the ‘theft of the century’ and the mass protests generated mainly by the given theft. In this respect, losses will be undoubtedly sustained by the ruling parties and, respectively, by a part of these parties’ candidates for the posts of mayor and councilor. The government will have to pay this price no matter whether it was involved in the theft or was just unable to prevent it. What the government can do on this last 100 centimeters of the election campaign is to diminish the price, but it’s not known if it is able to.

The opposition parties, on the contrary, will only gain from this damaged image of the government and they fully take this chance. Their message gains credibility also because it is similar to the message of the protest movements that developed unprecedentedly in this period. The critical point will be witnessed on June 7, when the protest organized by the Civic Platform “Dignity and Truth” will take place. Judging by the number of those who announced their intention to take part in this protest, including the groups of war and police veterans, it is expected that the participants will outnumber the about 50,000 protesters who came together for the previous demonstration. This means that the fate of the local elections for the government will be predetermined because the ruling parties practically have no time for actions that would radically change their image, while the protesters and the political opposition will have five days to disseminate the message from the Great National Assembly Square to each village. And these are the last five days before the elections, when the message is remembered the best.

Most probably, the three players – the government, the opposition and the protesters - realize the possible impact of the June 7 protest and each of them perhaps plans the moves so as to gain most of the benefits for themselves and cause the largest number of disadvantages to their opponents. I will speak below about possible scenarios, but first I would like to express my hope that all the sides eliminate from the start the destabilization of the situation by employing force, provocations and confrontations, including firearms, as a solution. If the ‘April 7’ scenario or, worse, a ‘maidan’ repeats, all of the players will sustain losses. The government will completely destroy its image and the legitimacy of governance, while the other two players can lose the possibility of developing and modernizing the country by peaceful and democratic ways, if the elections are annulled for reasons similar to the declaration of a ‘state of alert’ in the country, for example.

Moldova’s image in Brussels and Moscow

In the coming local elections, the vote will be again geopolitical, at least in the municipalities and towns of the country, though not to the same extent as in last year’s parliamentary elections. In this respect, the government and the opposition continue the struggle to maintain the ‘traditional spheres of influence’ and, newer, to take over these spheres from the opponents.

In this period, the pro-European government has fewer accomplishments in the relationship with the EU than before other previous elections. The reasons are many in number and are both internal and external, but the main refer to the aforementioned problems, especially the crisis in the banking system and the low efficiency in promoting the reforms suggested by the EU as a condition for having better relations. The Riga Summit brought no additional benefits to the government or the country in general. If there hadn’t been the ‘theft of the century’, this stoppage of the European train in the Moldovan station would have been an understandable and even justified phenomenon. At least, the reduced capacities of the minority government, the prospect of creating an authentic parliamentary majority and the difficult regional circumstances could have been invoked any time. The slowdown occurred and this fact was noticed in Brussels and in Moscow too.

In Riga, Brussels didn’t offer Moldova a clear European perspective and didn’t give a positive response to Moldova’s initiative to hold the next EaP Summit, of 2017, in Chisinau. Such a decision would have brought the current government a series of benefits that would have partially influenced the results of the coming local elections. But Brussels couldn’t have risked too much owing to the not very good internal reputation of the pro-European government which is to take another two serious exams at national level shortly after the local elections. The first exam will test the capacity of the pro-European parties to create a majority parliamentary coalition immediately after the local elections, which would be able to really promote the European course. The second exam refers to the government’s capacity to elect the head of state by a parliamentary vote the next year. If at least one of these two exams is failed, the early parliamentary elections will be inevitable and these would be won by the political forces pleading for joining the Eurasian Union, judging by the current pronounced trends. These would anytime be ready to stop Moldova’s path of European integration. Does anyone think that Brussels didn’t anticipate the holding of the EaP Summit in a country that would be hostile to the Eastern Partners or the EU in general?

The stoppage of Moldova’s European train was also observed in Moscow. This is probably why the Moldovan-Russian relations started to revive following a series of important events, like the high-level meeting between Prime Ministers Gaburici and Medvedev last weekend, after a pause of about two years, and the recent visit by a team of experts of Russia’s Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision (Rosselkhoznadzor), with both of these events leading to the possibility of resuming Moldova’s exports to Russia. The lifting of the Russian ban on the import of Moldovan products the next few days would be one of the few results that would essentially strengthen the result of the ruling parties in the June 14 local elections. Regretfully, such an action is rather improbable, but not impossible yet. It depends on the price that Russia asks and that the Moldovan government is ready to pay. In all likelihood, Russia’s interest should be looked for in its relations with the EU and Ukraine, especially after the denouncing by Ukraine of the agreement on the transit of the Russian military through its territory to Transnistria.

Electoral strategies and tactics

The ruling parties cannot be suspected of cooperation within the current election campaign and of reciprocal attacks as well. They have different styles and different behaviors that reveal different electoral strategies and tactics. This great difference may also reveal the weakness of the government coalition that does not enjoy majority support in Parliament.

On the one hand, the Democratic Party has an active campaign with frequent appearances in the public sphere and the mass media, based on large-scale projects and actions and on significant financing, centering especially on the candidate for the mayoralty of Chisinau Monica Babuc and maintaining the style witnessed in the election campaign prior to the parliamentary elections.

On the other hand, the Liberal Democratic Party (PLDM) is not very active and appears less in the public sphere and the mass media, with small exceptions in the case of the candidate for the post of mayor of Chisinau Serafim Urechean and with smaller financing compared with the previous own campaigns and with the campaigns of other parties of its category. It didn’t even stage an official presentation of the party’s candidates running in these elections. Such behavior that is not typical of the party that ranks second by the number of seats held in Parliament can have several explanations: 1. The party is sure of its success and does not consider it necessary to assert itself in a special way; 2. It is aware of the failure predicted by the latest opinion polls for the ruling parties and does not consider it necessary to spend money where it is not worth spending it; 3. It set another goal, which it considers more important and on whose accomplishment the fate of the party, the country and the European course depends.

Here we should remember the assertion of the chairman of the Party of Communists Vladimir Voronin, who said that the leader of the PLDM Vlad Filat and the leader of the Liberal Party (PL) Mihai Ghimu are discussing the formation of a majority coalition in secret. Maybe the logic of the two tells them that there is no use winning the local elections if you risk losing the government at central level and the country’s European perspective. Maybe the inactivity of the PLDM is due to the reactivation of the proposal to offer its support to the PL’s candidate for the mayoralty of Chisinau Dorin Chirtoaca in exchange for the agreement to form a coalition? Or there may be other explanations for such behavior that is not typical of the PLDM.  

The Liberal Party is active, combative and promotes a clear message against the current government coalition, which is much harsher than in the previous election campaign. This way it wants to win the third term in office for Dorin Chirtoaca and this was possibly the big stake for which it refused to enter government at the start of this year. We will soon see if this party is ready to resume the negotiations or prefers early legislative elections.

The Electoral Bloc “European People’s Platform of Moldova” plays the key role of strengthening the experience and political visibility of its leader Iurie Leanca and its team that wasn’t very well known so far. It may have chances to win posts of councilor in urban centers, not yet the post of mayor of Chisinau, with all respect for the experience, honesty and courage of Oazu Nantoi. The reason can be formulated by Oazu Nantoi himself: “The political class in Moldova is mainly an anti-system product and one anti-anti-system is not enough for creating a normal system”.

The Party of Communists campaigns actively and conducts a rather expensive campaign, especially in Chisinau, where it fielded businessman Vasili Chirtoca for the mayoralty. It promotes a partially positivist message because its message after the parliamentary elections has been moderate, suitable for a constructive opposition, as this party said. It is partial because a more aggressive message in relation to the government would give an advantage to its electoral opponent – the Party of Socialists (PSRM).

The Party of Socialists maintained its active spirit and aggressive message against the government and against Dorin Chirtoaca and the PL in general. It also spends a lot of money. It seems that it spent the largest amount in the campaign so far and this shows that the stake of the PSRM is great – winning the local elections as a first step towards taking over the government as a result of early or ordinary parliamentary elections. The PSRM and its leader Igor Dodon gave up employing the ‘Russian trump card’ that was used in the previous elections, especially because the government offers it enough subjects for harsh criticism at internal level. Volens-nolens, the protest movement becomes its partner in this respect.

Renato Usatyi’s party “Partidul Nostru” is another open and discreet partner of the PSRM in this and the subsequent campaigns. It seems that the two parties consciously divided the spheres of influence, at least in the municipalities of Chisinau and Balti. Renato Usatyi not only withdrew to Balti and allowed Zinaida Grechenyi to run in Chisinau, but even put forward a candidate with a distinct European CV for the mayoralty of Chisinau. This means that  Ilian Casu will attract votes, possibly not many, not from Zinaida Grecheanyi, but from Dorin Chirtoaca, Serafim Urechean and, perhaps, Oazu Nantoi.

Realistic and less realistic, but necessary solutions

The election campaign prior to the 2015 local elections reveals a difficult situation in the country, which is difficult not for the elections themselves. In democratic societies, the local and national governments must come and leave so as to regenerate society. This time, the winning of the local elections by the political forces oriented to Russia can lead to the diminution of the legality of the central government and thus to early parliamentary elections in the near future. The result of these elections can be easily anticipated and the given political forces would undoubtedly thwart Moldova’s European course. This contradiction between the natural course of democracy and the country’s vital interest can be overcome by adopting unordinary, not very realistic, but necessary solutions, including.

One: All the parties, especially the pro-Eurasian ones, should officially pledge not to thwart the current development course of the country, at least for a period of 5-10 years. Acting like this, they will confirm their honesty and the rightness of the calls made in this period to the pro-European parties not to force things in this direction. Such a gesture would offer the largest part of the population the chance to vote non-geopolitically in the local elections, focusing on good specialists and honest people;

Two: The ruling parties should make public their position on the ‘theft of the century’ by indicating those who bear responsibility for it and announcing their resignation;

Three: The ruling parties should make public their invitation to the parties with which they can form a majority coalition, by publicly presenting the political offer for these and their view on how to reform the  state institutions to make them functional and how to modernize the country.

There may be other unordinary solutions that are very necessary in this very unusual situation for Moldova. Could this be the only and last capacity test?

Valeriu Vasilică, IPN