On May 7, the European Parliament (EP) adopted a resolution on the Republic of Moldova whereby it strongly condemns the massive campaign of harassment, grave violations of human rights and all other illegal actions carried out by the Moldovan Government in the aftermath of the parliamentary elections, but also calls on the EU member states and the European Commission to review the EU's visa system for and relax the conditions for granting visas to Moldovan citizens. Also, the Parliament reaffirmed its support for the country’s territorial integrity, stressing that the EU should play a greater role in finding a solution to the Transnistrian dispute. What is probably more important, it called upon the EU to make everything possible to offer the Moldovan people a really European future - in other words a clear prospect of becoming part of the EU. The Moldovan Opposition described the European Parliament’s resolution as a first serious step of the EU following the post-electoral events in Moldova. For their part, the members of the PCRM labeled the document as a sample of double standards and an insult to the Moldovan people. Moreover, they try to diminish the impact of this resolution on the development of the relations between Moldova and the EU, arguing that the European Parliament plays an insignificant role in the EU’s foreign policy. But such arguments run counter to the realities and show that the representatives of the PCRM are not very familiar or rather unfamiliar with the de facto role and duties of the European Parliament in the EU. This ignorance explains only some of the unpardonable blunders made by the governess during the last few weeks in relation to the legislature of the EU and its members. In reality yet, the Moldovan authorities will have to take account of the conclusions and recommendations of the European Parliament due to the following reasons: [First,] on June 16, 2009, Moldova will initiate talks with the EU over the Association Agreement. An important chapter in this agreement concerns the political dialogue between the Moldova and the European authorities, including at the parliamentary level. In other words, the European Parliament will have a say at the talks on the Association Agreement and on the new EU-Moldova Plan of Action; [Second,] after negotiated, the future Association Agreement with the EU must be voted on by the European Parliament. Until the agreement is not endorsed by the European legislators, it will remain a document with no juridical power; [Third,] Moldova wants that its citizens travel to the EU visa-free, but such an agreement must also be approved by the European Parliament. The same applies to a possible Free Trade Agreement between Moldova and the EU; [Fourth,] the EU budget, including the funding earmarked for its foreign policy, is approved by the European Parliament. So, the financial assistance allocated by the EU to our country is granted only after the EP approves it. The Parliament can increase or diminish the financial assistance intended for third countries. This ‘small’ detail should not be neglected; [Fifth,] during the last few years, the European Parliament has repeatedly called on the EU to examine the possibility of offering a clear European integration prospect to Moldova. If the Moldovan authorities continue to treat the recommendations of the MEPs with indifference and arrogance, our country will undoubtedly lose an important ally in the EU. Analyzed from the angle of Moldova’s aspirations for European integration, the EP’s resolution is not at all a success. It is in fact a letdown that we owe first of all to the ‘progress’ made by the Moldovan authorities in implementing the Plan of Action with the EU. The facts ascertained by the MEPs are hard-hitting and seriously affect the credibility of our authorities engaged in the dialogue with Brussels. The official Chisinau did nothing to avoid such developments. If the representatives of the power had established an open and correct dialogue with the European legislators, they could have lessened the criticism leveled against them to a certain extent. The PCRM and the Government of Moldova lamentably missed this opportunity. To the Europeans’ astonishment, the famed Ambassador of Moldova in Strasbourg Eugenia Kistruga was instructed not to talk to the ‘detractors of the Moldovan statehood in the EP’, thing that she knows to do the best. The way that she did it astounded many European politicians and diplomats. For such a deed, Missis Kistruga could be awarded the Civic Merit Order. For his part, the outgoing President of Moldova Vladimir Voronin was too busy to meet the European Parliament’s delegation that had come to Chisinau late in April to collect facts about the post-electoral events. At the same time, Grigore Petrenco, the co-chairman of the Moldova-EU Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, was sent to Strasbourg without being empowered to talk to the European MPs. The EP’s resolution is also a failure of the Moldovan Foreign Ministry that it should assume, if it has courage and verticality of course. In fact, the post-electoral events revealed what was obvious to many – our Foreign Ministry became a firm without content. After implementing for four years the Plan of Action with the EU, which is based on the principle of good neighborhood, Moldova systemically damaged the relations with its only neighbors, Ukraine and Romania. A series of problems appeared in the Moldovan-Ukrainian relations that risk worsening the political dialogue between the two states. Our relations with Romania are now at the worse level in their 18-year history. The partnership with the West gradually slips to a cool-down. The Moldovan-Russian relations are favorable rather for Moscow than for Chisinau. For Russia, the post-electoral context in Chisinau created favorable conditions for persuading Voronin to make the long-awaited political concessions in the Transnistrian issue and in Moldova’s relations with the EU and NATO. ‘The moral and political support’ offered by Moscow to Vladimir Voronin and the PCRM during the election campaign and in the aftermath of the April 7 and 8 events is not unconditional. The statement on the Transnistrian dispute signed by Vladimir Voronin in Moscow on March 18 and then Moldova’s refusal to take part in the NATO drills in Georgia, plus the going of the Moldovan Foreign Minister Andrei Stratan to the recent Eastern Partnership summit in Prague, not before visiting Moscow first to consult with Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, are rather relevant in this case. In conclusion, we can say that if the Moldovan authorities are further guided by the political support and moral encouragements of Moscow, they risk not observing that the European Parliament’s resolution is an open hand to help them reestablish the dialogue with the EU. Otherwise, the alternative is the country’s isolation and, consequently, the weakening of its independence and sovereignty.