For the first time Moldova is condemned to voluntarily adopt a certain behavior without alternative. In the coming period, it is not only to elect a head of state in the conditions of a political crisis that has lasted for a year and a half and establish a stable internal government after two years of instability, but also to choose once and for all its development course oriented to the West. For the first time Moldova does not have an alternative to this choice neither at national nor at foreign level. It is an exceptionally difficult choice also because the people living in the contemporary Moldova have never been faced with such a voluntary choice. During many centuries, this choice was made by someone else – Turks and Tatars, Turks and Russians, Soviets and Germans, only the Soviets ... The independence proclaimed 20 years ago was mainly the result of someone else’s effort, of the geopolitical conjuncture. The Baltic countries declared their independence long before the failed Moscow putsch of 1991, with Moldova proclaiming its independence only after that. Therefore, the election of the President of Moldova will now decide the country’s fate. The election of the head of state, the establishment of a stable government and the country’s development course are rings of the same logical and political chain. [AEI -PCRM, without alternative] All these three elements are interdependent, but each of them decides the fate of Moldova’s political orientation in general. The election of the President is chronologically the closest action that is to be carried out without alternative, which means without the participation of the Opposition. The Communist Party (PCRM) repeatedly said that they will not vote for the candidate of the Alliance for European Integration (AEI) and we should believe them. Another behavior would be against the logic of the political fight that has only one goal – to seize power. If the PCRM accepts the AEI’s scenario, it will install the ruling alliance in power for four years and will suffer all the unfavorable consequences for the opposition party. For its part, the AEI does not want to share the power as, if it does so, it will allow the PCRM to return to power and gradually or suddenly remove it. The PCRM could remove one of the components of the Alliance with the support of the other two components or only one of them. For these and other, external reasons, the transformation of the ruling alliance by including the PCRM in it is not possible. The early legislative elections are the only way, without alternative, whereby the PCRM can return to power. But the only way, without alternative, to legally call early legislative elections is not to elect the head of state. It seems that the AEI and the PCRM realize this and acts accordingly. The PCRM’s actions are aimed at avoiding responsibility for provoking new early legislative elections, including by imposing unacceptable conditions for opening the dialogue on the election of the head of state with the AEI. The governing alliance delays taking steps and this tactic seriously affects the positions of the opposition party that does not have the same resources as the alliance. From military viewpoint, this would be like a harassment tactic aimed at exhausting the enemy. An element of this tactic is to remove the Communist leader Vladimir Voronin from the negotiation process. The formal reason was uttered by Marian Lupu: “Voronin is too emotional.” Thus, the components of the AEI delegated the parliamentary group leaders to hold talks with the leaders of the Communist group, knowing that they can do nothing without Vladimir Voronin’s consent. It was expected that the talks in this format will not start and they did not start. Instead, Vladimir Voronin was put in the situation to express his readiness to talk and to seek meetings with one of the AEI heads, risking to be turned down. None of the sides has serious intentions to negotiate and reach a compromise so as to elect the head of state. Thus, the solution is without alternative and can be found if one of the sides assumes responsibility and shows capacity for this. The AEI has most of the legal levers owing to its access to governmental resources. The AEI has made public a number of scenarios that can be used to elect the head of state without the participation of the PCRM so as to remain in power for four years and choose the development course. Though it failed, the constitutional referendum of September 2010 convincingly showed what the government’s priorities in relation to the Opposition are. [AEI -AEI: insignificant harassment without alternative] ‘The harassment tactic’ is applicable in the context of the election of the President and inside the AEI even if to a lesser extent and not with the aim of reciprocal destruction, like the relations between the AEI and the PCRM. The ‘internal’ harassment is also without alternative, i.e. the three components of the AEI are condemned to continue being together as they must prevent the PCRM from returning to power. Currently, the harassment has two aspects. One: the lack of active and efficient communication between the three components of the AEI and, respectively, the three leaders in coordinating joint steps aimed at overcoming the political crisis. Such suspense in relations brings more advantages to the PLDM, which already undertook all its duties, and more disadvantages to the PDM and PL, which do not yet fully benefit from the privileges offered by the government. Two: the communication between one of the three leaders – Liberal-Democratic leader Vlad Filat – with Vladimir Voronin, after it was decided to empower the members of the party with a lower status to hold negotiations with the Opposition. It seems that the PL and especially the PDM do not have reasons to get angry because the roles were reverse before the AEI was formed. The PDM and the PL obtained from the PLDM roles and posts that they would have never obtained if the PDM had not negotiated with the PCRM. Vlad Filat is now paying Marian Lupu and the PDM members back. The delay in electing the head of state is beneficial to the components of the AEI from political viewpoint, in strengthening the positions in relation to the PCRM. But this situation does not allow taking the second and third steps and, respectively, to ensure political stability and the irreversibility of the pro-European orientation. This exposes the AEI to dangers. In possible early elections, the AEI would be penalized in the same way as the PCRM or even to a greater extent. The April 2009 events could repeat, but it would be the PCRM that would direct (and/or cause) the masses that are dissatisfied with the recent price rises. The PCRM showed what it can do at the beginning of the parliamentary session, when it gathered together its supporters in front of the Palace of the Republic. We are not sure that the present political class and its leaders can play the role of Moise, who led the Jews through the desert during 40 years, until the syndrome of the slave got out of them. We, the Moldovan society are also condemned to accept the political leaders and their decisions as regards the reformation and reorientation of the development course, if we had one until now. But we do not have another piece of land than this one. The external political conjuncture is now extremely beneficial to Moldova. It is so beneficial that it does not allow room for alternative. {The external political conjuncture is marked inclusively by the forthcoming visits by high-ranking European officials to Moldova, about which we will speak in part II of the analysis “Moldova condemned, without alternative”.} [Valeriu Vasilica, Info-Prim Neo]