 |
|
| Dionis Cenuşa | |
During the 25 years of Independence, Moldova has been hit by a series of shocks typical for a country in transition. Obviously, we mean the vulnerability of state institutions to the influence of political-oligarchic groups, both local and foreign. We also mean the undermining of the free market foundations by faulty public policies, systemic corruption, inefficient bureaucracy and an indifferent judiciary.
Most of these problems stem from the existence of a populist, selfish post-Soviet political class. Most of the governments so far have focused on achieving their short-term political interests at the time (while employing extreme electoral populism) and rarely on accomplishing some realistic strategic goals. The acute inefficiency of government, obvious throughout the independence years, has aggravated and perpetuated the weaknesses of the state. This hampered the development of a mature foreign policy, based on strategic thinking and focused on strengthening democracy and human rights, without which a social state is impossible.
In all this time, our foreign policy has been incoherent or conjectural, meant to achieve only temporary benefits. The governing parties have exploited the pro-Russian preferences of some voters in order to adopt a conformist position in international matters, intentionally increasing the country’s dependence on Russia, a very unpredictable player, especially since Vladimir Putin came into power.
The regional geopolitical situation has always had a big impact on our foreign policy. The European Union was hardly present here before 2004, while Russia was dominating the ex-Soviet space, including Moldova (through pro-Russian parties, Russian-speaking minorities, the Church, the status of Russian language, the Transnistrian conflict, etc.). These factors have lead towards a multi-directional foreign policy, with the attention of the government changing according to the source of external benefits. In this wavering between East and West, Russia has remained a powerful pole of attraction. Even after Moldova signed the Association Agreement with the EU in July 2014, the Russian influence remained strong.
The impact of geopolitical transformations on Moldovan foreign policy
The 25 years of Independence can be divided into three stages according to the major geopolitical changes that shaped Moldova’s foreign policy. In the first stage (1994-2004), our foreign policy vacillated inasmuch as Russia’s permissive attitude allowed it. The relationship with Brussels lacked political substance, although it provided some technical assistance thanks to the Agreement for Partnership and Cooperation (which came into effect on 1998). Its contents were based on the agreement between the EU and Russia. Brussels was mostly disconnected from Eastern Europe. Its resources were alloted for the integration of the Warsaw Pact countries (the Visegrad group) in the EU structures and for mitigating the aftermath of the Balkan Wars.
After the expansion of the EU to the East in 2004 and the stabilization of the Balkans, we get to the second stage – 2004-2009. The creation of the European Neighborhood Policy, targeting all Eastern European countries except for Russia, boosted the relationship between Moldova and the EU. During the government of the Party of Communists, the Moldova-EU Action Plan is agreed (February 2005), similar to other political reform documents signed by the EU with 5 other countries in the region (Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan). Meanwhile, Russia was using trade as a means to punish the Communist government for its close ties with the EU and restricted the import of low-end wines from Moldova (2006), previously accepted without any problems on the Russian market. Thanks to the reforms undertaken within the Moldova-EU Action Plan, trade with the EU is booming (GSP, GSP Plus, Autonomous Commercial Preferences) and EU assistance is increasing. Initially, Russia was reluctant to allow the interference of the EU in its sphere of influence, but then it accepted the ENP and decided to collaborate with the EU in order to ameliorate the situation in the shared neighborhood, the 6 post-Soviet countries, Moldova included.
The third stage (2009 – present) includes the launch of the Eastern Partnership and then of negotiations regarding the enhancement of relations between the EU and Moldova, then Ukraine, by signing an Association Agreement, a move harshly criticized by Moscow. The 2009 protests in Chisinau and the following political changes (the first officially pro-European government) helped advance the dialogue with the EU. Russia retaliated by imposing restrictions for the import of fruits, canned goods and meats from Moldova, while also announcing import taxes for other Moldovan goods, in violation of the CIS Free Trade Area provisions. Ukraine was targeted by similar measures and Armenia was pressured into giving up the EU Association Agreement and joining the Eurasian Economic Union (2015).
What kind of Moldovan foreign policy would satisfy Russia?
Russia doesn’t simply want to punish the governments of Eastern Partnership countries for pursuing closer ties with the EU. Its goals are broader and include the removal of transformational elements (democracy, human rights, rule of law) from the EU instruments in Eastern Europe. This would entail the dismantling of the Eastern Partnership and the profound rethinking of the ENP. Moreover, Russia wants all these countries to join its Eurasian Union, like Armenia did.
According to the Russian scenario, once absorbed into the Eurasian Union, the former Soviet countries will shape their commercial relations with the EU according to Russian interests and any democratic reforms will be canceled.
Russia’s major goal is a free trade area between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union, from Lisbon to Vladivostok. On one hand, Russia wants to slow down the absolute expansion of European norms, and on the other hand, it wants to export its own norms (GOST standards and other technical regulations). The most important element of this scenario is a return to the previous geopolitical status quo and division of the spheres of influence, according to which Moldova can never join the EU.
Conclusion
Moldova’s foreign policy and its closeness to the EU depends a lot on the quality of internal governance, because domestic issues lead to vulnerabilities that can be exploited to advance the Russian scenario. Political populism and both the pro-Russian opposition parties and the so-called pro-European parties are equally harmful and hinder the complete implementation of reforms.
In no way should relations with the EU be used as a counterbalance for relations with Russia. The European model of development is a civilizational choice Moldova made not to get vengeance against Russia, but to ensure the modernization of the country and a functional democracy. The higher the quality of reforms, the sooner Russia will understand Moldova is aspiring towards another development model. This can be facilitated by a more inclusive European integration process, with tangible results.
Political corruption, the politicization of institutions, the inefficiency of justice are just some of the obstacles that hinder Moldova’s European prospects and keep it within the reach of Russia’s Eurasian scenarios.
IPN publishes in the Op-Ed rubric opinion pieces submitted by authors not affiliated with our editorial board. The opinions expressed in these articles do not necessarily coincide with the opinions of our editorial board.
