“Put together, the factors mentioned above can have an unpredictable effect on the results of the presidential election. Respectively, for the PAS government it is important to at least obtain confirmation of the irreversibility of the European integration course for the future of the Republic of Moldova. In this regard, the initiative to amend the Constitution by referendum was launched, as Georgia did in 2017 and Ukraine in 2019. In conditions of war in the region, given the expansionist ambitions of the Putin regime, this approach is justified. The problem is that it polarizes to the limit the attitudes of the political class and social segments...”
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Beginning of electoral period
Parliament on May 16, 2024 set the date of the presidential election and the constitutional referendum - October 20. The election date has been known for a long time. However, the official formalization of the deadlines matters for starting preparations for the two electoral exercises. According to the Electoral Code, most of the electoral procedures have as reference point the electoral period, between the day of adoption of the document on the setting of the election date and the day when the election results are confirmed by the competent bodies, but not more than 120 days. Respectively, the electoral period will start on June 22, 2024.
In fact, the potential electoral contenders and a string of dubious elements engaged in preparations for elections as early as about a year ago. Local elections on November 5, 2023 followed, which served as a ground for testing the electoral potential of the main political parties ahead of the 2024 presidential election. The results of the local elections confirmed that only about 10 political parties, out of over 60 existing ones, have a certain potential to influence, to a certain extent, the results of the presidential election. In such circumstances, taking into account the deep polarization of society on the dimension of European integration vs. Eurasian integration, what matters is the ability of political forces to unite to tip the balance in favor of a pro-European candidate or the opponent of this, respectively, in favor of European or Eurasian integration.
In search of opposition’s common candidate in presidential election
Opinion polls stably highlight only two candidates with high chances of winning the presidential election – the incumbent President of the Republic of Moldova, Maia Sandu, and the former President, Igor Dodon. The former announced her intention to run as early as December 24, 2023, while the latter is maneuvering to gain broad support from the pro-Russian opposition.
For now, none of the candidates can be sure that they will win the presidential election. Therefore, in addition to the trust ratings and voting intentions of the citizens, an extra number of factors matter a lot. It should be noted that as the incumbent President, Maia Sandu can contend in the elections only as an independent candidate. It’s true, with the possibility that she will be supported by particular pro-European political forces. There is no doubt that the ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), which Maia Sandu founded in May 2015 and led until November 2020, will support her candidacy. On the other hand, Igor Dodon can be both the candidate of the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM), which he returned to lead after a break of about two years, and of a large electoral bloc. In the sense of the aforementioned, Maia Sandu and Igor Dodon can change the roles they had in the presidential competition of 2020.
Each of the two main candidates have advantages and disadvantages in the ratio between them. It’s true that Igor Dodon is a much more skillful communicator than Maia Sandu. This advantage is evident in the so-called process of identifying the common opposition candidate. Identifying the common opposition candidate is not a fad or a good intention devoid of practical reasoning. The task of the eventual common opposition candidate would be to mobilize the protesting electorate so as not to allow the incumbent President to score a victory in the first election round.
The Pro-European political forces do not even discuss identifying a common presidential candidate. Actually, the fact that she created a pro-European opposition in the person of the Together Political Bloc (BPÎ) is a great disadvantage of President Maia Sandu. The inability to communicate effectively in order to strengthen the pro-European forces, at a critical moment for the fate of the country, is a handicap difficult to ignore. In such circumstances, given the BPÎ’s irreconcilable criticism of President Maia Sandu and the PAS, the latter’s only hope is that the BPÎ will not be made up of useful idiots of the opposing side.
PSRM leader’s maneuvers
The chairman of the Party of Development and Consolidation of Moldova (PDCM), Ion Chicu, the chairwoman of the Moldova Platform, former governor of Gagauzia, Irina Vlah, tried to identify a common opposition candidate, but without any success. It should be noted that, in contrast to Maia Sandu, her main political opponent – Igor Dodon, didn’t reject theinvitations to participate in the union of opposition forces. As an experienced politician, Dodon imposed conditions for giving his support for the common candidate, insisting on the confidentiality of the efforts (see min.06.30) and on the non-affiliation to a party of the eventual contender. Obviously, being aware that he has the highest rating among the opposition candidates, Igor Dodon made it clear to the potential allies, without antagonizing them, that they have to only look for such a common candidate, assuming a lenient, passive role. In case of failure, the solution will be none other than supporting the PSRM’s candidate, either in the first or second round of the election. By all appearances, ex-Prime Minister Ion Chicu understood Igor Dodon’s maneuvers and on February 24, 2024 announced that the PDCM will have its own presidential candidate. The announcement didn’t cause public upset and also didn’t block the efforts to identify the common candidate.
After the date of the presidential election was set, Igor Dodon decided, with great inspiration, that it is the right time to reveal the participants in the consultations, insisting on the identification of the joint candidacy, although he understands that this cannot be identified. At the same time, the potential allies of the PSRM have no reason to be upset about being exposed. The point is that Ion Chicu and Irina Vlah separately and in different periods announced that they have an interest and participate in consultations on the combination of the opposition’ forces and, respectively, the identification of a common presidential candidate. The other revealed participants matter not much and were named with diminutives or among others so as to emphasize their insignificant weight. However, the disclosure had a specific purpose – to let the public know that the Shorist clones do not participate in the process of identifying the common candidate.
In fact, after the Communist-Socialist gorillas barred one of the representatives of the Shorist clones from leading the column of the 9 May demonstration, it became clear that the opposition remained divided. Respectively, there is an additional indicator that identifying a common candidate of the pro-Russian opposition for the presidential election is almost impossible. Although, it would be wrong to rush to conclusions, especially after the fugitive, Ilan Shor, was worthy of obtaining Russian citizenship. It is curious that Ilan Shor’s acquisition of Russian citizenship coincided with the debates in the Israeli press on the expansion of anti-Semitism in Russia, which erupted with a new force after the attack on the Jewish state by terrorists from the HAMAS group, a phenomenon confirmed by opinion polls, which show that Russian propaganda against Israel has the effect the fact that about 1/3 of Russia’s citizens, compared to 1/5 two years ago, believe the Jews should not be allowed to enter Russia. In such a context, the importance of Ilan Shor and his network of clones for the Kremlin’s plans in the Republic of Moldova is extremely telling.
PSRM leader’s impossible proposal for common opposition candidate
In order to appear constructive, Igor Dodon proposed the former prosecutor general, Alexandr Stoianoglo, as a potential common candidate. The curiosity lies in the fact that, at the same time, Dodon insists that Alexandr Stioanoglo will certainly return to the position of prosecutor general, after the opposition wins the presidential election. How this is possible, Igor Dodon didn’t explain to us. The fact is that Alexandr Stoianoglo’s eventual acceptance to become the opposition’s common candidate for President will bring to an end his efforts to be reinstated as prosecutor general. It’s clear that if he wins the presidential race, he will become head of state and if he loses, he will remain with the label of representative of the pro-Russian opposition. Both of the options would make it impossible to return to the post of prosecutor general. Respectively, Igor Dodon’s reasoning shows us how sincere the PSRM leader is in the effort to identify the common opposition candidate in the presidential election.
However, we must admit that Igor Dodon aimed to kill two birds with one stone, remaining somewhat loyal to potential coalition partners, arrogating to himself the right to task them with the identification of the common candidate by May 31. Otherwise, each potential candidate will be entitled to contend on their own in the elections, without attacking each other in order to support the strongest candidate in the second round. Therefore, we can assume that, most likely, the pro-Russian opposition will not have a common candidate in the presidential election. Respectively, the results of the first round will naturally identify the common opposition candidate, who in the second round will be supported by the entire opposition, which will have no other solution. From this point of view, Igor Dodon’s calculations are pertinent.
Unpredictable factors
There is no doubt that the overlapping of a series of crises of all kinds, caused by the destabilization of the regional situation following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, has greatly eroded the image of President Maia Sandu and the ruling party. But the string of mistakes and dubious actions committed by some of the representatives of the PAS government, as well as the compromised reforms, especially in the justice sector, devalue the excuses for the negative effects of the Russian aggression on the country’s economy. From this point of view, the government loses the propaganda battle with the pro-Russian opposition, which is financially supported by Russia through the Shorist network. In general, the PAS government remains extremely weak in terms of communication with the citizens and this is a major risk factor for the PAS.
Put together, the factors mentioned above can have an unpredictable effect on the results of the presidential election. Respectively, for the PAS government it is important to at least obtain confirmation of the irreversibility of the European integration course for the future of the Republic of Moldova. In this regard, the initiative to amend the Constitution by referendum was launched, as Georgia did in 2017 and Ukraine in 2019. In conditions of war in the region, given the expansionist ambitions of the Putin regime, this approach is justified. The problem is that it polarizes to the limit the attitudes of the political class and social segments. In such conditions, challenges of all kinds, designed to induce fear and anxiety are not excluded and we notice such challenges with a certain frequency,.
Another unpredictable factor is related to the possible behavior of the Diaspora. It’s not known and we cannot estimate the eventual behavior of the Moldovan citizens abroad, who represent about 1/3 of the electorate. Will they still be as enthusiastic as in 2016, 2020 and 2021, when the Diaspora vote weighed about 10-15%? In any case, we can assume that both the government and the opposition will mobilize all the resources to convince the voters to support one electoral option or another, as well as a regional integration course.
