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| Dionis Cenuşa | |
The campaign prior to the October 30, 2016 presidential elections is underway in Moldova. The representatives of the current government use geopolitical messages, projecting an apocalyptical situation for the country’s European course in case of the pro-Russian candidate’s victory. Their calculations stem from the fact that about half of the voters feel affinities with the European course and can be thus easier mobilized for propelling the government’s candidate.
In parallel, the pro-Russian candidate suggests balancing the foreign policy by developing a strategic dialogue with Russia. Even if this promises to review particular aspects related to the new bilateral EU-Moldova framework (on trade, nondiscrimination legislation etc.), he shows a rather moderate approach to the EU. But the moderate character can be a temporary decision of electoral character, which derives from the multi-vector particularities of the population (up to 30% oscillate between the EU and Russia), without reflecting the real long-term agenda of the pro-Russian candidate as regards the European integration.
The other candidates for President, in particular the leaders of the new parties created amid anti-government and anti-corruption protests (Party “Action and Solidarity” and Platform “Dignity and Truth”), disseminate a lower number of geopolitical messages. Their rhetoric centers yet on the urgent necessity of reforms and this connects them indirectly with the European integration process. Moreover, these communicate intensely with the European capitals, in particular political players from Brussels, which also places them in the pro-Western category of Moldovan politicians.
Separation of geopolitical messages
The exploration of the relationship with the EU is noticed especially at the main ruling party - the Democratic Party of Moldova. Apparently, there is a conscious separation of the pro-EU message of the Democrats from the powerfully accentuated pro-unionism message of the Liberal Party, which is the smaller partner of the PDM in the current government coalition. Earlier, the Liberals used in excess the European symbols (EU flag), while in the current presidential elections these focus on the unionist dimension of the voters, abandoning practically the pro-EU speech.
On the other hand, the Democrats and the Liberals intend to attract undecided voters who sympathize with the EU or at least could be captivated by the idea of the union with Romania. On the other hand, accidentally or not, by separating the geopolitical messages, the two coalition partners of the EU (PDM – Marian Lupu and PL – Mihai Ghimpu) avoid the risk of overlapping the geopolitical discourses, maximizing thus their electoral potential. However, of the two, only the Democrat Marian Lupu possesses bigger electoral possibilities of reaching the runoff, counting mainly on huge administrative resources, significant media coverage (4 TV channels) and direct support of the oligarchic group coordinated by Vladimir Plahotniuc. At the same time, even if he has insignificant electoral possibilities, the Liberal Mihai Ghimpu could play the role of ‘confusion source’ among the unionist voters, in the same way as other pro-unionism candidates (Ana Gutu). This could cost Maia Sandu and/or Andrei Nastase, who represent the new political parties and are against the current system, about 1% of the available votes.
The dialogue with Russia is fully absorbed by the Party of Socialists (Igor Dodon), which constantly monopolies the pro-Russian segment of the voters. Moreover, Dodon combines the pro-Russian speech with the anti-unionist one (critical of particular policies of Romania) and, respectively, pro-statehood one. Such a combination of messages enables the Socialist to secure an easier pass to the second round of the presidential elections.
The leaders of the new anti-government parties (Maia Sandu, Andrei Nastase) for now refrain from open geopolitical speeches. Instead, they prefer to raise internal subjects such as the defective political and economic management, systemic corruption and the enormous influence of oligarchs on decision-making in the country. The absence of the pro-EU messages can be a temporary tactic that will be later abandoned or a consequence of the efforts made to identify the ‘common candidate’. Anyway, their relations with European political players (pan-European parties) betray a direct association with the European course.
Government makes use of EU support through oligarchs
While the EU demands reforms with concrete results, the main ruling party (PDM) asks for increased support from the Europeans, including a European perspective. The coordinator of the government coalition, first deputy chairman of the PDM, oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc related this in an article published on a popular Brussels website, several days after the official visit by Commissioner Johannes Hahn to Chisinau.
Among others, the article highlights the results achieved by the government led by the PDM in 2016, without mentioning that these were obtained amid the pressure exerted by large-scale protests and the foreign partners in 2014-2016. In in the interview given by Plahotniuc, Moldova is given as an example of European aspirations and is contrasted with the EU countries where the populist euro-Skeptics ask to withdraw from the EU (in particular, the UK).
At the same time, the extension of the European integration is counterbalanced by the proposal of a constructive relationship with Russia (trade, Transnistrian conflict settlement).
The article reveals the problems faced by Moldova (poverty and migration), which became more intense during the last few years (after the extension of the effects of the banking frauds). But Plahotniuc, who was earlier an active player in the governments of 2009-2016, avoids assuming any responsibility for these problems. On the contrary, the government coordinated by the PDM is presented as able to overcome the political and economic hardships faced in the country.
This attempts to speak in the name of the whole country, even if, according to the most recent polls, the negative rating of Vladimir Plahotniuc remains at over 90%. But this trend of Plahotniuc shows that he represent the main voice of the government of Moldova, even if the country is formally governed by a collation.
The article presents several risks that, according to Plahotniuc, will obstruct the accomplishments of the current government – possible pro-Russian President and, respectively, the “anti-reformists”. The reality is yet different.
The pro-Russian candidate poses risks, but smaller than the government says. Evidently, a possible pro-Russian candidate will negatively influence the general pro-European speech at the level of institutions. This could also generate particular dissonance on the foreign policy segment, where the EU-Moldova dialogue could meet with particular difficulties. Least but not last, a pro-Russian President will be more keen to provoke early parliamentary elections for interrupting the unilateral European course (for example, in case of non-formation of the government following the adoption of a no-confidence motion). Furthermore, the pro-Russian president will possess instruments to delay the adoption of particular laws, related to the European agenda or external assistance of the IMF and the EU, respectively. However, the political power will anyway remain yet in the hands of the current government – Parliament and Government.
By “anti-reformists”, the Democrat Plahotniuc means the representatives of the anti-government opposition, more exactly of the Platform “Dignity and Truth” – Andrei Nastse, who is associated with obscure interests – Victor and Viorel Topa, who are accused of offenses and are chased by the current government. The article signed by Plahotniuc presents yet all those who oppose the current system as “anti-reformists” (Andrei Nastase, Maia Sandu and others).
Ultimately, through the agency of the article, Plahotniuc wants to dissociate the Democratic Party and himself from the offenses committed in the banking system. The intention of such a message is not only to rebuild the image following the banking frauds, but to also persuade the public in Brussels that the EU financing must be unblocked for supporting reforms.
Instead of conclusion…
The presidential elections of October 30 will be influenced by geopolitical speeches, but more intensely in the runoff vote, where the decisive struggle will be between the pro-Russian candidate Igor Dodon and Andrei Nastase or/and Maia Sandu or with the Democrat Marian Lupu.
Given that the powers of the Head of State are related to the policy, the discussions on the country’s external course must prevail and the abundance of geopolitical rhetoric is thus inevitable. Consequently, the discussions about the development models proposed for the country – European or Russia-Eurasian one – are logical and even necessary, including for dissipating the anti-European myths.
Even if the origin of internal problems is domestic in character (political corruption, defective justice, inefficiency of law-enforcement agencies etc.), the government uses the external factor as a source of solutions. The pro-Russian candidate, who considers that the rapprochement with Russia will bring economic recovery and, respectively, welfare, does the same. The candidates of the new opposition parties focus yet on the source of problems, namely rooting out of corruption and de-politicization of institutions (de-oligarchization of the political power).
The sincerity of candidate’s geopolitical options must be contrasted with the integrity level of the candidates and their parties. Thus, the candidates for President connected to unknown resources that are transferred through offshore areas are the opposite of the anti-corruption and pro-integrity reforms required by the EU and other development partners. For these, such reforms and the development model of the country represent rather a personal threat than a ‘roadmap’ for fixing the country.
Ultimately, for a country like Moldova, the support provided by the foreign partners is a crucial element for any government (either this is pro-European or pro-Russian) and, simultaneously, for the survival of the state in the long-run.
IPN publishes in the Op-Ed rubric opinion pieces submitted by authors not affiliated with our editorial board. The opinions expressed in these articles do not necessarily coincide with the opinions of our editorial board.
