“The citizens of the Republic of Moldova must be correctly informed about the advantages and disadvantages of the Republic of Moldova’s accession to the EU. Based on the experience of the member states, they must be sure that joining the EU, which is a political-economic union, does not mean giving up sovereignty and independence, but means opportunities for the country’s development, for assistance in finding the most favorable economic niche and access to a market of about 500 million consumers, without arbitrary embargoes and sanctions, such as those imposed on the Republic of Moldova in 2006 and 2013, etc.”
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Pleas in favor of holding referendum on European integration

As the date of the constitutional referendum on amending the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova for enshrining the European integration, the attacks intensify and the disinformation directed against the mentioned initiative increases. In fact, the opponents of the European integration challenge the opportunity of holding the referendum, in particular, its holding simultaneously with the presidential election of October 20, 2024. Respectively, the issue of opportunity is one of electoral interest for the main political forces.

It is worth noting that the start of the pleas for the organization of a referendum on the European integration was given, in June 2023, by an initiative group from the network of the convicted fugitive, Ilan Shor. Half a year later, after the European Council decided, on December 14, 2023, to start negotiations on the Republic of Moldova’s accession to the EU, the leader of the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM), Igor Dodon, insisted on the need to hold a referendum, arguing that: “... any external integration, both in the West and in the East, can take place only on the basis of a referendum...”. This plea of the PSRM leader was fixed in the renewed program of the party adopted at the congress of December 19, 2023, which expressly provides, in chapter V, dedicated to the sovereign foreign policy, that “The foreign policy course must be approved by national referendum”.

Head of state’s request to hold referendum on European integration

Chronologically, only after the publicly expressed pleas to organize a referendum on the European integration, the President of the Republic of Moldova, Maia Sandu, asked the Parliament, on December 24, 2023, “to initiate the organization of a referendum next autumn, in which the voice of the citizens will be decisive”. The head of state’s request caused public debates on the opportunity to achieve the opposition’s wishes. However, the Shor network, whatever one may say about it, has remained, at least for now, consistent regarding the need to organize the referendum, calling for a negative vote against the European integration, while the PSRM has cardinally changed its attitude, pleading in favor of boycotting the referendum. In this regard, on July 10, 2024, the Republican Council of the PSRM adopted a resolution “on boycotting the referendum on European integration”.

The resolution of the Republican Council of the PSRM on boycotting the referendum on European integration can prove counterproductive. The fact is that Article 200, item 2(b), of the Electoral Code expressly provides that the registration of participants in the referendum requires political parties to submit to the Central Election Commission (CEC) a request, accompanied, among other things, by the declaration regarding the option chosen in the national referendum: “YES” or “NO”.  This means that the PSRM will simply did not manage to register as an electoral contestant in the referendum. Respectively, the PSRM will be limited in resources to promote the boycott. The previous experience of holding referendums in the Republic of Moldova confirms that in all the previous plebiscites, electoral contestants were registered on the basis of the declared option: “Pro” or “Against”. Respectively, no electoral contestant that promoted the boycott has ever been registered.

Types of referendums on European integration

The speculations in the public space about the opportunity to hold the referendum on European integration can be combated based on various arguments. Especially since the protagonists of disinformation offer numerous opportunities to combat their subversive activity. An example of this is the disinformation promoted by the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) regarding the fact that the supreme laws of the EU member states do not contain any references to European integration. Likewise, the citizens of the Republic of Moldova are subjected to a barrage of pieces of disinformation on the role of referendums organized by member states or EU candidate countries.

There are numerous studies on the accession of different states to the EU, which show that during the existence of the European Community, which later became the European Union, about 60 referendums were held, of which about half anticipated the ratification of the treaties that are the basis of the EU, and the other half anticipated the signing and subsequent ratification by the legislative bodies of the agreements on the accession of the respective states to the EU. The referendum initiated by the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, at the request of the head of state, is part of the second category of referendums. Only five out of 27 EU member states – Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany, and Portugal – have not held referendums at all.

From the above, we can conclude that the purpose of the referendum of October 20, 2024 is to create the constitutional framework necessary for the eventual signing and ratification of the country’s treaty of accession to the EU, when the accession negotiations are over. In this regard, it is important to mention that the Constitutional Court (CC), at the request of the PSRM, in Decision No. 24, of October 9, 2014,  held that: “In the sense of the Declaration of Independence and Article 1 of the Constitution, the orientation towards the European democratic value space is a defining element of the constitutional identity of the Republic of Moldova”. Respectively, the impact of a positive result of the citizens to the question from the ballot paper will consist in transforming the defining element of the constitutional identity into a fait accompli. A negative result will not hinder the EU accession negotiations, but it will possibly postpone the holding of another referendum on a similar question for a few years.

Speculations over participation rate for referendum

A speculative element, insistently circulated in the public space, refers to the minimum participation rate for the referendum – 1/3 of the number of voters registered in the electoral rolls (Article 211). This argument is insistently circulated by the parties that oppose the European integration of the Republic of Moldova, in particular, the PSRM and the PCRM. First of all, the participation rate in the referendum is established by law. This rate was lowered in 2010, from 1/2 to 1/3. Between 2019 and 2021, the PSRM was in power, together with the Shor Party, and had all the necessary levers to amend the electoral legislation, including the threshold for validating elections and referendums. Moreover, the PSRM had the opportunity to modify the thresholds for validating elections and referendums in 2017, when, together with the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM), it participated in the cardinal revision of the Electoral Code, replacing the proportional representation voting system with the mixed one for parliamentary elections.

Secondly, the thresholds for validating referendums are counterproductive, being used for blockages, which is exactly what the PSRM is trying to do. In this regard, the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practices for Referendums expressly states: “It is advisable not to provide for a turnout quorum (threshold, minimum percentage), because it assimilates voters who abstain to those who vote no...”.

Paradoxically, the representatives of the ruling party, which promotes the holding of the referendum, do not have the capacity to debunk the speculations of opponents who invoke arguments regarding the thresholds for validating referendums. Although, they could invoke the experience of a number of EU member states that do not have thresholds for validating referendums – Austria, Belgium, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Ireland, Sweden. Respectively, Croatia’s referendum on joining the EU, for example, was validated with a participation rate of only 43.3%. What matters is that the Croatian authorities had a reason – the favorable vote of 2/3 of the voters, for the ratification of the treaty of accession to the EU.

By the way, in the country of direct democracy, Switzerland, where about 2/3 of all referendums are held, the average participation rate is about 40%, but it happens that the participation rate is also below 30%. What matters is that citizens are well informed and have the right to participate in important decision-making, without anyone being able to resort to boycotts to introduce confusion.

Conclusions

The citizens of the Republic of Moldova must be correctly informed about the advantages and disadvantages of the Republic of Moldova’s accession to the EU. Based on the experience of the member states, they must be sure that joining the EU, which is a political-economic union, does not mean giving up sovereignty and independence, but means opportunities for the country’s development, for assistance in finding the most favorable economic niche and access to a market of about 500 million consumers, without arbitrary embargoes and sanctions, such as those imposed on the Republic of Moldova in 2006 and 2013, etc.

Parties engaged in boycotting the referendum will not be able to register as electoral contestants in the referendum, as their capacity to attract funding and gain access to the media will be limited. Therefore, the PSRM could convene its Republican Council to revise its boycott option in favor of the “NO” option, in order to ask the CEC to register it as an electoral contestant. In the event of such a scenario, the risk is that the PSRM will confirm its inconsistency, which will affect the party’s image.