{Analysis written by Victor Chirila for Info-Prim Neo} Transnistria’s reintegration with a special status within the Republic of Moldova is one of the fundamental priorities of the Moldovan constitutional authorities. To achieve this goal, the Government of the Republic of Moldova is determined to plead for the full withdrawal of the Russian military forces from the territory of the country, replacing peacekeeping forces with an international civilian mission and the settlement of the conflict in the 5 + 2 format, respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. In turn, the secessionist Transnistrian administration rejects from the very beginning any discussions or negotiations with respect to the reintegration of the Transnistrian region with a special status within the Republic of Moldova. The transfer of power in the region that took place in December 2011 didn’t change anything in this respect. The new Transnistrian leader, Yevgeny Shevchuk, intransigently rejects, as well as his predecessor, Igor Smirnov, the idea of reintegration. However, unlike the latter, Yevgeny Shevchuk and his team are doing it much more skillfully, using diplomacy, dialogue with foreign partners, making use of the new tools of communication and distribution of information on the Internet and agilely exploiting civil society capacity to promote/inoculate arguments, opinions and interests of the Transnistrian region in Western capitals, etc.. Moldovan authorities hope that European integration will increase the attractiveness of the Republic of Moldova for its citizens from the Transnistrian region. Their hopes are contradicted by a number of adverse political, economic and social realities in the region. Can the Republic of Moldova change those realities? In the current conditions, it is almost impossible. Small steps policy promoted by Chisinau suffers from a number of deficiencies that make it less credible both on the left and on the right bank of the Nistru River. What is the solution? The solution is just one, regaining our citizens’ confidence in the Transnistrian region. [Step by Step, but in opposite directions] In 2012, the Republic of Moldova and the Transnistrian region agreed to initiate small steps policy in order to rebuild confidence through the settlement of common socio-economic problems. The new approach has created a favorable background for organizing regular meetings in the 5 + 2 format, favored the agreement on the agenda and the principles of the negotiations, diminished the dialogue between Moldovan and Transnistrian administrations and contributed to the resumption of cargo rail traffic through the Transnistrian region. At the same time, Chisinau and Tiraspol failed to reopen the bridge over the Nistru River at Gura Bacului for local and international traffic, the situation of the Moldovan-administered, Latin-script schools in the Transnistrian region remains uncertain, direct telephone links were not resumed, and the Tiraspol administration has reimposed the 100% fee on the “imports” of a range of goods from the Republic of Moldova. These and other problems, such as lack of consensus regarding the recognition of Transnistrian registration plates of vehicle or the opening of a Russian consulate in Tiraspol, have drawn out the existence of contradictory objectives behind the small steps policy. From the point of view of the Moldovan authorities, small steps policy should contribute to the development of practical cooperation with the administration, business and civil society environment in the Transnistrian region, creating thus the prerequisites required for the initiation of negotiations on the future status of Transnistria within the Republic of Moldova. Thus, Chisinau’s stance doesn’t coincide with that of Tiraspol, which considers that Transnistria has accomplished itself as a distinct political entity, and now must ensure its economic viability. In addition, the Transnistrian leader Yevgeny Shevchuk believes that the Region already has a statute, just that, so far, it lacks international recognition. Therefore, it is not by chance that the Transnistrian administration insists that the small steps policy should focus solely on resolving the socio-economic problems of the region, refusing categorically to initiate negotiations on its future political status. In this way, it hopes to normalize relations with Chisinau on the basis of good-neighborliness and legal equality, to bring the region out of economic and political isolation, assuring in this way, a greater degree of sympathy and understanding on the international arena for the “right to self-determination”. However, the immediate goal of Tiraspol is ensuring stability and economic security of the Transnistrian region by maximally reducing control of the Republic of Moldova on the development of its foreign economic and trade relations. [Reintegration through European integration: theoretically possible, but practically uncertain] Moldovan authorities are aware of the mentioned difficulties. However, they consider that these could be overcome through the process of European integration, which will enhance the attractiveness of the Republic of Moldova for the Transnistrian region. It relies in particular on the opportunities and benefits that will be provided to the Republic of Moldova through the Association Agreement, Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement and the liberalization of the visa regime with the European Union (EU). Although in theory this hypothesis is credible, its practical materialization is by no means certain. The current political, social and economic realities in the Transnistrian region counter the Moldovan officials ' optimism, for example: - Transnistrian economic and political elite, regardless of the ethnic origin of its representatives are by excellence pro-Russian and pro-Eurasian. There is no politician, no political party or political movement in Tiraspol which would promote the idea of European integration. Customs Union Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan and the future Eurasian Union are the integration models to which the Transnistrian elite is aspiring to, and certainly not the EU. - Transnistrian elite is concerned above all with its own security, protecting its privileges and ensuring total control over the region. In this regard, the resources allocated for defense, maintaining internal order and security are quite relevant. Thus, in 2012 the cumulative budget for those areas was 549 million Transnistrian rubles (US$49 million) or 17% of the total Transnistria’s budget of 3.1 billion Transnistrian rubles (US$282 million). For comparison, in 2012 the Moldovan Government allocated to the same areas 1.6 billion Lei (US$136 million) or 7% of the national budget of 22 billion lei (US$1.8 billion). - Legal and institutional approximation to the Russian Federation legislation, policies and institutional system is the main goal of the Transnistrian political elite. Namely this harmonization, in parallel with the self-identification of Transnistria as part of the Russian world, is ensuring legitimacy to Transnistrian elite in Moscow, Russian unconditional political, economic, financial and military support, without which it would not be able to survive. - The Tiraspol administration has currently more political-institutional prerogatives than the Republic of Moldova is offering through its reintegration project or its policy of European integration. It has at its disposal and unlimited control all political, administrative, economic and security leverages essential for promoting separatism and the preservation of its privileged status. European integration implies, as it is known, political reform, economic and social development which would entail the transfer, diffusion and ceding of various powers from Tiraspol to Chisinau or Brussels. Seen from this perspective, it becomes as clear as possible that the European integration in tandem with the Republic of Moldova is rather an existential threat to the current Transnistrian elite. - The Republic of Moldova has no real partner in the Transnistrian region who'd fight for the reintegration of the country and European integration. Although, Moldovans constitute one third of the population in the region, and 250 thousand inhabitants in the region have citizenship of the Republic of Moldova, Chisinau did almost nothing to convince them to support its policy of reintegration and European aspirations. Worse than that, they are demoralized, apathetic or guided by associations and individuals supporting separatism and promoting a Transnistrian identity or nation. - Winning elections in 2012, in the context of several political alternatives and fierce competition, has provided the current Transnistrian leader Yevgeny Shevchuk and his team with the representational credibility in the eyes of Western partners. The expression of this reality is the increasingly frequent visits to Tiraspol by European officials. From January 2012, and so far, Transnistria was visited officially or unofficially by Jean-Claude Mignon, President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Lamberto Zannier, Secretary General of the OSCE, Knut Vollebaek, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Lucinda Creighton, Minister of State for European Affairs of Ireland, Carl Bildt, Sweden's Foreign Minister, Radoslaw Sikorski, Polish Foreign Minister. At the same time, meetings of the European diplomats with representatives of the Transnistrian administration have become a habitude. This change of attitude on the part of many States and European organizations inspires confidence to the Transnistrian elite that recognition of Transnistria as a separate political entity is an achievable goal, and just little patience and persistence is needed. Their hopes are not without reason. The repetition of similar elections in the future could lead to the gradual transformation of the representational credibility in the representational legitimacy, not only of the leader, but of the entire legal, political and administrative system build in the region, and this fact will make practically inevitable, including recognition of the existing status of the Transnistrian region. By the way, incidentally or not, but the conclusions and recommendations of the recent report of the OSCE mission “Moldovan-administered Latin-script schools in Transnistria”, as well as of the report prepared by Thomas Hammarberg, UN Expert on Human Rights, with regard to the respect for human rights in Transnistrian region, are based on accepting de facto the institutional realities in the region in the areas covered by them. - Although the Transnistrian economic community has enjoyed for almost five years the advantage of autonomous trade preferences offered by the EU to the Republic of Moldova, it has not become an active supporter/promoter of the Transnistrian region’s participation in the set up of the deep and comprehensive free trade area with the EU. On the contrary, it is dominated and controlled mostly by Russian capital which has privatized strategic enterprises of the Transnistrian industry, such as the Rybnitsa Metallurgical Factory, owned by the Russian Metalloinvest Corporation, the Moldovan Hydroelectric Station in Cuchurgan, which belongs to Inter RAO UES, the Rybnitsa Cement Factory, purchased also by Inter RAO UES, Machine and Construction Plant (Mashinostroitelny Zavod) in Bender, taken over by the Russian Corporation Salyut, the Pumps Factory in Rybnitsa, and Moldavkabeli Plant in Bender. - Transnistria’s stability and viability as a separate political entity, including the preservation of the privileges of the local elite, are dependent entirely on the political, economic and financial support granted by the Russian Federation. In the past five years, Moscow has granted financial assistance to Transnistria, in the form of non-refundable grants, or the accumulation of debts for natural gas consumption, amounting to US$2.29 billion or US$4,580 per capita in the region. For comparison, in the same period, the EU has allocated to the Republic of Moldova financial assistance of around US$600 million, or about US$164 per capita. As of 2008, the Transnistrian debt for natural gas imported from Russia has grown by over US$2.2 billion, reaching a total figure of US$3.7 billion. Of course, this happens with the tacit indulgence of the Russian authorities. At the same time, using the humanitarian assistance, Russia provides regular financial support directly to the Transnistrian region. As of 2008, Moscow transferred to the region over US$90 million or US$590 per capita. In 2012, the Transnistrian administration received two installments of grants worth over US$30 million, plus US$30 million for expanding the foreign exchange reserves of the Central Bank in Tiraspol. About 137 thousand Transnistrian retirees receive monthly from the Russian Government a pension worth US$15. Russia is the main economic and commercial partner of the Transnistrian region. In 2012, the region's foreign trade with Russia reached the figure of US$1 044 398 595, which represents 42% of the total imports and exports of the Transnistrian economic entities over the past year. During the same period, Transnistria’s trade with the EU Member States, plus Croatia, amounted to US$483 408 173 or 26.8% of the total amount. As long as these realities persist, it is unlikely that the European integration of the Republic of Moldova will have any significant impact upon the Transnistrian region. At present, the political class and the Moldovan authorities are not prepared to deal with these challenges. They have no common vision, no political support, no resources, no levers of action in the region, and the policy of small steps is not able to rise to the level of a credible and attractive policy of reintegration of the country for several reasons: - Tiraspol administration was able to limit the small steps policy just to “promote trust” between Vladimir Filat, Prime Minister of Moldova, and Yevgeny Shevchuk, Transnistrian leader, although not even this is certain at the moment. In addition, Tiraspol had reduced to a minimum the involvement of local authorities and business community, and civil society in Transnistria is subject to strict monitoring by the security bodies of the new administration. - Small steps policy agenda has been reduced by Tiraspol and Moscow to resolving selectively first and foremost, some essential economic problems key for ensuring the security and economic independence of the elite and the Transnistrian region from Chisinau. In the meantime, Tiraspol is refusing to address political, security and human rights issues in the region. - Small steps policy promoted almost exclusively by Prime Minister Filat and his party, the Liberal Democratic Party, no longer enjoys unconditional support of the pro-EU parties, the Democratic Party and the Liberal Party. In the last six months, Marian Lupu, Head of Parliament and leader of the Democratic Party, and Mihai Ghimpu, leader of the Liberal Party, criticized implicitly or explicitly the results of small steps policy promoted by the Government. In the opinion of the Head of the Parliament from Chisinau, Moldova hasn’t made progress in the conflict resolution process, and at the time being things are not moving forward in the 5 + 2 format. For his part, the leader of the Liberal Party consider that all the actions taken so far by Prime Minister Vlad Filat didn’t do anything than to present Yevgeny Shevchuk as an important leader in South-Eastern Europe, and the attempts of the Government and of the European partners have brought only benefits to Russia and financial disadvantages to the Republic of Moldova. - Chisinau doesn’t have a short and medium term plan of action, which would guide ministries in the implementation of small steps policy. Moreover, in the absence of updated analyses, ministries are far from the existing sectorial realities in the Transnistrian region. Under these conditions, most of them have a reactive behavior, without vision and initiative in the sectorial dialogue with the Transnistrian administration. - The financial resources allocated by Chisinau and the EU in order to achieve small steps policy are insignificant in comparison with the Russian financial and economic assistance of tens of millions of dollars received annually by Tiraspol. In the past four years, the Government has allocated annually approximately US$800,000 (10 million MDL) for reintegration activities implemented solely in the Security Zone localities which are under Chisinau’s authority. Also, the EU and the United Nations Development Programmed (UNDP) granted €13 million to promote measures to strengthen confidence between the two banks of the Nistru River in the period of 2011-2013, most of which goes to the right bank of the Nistru River. - Small steps policy is not supported by a constant strategy of information and communication with citizens on both sides of the Nistru River. As a result, both sides are apathetic towards the idea of reintegration and know very little, almost nothing, about the special status which the Republic of Moldova grants to the Transnistrian region. Also, according to the Public Opinion Barometer carried out regularly by the Public Policy Institute in Chisinau, just one percent of Moldovan citizens on the right bank of the Nistru River consider the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict as a major State priority. - The Reintegration Office of the State Chancellery has no institutional capacities, necessary technical and financial resources to fulfill efficiently its mission and functions. In accordance with the rules of the organization, the Office is responsible for implementing government policy for territorial, political, economic and social reintegration of the Republic of Moldova; conducting consultations and negotiations for settling the Transnistrian conflict; developing the legal framework dictated by the implementation of reintegration policy; coordinating the activity of public administration bodies in order to implement reintegration policies; developing and promoting confidence building and security policies; coordinating the activity of the sector working groups; monitoring the developments in the Security Zone, as well as the work of peacekeeping mechanisms; etc.. . To accomplish these tasks, the Office has a staff of 20 units. In reality only ten people are working, a third of whom are young employees. In addition, it doesn’t have an autonomous budget and it is at the discretion of the State Chancellery. For comparison, Nina Stanski, Tiraspol’s representative at the negotiations, has 80 employees, benefiting in 2012 from a budget of about US$850,000, of which US$500,000 for the internal body, and approximately US$350,000 for international activity. In the first quarter of this year, Ms. Stanski has at her disposal a budget two times bigger than in the corresponding period last year. Thus, if in the first quarter of 2012 the budget was of 295,941 Transnistrian rubles (about US$26,000), in the first quarter of 2013 it is 603,372 Transnistrian rubles (about US$54,000). In addition, the Reintegration Office doesn’t have a policy of territorial, political, economic and social reintegration of the country which could be implemented together with relevant institutions. Such a policy should clearly set medium-term and long-term general and sectorial objectives, define implementation and coordination mechanisms, establish institutional capacity and financing resources, assign responsibilities and action plans for each Ministry and field separately. The Office for Reintegration has neither human resources nor the sectorial expertise required for the preparation and implementation of such a multidimensional policy of reintegration, which should be designed, definitely, by an inter-institutional group (Government, Ministries, Parliament, Presidency), with the participation of civil society and the assistance of international experts. Furthermore, the Office is lacking an information and communication strategy, and its available internal capacities for this area are extremely small, only one employee in the public relations department. [Conclusions and recommendations] The political and economic elite of Transnistria is concerned, primarily, about its own security and protection of its current political and economic privileges. The current status quo, politically, financially and military sponsored by Russia, is ensuring optimal conditions for the protection of its interests and the survival of separatism. In return, reintegration with Republic of Moldova on the basis of a special status represents an existential risk to its status, therefore, is rejected from the very beginning. Tiraspol and Moscow think that Transnistria has developed as a separate political entity, and now it should develop as a distinct and self-sufficient economic entity. The Transnistrian administration headed by Yevgeny Shevchuk intends to achieve this goal, including through small steps policy of “normalization of good neighborhood relations” with Republic of Moldova, which, in reality, means ensuring its exclusive control on commercial-economic activities with foreign partners, excluding authorities in Chisinau. Moldovan authorities hope that European integration will increase the attractiveness of the Republic of Moldova for its citizens from the Transnistrian region. Their hopes are contradicted by a number of adverse political, economic and social realities in the region. The Transnistrian elite rejects integrationist processes promoted by the EU, as well as participation in the deep and comprehensive free trade area with the EU, advocating instead for Eurasian integration and harmonization with the legislation of the Russian Federation, declared as strategic vector of Transnistrian statehood. Recently, the Institute for Strategic Research in Moscow has committed itself to assist the Government in developing a strategy for Euro-Asian integration. Can the Republic of Moldova change those realities? In the current conditions, it is almost impossible. Small steps policy promoted by Chisinau suffers from a number of deficiencies that make it less credible both on the left and on the right bank of the Nistru River, such as: the lack of a conceptualized policy and action plan on short and medium term; limited political support; insignificant financial resources; the lack of an information and communication strategy; and reduced institutional capacity for coordination and implementation. What is the solution? The solution is just one, regaining our citizens’ confidence in the Transnistrian region. Small steps policy, in its present form, is incapable and inadequate to achieve this aim. It focuses almost exclusively on dialogue, negotiation and interaction with the central administration in Tiraspol, and communication with citizens, the business community and civil society in the Transnistrian region is controlled or reduced to a minimum by the same administration. In view of the situation described above, it is necessary to develop a comprehensive long-term policy of country’s reintegration which would cover all areas of activity and would be designed to support ordinary citizens, business community, cultural and academic world, and civil society. This policy should have a pro-active approach and should be implemented in parallel with political negotiations in the 5 + 2 format, trying to achieve the following objectives: - Involve all State institutions, the most important media resources, business community and civil society in a joint, constant and coordinated effort of communication/cooperation with our citizens on the left bank of the Nistru River; - Equip the Moldovan Government with credible instruments to defend the democratic, economic, social, and cultural interests of our citizens, as well as project their influence and messages in the Transnistrian region; - Identify the incentives and optimal economic, commercial, financial, and fiscal resources to encourage business community in the region to support the participation of the Transnistrian region in the deep and comprehensive free trade area with the EU; - Create a National Reintegration Fund whose resources will be used to support the socially deprived sections, business community, the academic world, students, journalists, civil society etc. in the Transnistrian region; - Establish independent bridges of multi-dimensional communication with the society in the Transnistrian region. Are the Moldovan authorities able to elaborate such a policy? Do they have the vision and the political will to do so? These are key questions to which there is no certain answer. [Victor Chirila, executive director, Foreign Policy Association, for Info-Prim Neo] {Chisinau, March 4, 2013}