The implementation of reforms stimulated by the rapprochement of Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia with the EU implies identical objectives, such as economic integration with the European market and political association, including in foreign policy matters. The undertaking of the model of functioning of the economy, institutions and states in general, according to European best practices, ideally should end with the improvement of living conditions for citizens. These expectations are yet far from the daily reality. The reduction of these discrepancies can be achieved through the Association Agreements of the three countries with the EU. These represent the most ambitious transformation engines from which these countries benefitted during the last 28 years of statehood.

In 2014-2018, when the agreements started to materialize at a slow pace, the mood of the citizens of the three states varied towards the domestic and foreign policy. Negative moods prevailed and this confirms that the impact of the Association Agreements is for now insignificant. The speed of their implementation depends on the political will in Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia and the degree of congruence with the EU requirements. On the one hand, the existence of the Agreements does not change citizens’ attitude with regard to ‘de facto’ situation in the country. In other words, besides a favorable positioning of the country towards the EU, the citizens want a renewed “social contract” that favors them. If not, then they are ready to desert their countries, and such a phenomenon is visible, in particular, in Moldova and Georgia. On the other hand, the European institutions are perfectly aware of the European integration handicaps in the three countries, which in parts resemble, but in many cases differ enormously. But they do not have other instruments than the conditionality, which is inefficient in the case of the national governments that are disinterested in respecting their own commitments to the EU.

Even if each of the three countries is in the EU’s focus, this becomes nuanced by Europeans’ level of confidence in the national governments. A compared look at the content of polls reveals a series of paradoxes. This way, even if Ukraine receives substantial financial and political support from Brussels (IPN, September 24, 2018), the Ukrainian public manifested itself less actively in favor of the entry into the EU than the Georgians. Also, in the period after the banking fraud and the subsequent monopolization of the power by one oligarchic group in Moldova (October 2015- March 2016), the people’s dissatisfaction negatively affected the pro-European sympathies. At the same time, in the situation in Georgia, where the public credibility towards the government declined, the citizens avoided to penalize the country’s pro-European course. The political diversity, maturity of the dialogue with the EU and different impact of the Russian influence individualize these countries. The comparison of public perceptions help identify the divergence points between the three Eastern Partnership countries and the multiple similarities that unite them, usually in negative aspects.

Pressing problems of Moldovans coincide with those in Ukraine and Georgia

The nature of citizens’ concerns during the past five years hasn’t changed radically in Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. Russia’s aggression in Donbas does not stop, as doesn’t the unofficial movement of Georgian borders in favor of the separatist regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia, whose independence from Tbilisi is ensured by the Russian military protectorate. In the same way, the dimensions of corruption in Moldova and Ukraine remain superior to the real and pretended efforts of the authorities. The economic situation and incompetence of national governments are deplorable in areas that the citizens of the three countries signal with similar intensity.

The rankings of the top ten problems perceived by the citizens of Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia highlight a series of differences and also important resemblances (See Table 1).

Primo, unlike Georgia, public opinion in Ukraine and Moldova put corruption on second place. The lack of corruption on the list of problems does not annul its existence in Georgia and rather shows that the Georgians do not perceive it in the daily life and don’t usually notice it in the interaction with the public sector. The situation in Ukraine and Moldova can improve if the access to public services is ensured without practicing acts of corruption. This will no way diminish grand corruption that is fueled with public funds and targets rather group interests than individual ones.

Segundo, even if Moldova’s security is threatened by the Transnistrian conflict and the illegal presence of Russian military forces, the Moldovan citizens do not express any preoccupation about a similar issue – the Transnistrian conflict. In contrast, the Ukrainians and Georgians are extremely sensitive to Russia’s actions that violate their territorial integrity. Evidently, the memory of the public in Georgia, but especially in Ukraine, is fresh because the Russian military aggression does not stop to cause victims. Any military offensive of Russia on the part of the Transnistrian region could yet easily inflame public opinion in Moldova.

Tertio, the deficit of jobs provided by the national economies and the mediocrity of the government are common problems emphasized in the rankings of the top ten problems in all three countries. The weak performance of the economy is determined by the absence of viable solutions proposed by the national governments and the citizens flagged this thing.

Cuarto, the individual problems on which the citizens refer persist in each of the three countries. In Moldova, the public invokes the physical infrastructure whose degradation is visible all over the country, including in the capital city. The Ukrainians raise the issue of the impact of the depreciation of the national currency that led to lower salaries and pensions and, inevitably, curbed the economy. Also, for objective reasons, the public opinion in Ukraine lays emphasis on the difficulty of the relations with Russia, which applies a varied arsenal of (non)conventional weapons for destabilizing the Ukrainian state. The crimes are a separate problem among the Georgians. The reports on the implementation of the Association Agreement in Georgia’s case make reference only to organized crime for whose fighting an Action Plan was adopted for 2017-2020.

Table 1. List of major problems faced by countries according to citizens’ opinion

Source: IRI.org

Quinto, only in Moldova and Georgia migration is regarded as a pressing problem. This is due to the small size of the population and, respectively, to the increased visibility of demographic shortcomings. Unofficial figures show a critical situation for Moldova, where over one third of the population of about 3 million is involved in seasonal or long-term migration. In comparison, the over 40 million Ukrainians look at migration through a more positive angle even if Russian’s aggression in eastern Ukraine and the Sea of Azov affects regional demographic dynamics and intensifies appetite for internal and external migration towards Europe.

Sexto, the citizens in Ukraine and Moldova put the political instability on the list of problems. This way, Petr Poroshenko’s control of the presidency and the parliamentary majority in Ukraine wasn’t sufficient to consolidate the feeling of stability among the Ukrainians. Also, Vladimir Plahotniuc’s domination of the decision-making process in Moldova was complete, but excluded the opposition from any equation of the power, which triggered an enormous deficit of political harmony.

Paradoxes of citizens’ perceptions of domestic and foreign policy

The views of the citizens of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia on the domestic political phenomena had a different reflection on the sympathies with the EU. Three important paradoxes that explain best the unpredictability of public opinion in the three countries can be emphasized here (See Table 2).

The first paradox resides in the fact that the citizens in Moldova and those in Georgia differently connect the domestic policy to the foreign one. This way, amid the crisis in the banking and political systems (October 2015-Sepetmber 2016), the Moldovan citizens gave the poorest grades to the direction in which the country goes – 79-82%. The same negativism expanded to the attitude about the EU membership, which, for the first time, dropped below the level of the pro-Eurasian views. The latter varied between 42% and 45%, which is by 7% above the pro-EU orientation registered in October 2015. A drastic change in the opinion of the Georgians about the government in February 2015 had practically no impact on Georgians’ sympathies with the EU. Thus, the positive assessment of the government among Georgians decreased from 56% in May 2013 to 25% in February 2015. At the same time, the pro-EU option changed insignificantly from 87% to only 85%. A similar behavior is seen in Ukrainians (See Table 2). The stability of the pro-European sympathies showed by Georgians is due to the weakness of the pro-Russian political forces that in Moldova’s case control the presidential institution (Igor Dodon) and could become the largest political party after the elections of February 2019. Additionally, the discrediting of the government controlled by the Democratic Party, associated with the EU, disadvantaged the pro-European attitudes. Finally, the pro-Russian sympathies and, respectively, the Eurosceptical antipathies can easier penetrate the Moldovan media space than the Georgian one.

Table 2. Citizens’ opinions about state of affairs in country and their geopolitical options, %

Source: IRI.org

The differentiated impact of the EU support on public opinion is the second paradox. This time the Georgians’ position on the EU is again more solid than in the case of the Ukrainians. Even if the latter receive constant support on the part of the European institutions, their Euro-optimism is more reluctant than in Georgia. Between 2014 and 2018 the pro-European Ukrainian sympathies reached a record high of 59% in September 2014. The highest level in Georgia was recorded in March 2017 – 90% (See Table 2). The origin of a dose of reticence towards the European course seen in Ukraine is similar to that in Moldova and results from the existence of pro-Russian forces in eastern and southwestern regions of Ukraine. At the same time, the stopping of the pro-European Ukrainian feelings at 50% can be due to the critical reaction of the European states to particular policies adopted by Kiev. Also, Russia’s aggression in Donbas and the ascent of the Eurosceptical forces inside the EU, which are often friendly towards Moscow, condition isolationist tendencies among segments of the Ukrainian population.

The third paradox is related to the combination of a robust pro-European course with the predisposition to maintain pragmatic relations with Russia. Georgia exemplifies a contradictory situation were the population’s will to join the EU is as advanced as the wish to improve the dialogue with Russia. On the one hand, this shows that the relationship with the EU does not exclude the openness to Russia. On the other hand, Georgia, as Ukraine, recently experienced the Russian aggression that resulted in the definite rupture of the separatist territories. The conciliatory approach followed by the government headed by Bidzina Ivanishvili starting with 2012 and, respectively, the controversial position of the new President Salome Zurabisvhili on Russia could maintain a double, contradictory perception of Russia – of aggressor and of potential pragmatic partner. The same cannot be said about Ukraine, which continues to expand its independence from Russia, including in the field of religious institutions. The intervention in Donbas and the annexation of Crimea by the Russian authorities practically exclude any pragmatic dialogue between Kiev and Moscow. On the contrary, these realities that are unfavorable for Ukraine stimulate cooperation with the EU and NATO.

Instead of conclusions…

The analysis of the attitudes of the citizens of Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia is a useful instrument for measuring progress in the European integration process. The complexity of these perceptions requires a very attentive interpretation, but does not ensure complete understanding of the paradoxes created by the interaction between the domestic policy and the foreign one.

Public opinions in the three countries reveal paradoxical situations when the EU enjoys unconditional support on the part of Georgians, who can also combine the pro-European course with the remediation of the dialogue with Russia. In another case, the negative position of the citizens to the own governments can result in antipathy to the EU, as Moldova’s experience shows.

It is yet definite that the implementation of the Association Agreement brings about changes at a slow place. As, the lists of major problems invoked by the Moldovans, Ukrainians and Georgians remain the same even if the European integration process continues.