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| Dionis Cenuşa | |
The European Union’s approach to Moldova became more concrete and dynamic in 2016. The EU became more actively involved amid numerous internal crises (refugee problem, Brexit, etc.) and the major image crisis sustained in Moldova owing to the discrediting of the European course by the corrupt governments. In a critical year for Moldova, and for the EU too, the latter played an evidently constructive role as it employed the harshest element of conditionality for the first time – freezing of the EU funding. Moreover, the EU joined in the enormous pressure exerted at internal level by protesting groups and civil society.
Brussels should maintain an as active position after the presidential elections, regardless of their outcome, as the challenges related to the European integration can multiply. That’s why an EU ‘roadmap’ for Moldova should incorporate three essential elements. First of all, the process of democratizing Moldova necessitates special attention as this is stagnant owing to the high frequency of political crises, discrediting of state institutions and the phenomenon of captured state. Secondly, it is essential to accelerate the activities related to the transposition and implementation of the Association Agreement, both of the political and economic parts. Last but not least, the dialogue between Brussels and Moscow, held to identify cooperation ways in the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union, must not affect the EU’s relations with countries that signed Association Agreements – Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine.
Democratization of Moldova
The shortcomings of the Moldovan democracy became more visible during the last few years. These defects derive from the ‘colonization’ and subduing of state institutions following the pressure and confrontations between different political players. Anyway, the politicization of institutions is the visible part of the problem, the hidden one being the low immunity and diluted integrity of the institutions and the whole public sector, at the local and central levels, which can easily become victims of the influence of the parties that take over.
In this difficult context for the stability of democracy in Moldova, the EU should step up its actions to support the democratic and civil institutions whose role is hesitating and powerfully fragmented. These objectives are not at all easy given that the safest and most durable democracy is the one cultivated inside the country, not the imported one. That’s why the EU should swiftly put into practice the action plan on human rights and democracy that was adopted on July 20, 2015 with regard to Moldova. Surely, the objectives of the plan of action must be adjusted to the local, Moldovan problems and needs. Similar actions are planned by the EU as an intrinsic component of its foreign policy, but are very important for countries like Moldova, which have advanced relations with the EU, but do not have yet a clear European perspective. The EU priorities in relation to Moldova include: corruption fighting; integrity and transparency of public institutions (at central and local levels); consolidation of the democratic institutions (justice, electoral framework); capacity of civil society and facilitation of a favorable context for the mass media; and creation of an inclusive society, based on non-discrimination and guarantees for gender equality. These objectives fully meet the Moldovan realities.
The problem related to Moldova’s democratization depends yet on the sustainability of the actions taken by the Europeans and the credibility of the local partners approached by the EU.
So, on the one hand, the EU must be pragmatic in unpredictable countries like Moldova. The conditionality instruments must be anchored in the democratization priorities and vice versa. That’s why, where it is possible, the sector reforms must include components typical of democratization. This will simplify the possibility of launching conditionality instruments.
On the other hand, the EU needs credible partners both among the authorities and among civil society. The integrity is an essential aspect in this regard. This should be tested in time and repeatedly. Not only the state institutions, but also civil society have a low popular approval rating. Consequently, the role of the EU is not only to capacitate civil society, but to also encourage transparency ensuring and reanimation of the image of the NGO sector. Without civil society perceived publicly as a credible and upright actor, it will be harder for the EU to promote sensitive subjects (nondiscrimination, gender equality) and, respectively, to exert the necessary pressure on the authorities.
Anyway, judging by the election campaign prior to the presidential elections, three dimensions necessitate special efforts on the part of the EU and other development partners of Moldova. First of all, it is important to consolidate anti-corruption investigation journalism, on condition that access to information of public interest is ensured, but this thing is opposed by the political sector and by the politicized state institutions. Secondly, women’s rights and their capacity, in particular in rural areas, must become an urgent reaction to the sexist and misogynic attacks against women candidate (especially against Maia Sandu) in the election campaign. Last but not least, the anti-discrimination mechanisms existing in Moldova must be assessed, reinvigorated and fortified so as to better protect the vulnerable groups (women, sexual minorities) that are transformed into electoral targets by the conservative forces of society (especially pro-Russian parties, representatives of religious institutions controlled by the Russian Orthodox Church).
Monitoring implementation of Association Agreement
The European integration and implementation of the Association Agreement must continue at a more accelerated pace. The ordinary parliamentary elections will follow after the presidential elections of 2016, in 2018 (probability of early elections is low). That’s why the opportunity of European integration must be increased and diversified, while the ordinary people must also become beneficiaries of reforms, alongside, not after public functionaries, judges and other segments of players close to the state institutions. Ultimately, the benefits of the Association Agreement must penetrate society as profoundly and extensively as possible. The surface changes must be mandatorily replaced with profound ones.
To make sure that the reforms bring about high-quality changes, the actions of the authorities must be monitored actively, while the mechanisms of the Association Agreement, which involve civil society (Civic Society Platform, Local Consultancy Group) must be regularly examined by EU representatives, first of all in Chisinau, but also in Brussels. The capacity of the EU and of its local partners (civil society) to forecast and, respectively, to prevent crises, either political, economic or sector ones, counts a lot. This is also relevant for combating the phenomenon of captured state in Moldova, which is a reality confirmed by the existence of influence on the government on the part of oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc, who says that his role is to only stabilize the country (Reuters, November 11, 2016).
EU’s relations with Russia and Eurasian Economic Union
The interests of the countries that signed Association Agreements with the EU must be respected and promoted, especially given that Russia maintains its pressure on these (support for separatism, commercial barriers, media propaganda).
The eventual talks between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union through Russia (IPN, November 7, 2016) must take into account the situation of the middle countries, where the democratic institutions are weak and yet in the process of transition or are fissured by the often political crises. An emergent interest on the part of the pro-Russian forces in reviewing the Association Agreement with the EU in favor of the asymmetric free trade regime with the EU that existed earlier persists in these countries. The same voices suggest abandoning the commitments related to the harmonization of the legislation and even the political association with the EU owing to the incompatibility with local traditional values. The election campaign prior to the presidential elections of Moldova was full of proposals that match the rapprochement with Russia rather than the firm transposition of the European development model.
Regardless of the circumstances, Brussels must refuse conditions or ‘veto positions’ in relation to Russia or the Eurasian Economic Union in its dialogue with the countries that signed the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia). Any manifestation of flexibility and/or weakness to Russia will stimulate the pro-Russian forces in these states and will be interpreted as betrayal by the supporters of the course to European integration.
Instead of conclusion
Democratization, advancing of reforms and multiplication of benefits for the ordinary people and correct geopolitical posture represent the main components of a ‘roadmap” needed by EU in regard to Moldova. Simultaneously, the Europeans must combat the phenomenon of captured state and must support the modernization reforms included in the European agenda, many aspects of which were criticized by the pro-Russian forces.
The plan of action on democratization, planned for Moldova too, must be extensively reproduced in the association agenda and intercrossed with its provisions and, respectively, the sector reforms. This way conditionality can be launched more often and more efficiently.
Ultimately, the results of the presidential elections, regardless of the risks that they may seem to pose, should be regarded, in reality, as an opportunity of improving the European integration process in Moldova.
IPN publishes in the Op-Ed rubric opinion pieces submitted by authors not affiliated with our editorial board. The opinions expressed in these articles do not necessarily coincide with the opinions of our editorial board.
