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| Dionis Cenuşa | |
At the end of this October, the Moldovan citizens will choose again a Head of State, after almost 20 years of the last direct presidential elections held before amendments were made to the Constitution in 2000. The sustainability of the European course in Moldova depends on the result of these elections. This will be subject to a durability test for the first time after 11 years of the signing of the Moldova – EU Plan of Action (February 2005), during the Communist government and, respectively, two years after the signing of the Association Agreement (June 2014).
If the people support a pro-Russian candidate, the possibility of renewing the Russian vector as a geopolitical option is substantial. This will favor the return of the pro-Russian forces to the main political arena and the strengthening of the opposition to the European integration process. This can result in the stagnation of the Association Agreement or even its annulment.
At the same time, the presidential elections of this October are a huge opportunity for promoting political leaders of pro-European orientation. As a result, the emergence of a Head of State connected to the space of European values and views can contribute to the reinvigoration of the public support for the integration into the EU. The failure of the pro-European candidate will lead to the multiplication of the geopolitical dilemma in society. This will represent a direct consequence of the tensions between the pro-Russian president and the rest of the institutions in the state, which are involved in the implementation of the European agenda. In such a situation, the supporters of the pro-European course will be twice disadvantaged because they are to confront not only an ostensible pro-European government to blame for the weakening of the public confidence in the EU, but also a pro-Russian President.
Pro-Russian or pro-European President?
Polls give bigger chances both to the pro-Russian political leaders (the leader of the Party of Socialists Igor Dodon) and to leaders with pro-European views (Maia Sandu, leader of the Party “Action and Solidarity”, and Andrei Nastase, chairman of the Party “Platform Dignity and Truth”). The other candidates will most probably not have enough time to win the sympathies of large segments of the people. Consequently, the struggle for the seat of President will be given between the given three political leaders.
The Socialist leader Igor Dodon is for now the most powerful candidate on the political left. Though this would most probably not win the elections by the first round, he has the resources needed to reach the second tour. This will collect the votes of the people who want the relations with Russia to be restored, including by abandoning the European agenda.
The simultaneous participation of Maia Sandu and Andrei Nastase in the presidential elections will divide the voters that incline to the EU. Logically, these should conclude an electoral armistice and should concentrate on combating the candidacy of Dodon. These should also refrain from reciprocal criticism that would disadvantage any of the two that will be propelled to the second round. Inevitably, the electoral agenda of Sandu and Nastase will be based on the condemnation of the current government and the promise to use the presidency to oppose the actions taken by the current government. The victory of any of the two will be presented to the public as “the start of the liberation of the state from the captivity of the oligarchy group controlled by Vladimir Plahotniuc”.
However, particular risks can be generated even if a pro-European President is chosen, whether this is guided only by revenge (Andrei Nastase more) or will chose a combative, but also reasonable position (Maia Sandu more). The new elite that present themselves as pro-European must devote themselves to the public interests by doing reforms inspired from the association agenda with the EU, which ultimately counteract the manifestations of the ‘captured state’. The occupation of the seat of President should no way be transformed into a new attempt to subdue the state institutions for combating the political rivals.
Risks emanated by a pro-Russian President
It is evident that a pro-Russian President, like the Socialist leader Igor Dodon, will be a powerful blow to the forces that are close to the EU, either they represent the current discredited government or the new forces allied to the European idea.
Under the new provisions of the electoral legislation, the future Head of State will have to renounce his position in the party, but this will not hamper Igor Dodon to promote the ideas of the Party of Socialists. The legislation does not provide for the imposition of bans and penalties in this regard. At the same time, the previous experience shows that the President who came from a parliamentary party remains connected or event takes part in decision-making within his party (the example of Vladimir Voronin and the PCRM in 2001-2009). Consequently, the initiatives of the Socialists concerning Moldova’s rapprochement with Russia will be uttered by Dodon, but already from the position of Head of State.
The pro-Russian President will represent a counterweight to the government committed to implement the European agenda. The first will try to connect the corruption that derives from the government to the EU, even if the latter provides assistance for the reforms inspired from the Association Agreement, not for maintaining one government or another.
The election of a pro-Russian President will represent a geopolitical trump card at regional level for Russia. The President’s possibilities in the field of external policy, guaranteed by the Constitution (Art. 86 – participation in negotiations, signing of international treaties) are enough for destabilizing the political dialogue between Brussels and Chisinau. In this case, the risk of a dual external policy in Chisinau (pro-Russian President versus the other institutions engaged in the implementation of the European agenda) will increase imminently.
Moreover, Igor Dodon said the population could decide on the Association Agreement by a referendum. So, the Socialist could not only hamper the implementation of the Accord (for example, by broadly using the law abrogation instrument), but also ask the people to state their opinion on the Accord by a plebiscite. Also, this could suggest a plebiscite on the country’s entry into the Customs Union. This idea was insistently promoted earlier. Such a power is conferred to the President by the supreme law (Art. 88, p. f). Given the powerful presence of the Russian-Eurasian course in polls and the image crisis sustained by the European course, associated with the actions of the oligarchized government, a possible referendum on the Accord could have a disastrous outcome for the European agenda.
Instead of conclusion...
It is premature to conclude that namely the pro-Russian candidate will win the presidential elections of this October, but the risks that derive from such a scenario should be seriously analyzed by the new pro-European political forces, the current government and the European partners.
The only players that can exclude the materialization of the scenario of a pro-Russian President are the representatives of the new wave of pro-European parties, whose leaders enjoy credibility in society (Maia Sandu, Andrei Nastase). For this reason, these are obliged to conclude pacts so as not to strike each other in the first round and to combine forces in the second round of the elections by maximally mobilizing the pro-European voters. This is the only viable solution that would enable to keep or even to save the European course.
Ultimately, the counteracting of the manifestations of ‘captured state’ is really possible if the post of President is won by the new political forces that sympathize with the EU. Another scenario will be favorable to only Russia, which is extremely interested in stopping the European integration in Moldova and in the region and not in reformation and combating of oligarchic governments.
IPN publishes in the Op-Ed rubric opinion pieces submitted by authors not affiliated with our editorial board. The opinions expressed in these articles do not necessarily coincide with the opinions of our editorial board.