According to the Moldovan constitution, Transnistria - also known as the “Left Bank of the Nistru River” - is part of the territory of the Republic of Moldova. However, the reality is that Moldovan authorities have no control over the region which has been functioning as a de facto state since the early 1990s. The loss of control over this region occurred in the context of the collapse of the Soviet Union and worsening in the moment the Republic of Moldova gained and affirmed its independence on August 27, 1991.
Historical premises
Since the Soviet Union never admitted the Union of Bessarabia to Romania in 1918, the Soviets created great pressure on the Romanian authorities through the organization, training, and financing of subversive action in Bessarabia. This pressure implicated the creation of Moldovan ASSR inside Ukrainian SSR in 1924. The newly created republic received the status of an autonomous republic because of the future political perspectives of Soviet Moldova, i.e. the eventual annexation of Bessarabia. The Moldovan SSR was created by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on August 2, 1940, joining parts of historical Bessarabia and the Moldovan ASSR, but not in their integrity - only six from the total of thirteen rayons of the Moldovan ASSR were annexed to the Moldovan SSR.
In long lasting terms the unification of these two distinct entities (known as Bessarabia and Transnistria, or the “left bank” and “right bank” of the Nistru river), which never existed before in any sense as a common entity, was fateful for the further evolution both of the Moldovan SSR and the Republic of Moldova. Economically and demographically speaking, Soviet Moldova gradually developed as two republics in one: a largely rural, agricultural and indigenous Moldovan, and a more urban, Slavic, and generally immigrant population in Transnistria working in Soviet-style heavy industry. Most of the Moldovan industry worked out as an appendix of the great Soviet enterprises or were located outside Bessarabia in Transnistria, which was producing 1/3 of the Moldovan industrial output.
In the same time, mainly the Moldovan elements from Transnistria alongside with the Russian officials appointed from Moscow were the element of the party apparatus that promoted the Soviet nationality policies in the Moldovan SSR. As a whole, these elements enjoyed an almost cast-like dominance over public life in Moldova in the Soviet period, reinforced by the low level of education within the Moldovan population, the dominance of Russian and Russified cadres in most major institutions and near-universal use of Russian as the language of official business in the republic.
Besides the inherent distortion of the ethnic balance in the Moldovan SSR, that peculiar Soviet policy has generated the long-lasting premises of future Transnistrian separation. On September 02, 1990, the region, supported by Moscow, proclaimed itself as independent entity – “Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic (PMR)” and ceased to take order from central government of the Republic of Moldova.
Causes and beginning
The Transnistrian crisis was artificially created by Moscow on the turn of 1990 in the context of the Soviet system crisis and ascendancy of the national movements in the Soviet republics. Facing the probability of the Moldovan SSR to leave the Soviet Union, A. Lukianov, at that moment the President of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, with implication of D. Iazov and B. Pugo, respectively Soviet Ministers of Defense and Internal Affairs, decided to create on the territory of Moldova two states: on the left bank of Dnestr and in the region of Gagauzia. In the same time the Soviet official created a linkage between the problem of local separatism in Moldova and the Moldovan SSR’s commitment to sign the new Soviet treaty initiated by M. S. Gorbaciov in order to save the Soviet Union.
Moscow's first effective support for the Transnistrians came in September of 1990, when Soviet Interior Ministry troops were dispatched to Tiraspol to protect the “Congress” of Russophone elites that declared the “Transnistrian Republic” independent of Moldova within the Soviet Union. The troops' intervention was largely aimed at conflict management - in this case, deterring Chisinau from suppressing the gathering by force, as it had threatened to do. It also had a second goal, however: to pressure Moldova to abandon its bid for independence or else faces dismemberment.
The 14th Army troops - many of them natives of the Transnistria region - were further encouraged by the Defense Ministry's open tilt toward Tiraspol. Thus by the time the first Moldovan - Transnistrian armed confrontation took place outside Dubossary in November 1990, the Transnistrian Russophones had not only their own armed volunteer formations, but also the expectation of support from Soviet troops.
The conflict between the new Moldovan authorities in Chişinău and the “PMR” broke in late spring and summer 1992, and resulted in several hundred casualties. The conflict was soon eclipsed by other world events and disappeared from the news headlines. It remains, however, one of the most complicated conflicts on the post-Soviet scene, both in terms of its pre-history, its political constellations and its possible future developments. While an effective ceasefire was concluded on July 7, 1992, no solution has yet been found to the underlying contentious issue-the legal-territorial status of the Dnestr left bank of the Moldovan state.
Although the Russian mass media and officials have regularly referred to the war as an ethnic conflict, however, it would be a gross oversimplification to present the conflict as a showdown between the ethnic Moldovan/Romanian and the 'Russian-speaking' part of the Moldovan population. Moreover neither side involved in conflict agrees to this description and insist that it is essentially political in character.
On the Moldovan side, the conflict began as a mass insurgency, but it became a case of nationalism after Moldovan Popular Front came to power in Moldova and pushed ahead the policy of Romanization and the unification to Romania. Under the influence of the nationalists among the Popular Front leaders, the legislature introduced a series of divisive measures, which heightened the growing anxiety of the Russian-speaking minorities. The process of anti-Soviet mobilization that preceded the dissolution of the USSR thus reinforced the ethnic cleavage that was already existent in Moldova.
On the side of the Russian speaking secessionists in the Transnistrian region, in contrast, the violence was a case of elite conspiracy, with support from Moscow playing a crucial role. Incumbent Russophone leaders in the Transnistria region used ethnic outbidding to exacerbate mass hostility and the security dilemma in order to preserve and increase their own power. The war in Moldova happened as it did because Moscow deterred mass-led violence on the Moldovan side, but later determined that its strategic interests were best served by supporting instead of preventing the Transnistrian elites' secessionism. Moscow therefore helped the Transnistrian elites to start the war, and then to win it.
The escalation of the conflict after the Snegur ultimatum in March 1992 threatened to compromise the neutrality of the 14th Army in Moldova, which Russia took under its control by a presidential decree of 1 April, 1992. General Lebed, who replaced Yurii Netkachev as commander of the14th Army in June 1992, on a number of occasions voiced strong support of the “PMR” regime. He has declared the right bank city of Bendery an inalienable part of “PMR” and “PMR” itself “a small part of Russia” and the Transnistria region is the “key to the Balkans”. When Bendery was captured by Moldovan forces on 19 June, tanks from the 14th Army crossed the bridge over the Dnestr. This event appears to have been the turning point of the battle.
Consequences
The Transnistrian conundrum laid heavily on the process of post-communist transition in Moldova. As has been pointed out earlier, the conflict has generally portrayed as ethnic in origin. Nevertheless, efforts to deal with the ethnic concerns of the separatists remain ineffective so long as the more fundamental sources of the conflicts are not addressed. In fact, the crisis has been the result less of legitimate ethnic grievances and more of a long-term contest between two different political elites, one of which replaced the other in Moldova’s transition from Soviet republic to independent state. A complicating factor is that the Transnistrian republic established rudimentary state structures, that is, an elected president and parliament, military formations, a vast network of rayon and city councils left over from the Soviet period, and even introduced its own currency. As a result, since the Transnistrian leaders have profited from the lack of central Moldovan control over the region, they also unlikely to commit to political reforms which would diminish their position of leverage toward Chisinau.
But the most complicating problem of the dispute is the Russian 14th army and the Russian Federation’s favorable stance toward Transnistria. In October 1994, a Russian-Moldovan agreement was signed stipulating the withdrawal of Russian troops from the region but that accord has never gone into effect owing to the Russian State Duma’s refusal to ratify it. In addition, on 13 November 1996, the State Duma adopted a resolution declaring the region a zone of “special strategic interest for Russia”. Given the international pressure, at the 1999 Istanbul OSCE summit Russia subscribe to retreat its army forces from Moldova until 2001 but denying this responsibility citing technical difficulties of withdrawal.
In the context of post-Soviet politics, the relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Moldova are marked by many contradictions. From one side, Russia officially supports the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova and officially is involved in “settlement” of the Transnistrian conflict. In the same time, Moscow is the main supporter of the separatist regime in Tiraspol and provides to Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic political, economic, financial and military help.
Russia initiated two plan of settlement the issue of territorial integrity of Moldova both having as a fix idea the federalization of the Republic of Moldova, with Chisinau and Tiraspol as equal parts, and having therefore the instruments to influence and to pressure the Republic of Moldova and the possibility to maintain its military bases in Transnistria. The first one was “Primakov Memorandum”, signed in 1997 and the second was the so-called “Kozak Memorandum” which was supposed to be signed in 2003, but was rejected by Communist government as result of massive protest and external pressure. In both cases, but especially in the last one, Russia pushed for a treaty giving Transnistria near independence within a federal state, enough seats in the Moldovan Parliament to block constitutional change and the long-term presence of Russian troops.
Many other plans of settling were also proposed: OSCE Plan (1993) – Moldova as unitary state, with large autonomy to Transnistria; Belkovski Plan (2004): suggested Bessarabia to be awarded to Romania and to grant Transnistria Independence; Iushcenko Plan (2006): Democratization of Transnistria then unification with Moldova; Cioroianu Plan (2009): suggested Cyprus model.
Future
Based on the positions taken by the various internal and external actors in the recent past and the present, several scenarios could, however, be imagined in the solving of the conflict. The first one would result in a single Moldovan state that accords a large autonomy to Transnistria; the second outcome would be a confederation composed of Chişinău and Tiraspol (plus the Gagauz region), each of them with an equal status; the third would be integration of the Right Bank (i.e. the present Republic of Moldova minus Transnistria) into Romania on historical grounds that emphasize a Romanian unitary state which includes the historical territory of Bessarabia; the fourth outcome would mean the attachment of Transnistria to the Russian Federation along the lines of the two consecutive referendums voted in Transnistria, where this proposal was supported by a majority, albeit under circumstances marked by great irregularities; a fifth scenario could be of Transnistria joining Ukraine, a possibility suggested by history – Transnistria had been part of Ukraine between 1917 and 1940 – and demographic factors (ethnic Ukrainians represent 28 per cent of the region’s population); sixth, Transnistria could become an independent state, as its officials and inhabitants have advocated numerous times. However, similar historical experiences across the world suggest that post‐colonial or post‐imperial contexts are hard to predict when a newly formed state’s political and territorial identity is fragile and collides with great power ambitions of the former imperial center.
Today the future of state it is frequently presented in terms of a strong alternative: the Republic of Moldova could become a European state, with Transnistria an integral part of it as a result of European integration, or a confederation of Moldova and Transnistria under Russian control that would participate in the Eurasian projects of the Russian Federation. In both cases, the selected pattern would reflect not only the internal preferences of Moldovans, influenced by various state‐ and nation‐building projects, but also the general context of conflicting or consensual relations between European Union and Russian Federation regarding this issue. For these reasons, the most likely outcome in the short and medium run seems to be maintenance of the present status quo. Since the general context of confrontation between West and East is not encouraging the actual reconciliation of the Republic of Moldova.
Octavian Ţîcu,
doctor of history, Institute of History, Academy of Sciences
