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| Dionis Cenuşa | |
The migration of Moldovans to Europe was initially determined by the deficit of jobs in the native country, in particular in rural areas. But the Moldovans’ interest to go to the EU diversified in time. Thus, the Moldovans who chose to leave Moldova aimed to get more consistent economic opportunities in Europe. Their arguments became rational-materialistic and separate from the initial existential ones. The salaries in the EU member states were and are distinctly superior to those in Moldova (€500-800 or more versus €100-150), while the living conditions are much better than at home. Namely these aspects encouraged the medium- and long-term migration to Europe (about 250,000 people in Italy, the UK, Spain and other EU countries). However, a lot of Moldovans (about 500,000) continued to choose circular (seasonal) migration to Russia.
The perception that the Moldovans in Europe are not motivated and do not have sufficient capacities to contribute to the country’s “Europeanization” persists. The economic and political factors in Moldova and the host EU member states generate reticence and absenteeism inside the diaspora. It is yet premature to exclude an active role on the part of the diaspora aimed at facilitating Moldova’s rapprochement with the EU.
Migration, remittances and connection with Europe
The higher living standards and incomes made Europe more attractive for the Moldovan migrants. At the beginning, these chose to illegally reach Italy or Spain rather than to benefit from legal and simple ways to find employment in Russia, where other risks were waiting for them (in the 1990s to the physical and income security). But the development of banking services and their operationalization in Moldova made the transfer of remittances from Europe, including from Russia, safer and more constant. This way the remittances amounted to over US$1 billion a year, representing 30-40% of the country’s GDP.
The permanent flow of remittances created a major dependence between the Moldovan migrants in Europe and their families that remained at home. Furthermore, the migrants created unconventional networks of interaction with those who are at home, the transfer of parcels being the most important one of these. This way the Italian, Greek, Spanish and other kinds of products started to be more accessible to migrants’ families than to the rest of the population. In general, through the agency of migrants, remittances and the European products transmitted by these, large groups of Moldovans became connected to Europe. Evidently, the created connections didn’t involve much the transfer of European values (attention to the rule of law, human rights etc.) as the focus was on material aspects (money, food products, etc.).
Afterward, the pro-European political parties decided to make use of the electoral potential of the migrants in Europe. Political centers of parties were created in different parts of Europe, in particular in Italy. The political control over the diaspora was considered vital for more efficiently influencing the electoral conduct of migrants’ families that remained at home, but are powerfully dependent on remittances. The diaspora’s potential of agent of the country’s “Europeanization” wasn’t even included in the political agenda. Consequently, the ruling parties treated the diaspora strictly as a source of remittances and as an electoral opportunity, not as a conglomerate of Moldovan citizens who are (semi)integrated into different European societies and possible facilitators of the European integration.
Why did the potential of the diaspora in Europe remain unrealized?
A question persists: Could the diaspora play an important role in the country’s “Europeanization”, with or without the involvement of the ruling political forces? Until now there haven’t been clear signs that the Moldovan migrants in Europe would like and/or will be able to do this. But there are yet different reasons that hinder the diaspora from becoming emancipated, in particular as an agent of “Europeanization”.
Firstly, Moldovans’ migration to such countries as Italy, Spain and Ireland reached a dilemmatic stage, when the return to Moldova is not advantageous, while those who remained at home decide to join the family members who left. So, the acceleration of the family reunification logically leads to the reduction in the interaction between the diaspora and the country. This tendency is encouraged by the fact that the socioeconomic situation in the country of origin has worsened as a result of the multiplication of corruption and diminution of competence in government.
Secondly, the work in Europe consumes all the free time of the Moldovan migrants. Starting with 2009, the economic crisis has powerfully affected the EU, undermining the economies of the host countries, in particular Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. Consequently, the Moldovans had to work even more for having an income similar to that gained before the economic crisis. As a result, the diaspora focused on existential problems, but outside Moldova already.
Thirdly, besides the unfriendly socioeconomic circumstances in the host European countries, the diaspora’s attention from the European agenda of Moldova was distracted by the size of political corruption. The ruling parties that were long considered “pro-European” destabilized the country from political and economic viewpoints, while their discrediting seriously affected the credibility of those that promote the European agenda.
Last but not least, we must take into account the profile of the Moldovan migrants in Europe, on which the diaspora’s capacity to contribute to Moldova’s “Europeanization” also depends. According to the general perception, compared with the Moldovans who are in Russia, those who are in Europe include mainly Moldovans with higher education who represent skilled labor force. However, the diaspora in Europe is varied. Some of the Moldovans fully integrated into European societies, while others prefer to live in communities of Moldovans, rather isolated. Therefore, before the diaspora to function as an agent of “Europeanization”, this must “Europeanize” itself.
Instead of conclusion
The Moldovans’ migration to Europe becomes more legal. Partially, this is due to the legalization of the Moldovans in the EU member states and more to the Romanian nationality that, when it is regained, offers privileges to all the European citizens (the right to work). After the liberalization of the visa regime with the EU in April 2014, the Moldovans also came into possession of biometric passports that facilitates their entrance into Europe, even if on a short term.
The continuous flow of Moldovans to Europe does not lead to the increase in the pro-European dispositions in society as most of those who left are not attracted by/into the “Europeanization” process. At the same time, these face daily existential difficulties that absorb their attention. The absenteeism noticed inside the diaspora is also influenced by the discrediting of the ostensible pro-European political forces in the country. Furthermore, the Moldovans from the diaspora are exposed to the Euro-skepticism emanated by the anti-European forces in the host countries (Italy, Greece, etc.). All these perturbations inevitably affect the diaspora’s support for the European integration of Moldova.
Anyway, the diaspora in Europe is diverse. Some of its representatives integrate with difficulty into the European countries where they work. Others, on the contrary, do well and even start sociocultural activities aimed at Moldova (charity events, public events, etc.). However, the number of Moldovans from the diaspora who are really attracted by the European cause of Moldova is insignificant. However, there is great potential that hasn’t been yet realized and that can result from the academic diaspora. Namely the academic segments of the Moldovan migrants in Europe could become the driving force, not yet the only one, that is needed for restoring the diaspora’s role of visible agent of Moldova’s “Europeanization”.
IPN publishes in the Op-Ed rubric opinion pieces submitted by authors not affiliated with our editorial board. The opinions expressed in these articles do not necessarily coincide with the opinions of our editorial board.