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| Dionis Cenuşa, Senior Contributor | |
Whatever is the outcome of the presidential election on 1 November 2020, it can be said with sufficient certainty that they will be influenced by the existence of certain messages related to conspiracies, such as the so-called "colored revolutions", and especially by the fusion of them. Moreover, their influence will be felt in the second round, if it takes place, in which two of the eight candidates will compete. In any case, their electoral pools will be targeted in the run-off. Transversal populism and the complete lack of doctrinal lines of demarcation will facilitate the easy migration of votes in any direction.
The pandemic contains the most unknowns. Voters behaviour may derive from restrictions imposed by health authorities, as well as from the individual attitude towards the risk of infection as such. At the request of the health authorities, the Central Electoral Commission introduced measures to protect the officials involved in elections and the citizens. Even in such conditions, the risks of contagion outside polling stations persist. The most disadvantaged are (the elderly) and Moldovan emigrants in countries such as Spain (4 polling stations) and France (8 polling stations). Recently, they have newly introduced state of emergency. Sanitary restrictions have been reinstated in other European countries, including where voting is possible at embassies representing Moldova simultaneously in several countries (Austria). In these countries, due to quarantine, leaving places of residence and countries is disrupted. Therefore, reaching the poll stations becomes more problematic, involving additional costs, and sometimes the interaction, possibly unwanted, with the national authority. Against the background of the avalanche of new infections, from a total of 36 countries (139 polling stations), in about half of them are reported (semi-) strict health requirements (MFA.gov.md, October 31, 2020). Although in most cases there are no impediments to the exercise of the vote, the existing restrictions have a deterrent effect on participation in the first round of runup. In the 2016 election, Moldovan emigrants chose to vote more actively in the second round - 138,720 votes compared to 67,205 votes in the first round (IPN, September 22, 2020). The pandemic increases the call for such a rationale in the 2020 presidential elections.
The impact of conspiracies thrown in the public space cannot be measured. However, it is clear that in the same way as "fake news", conspiracies can play a major role in mobilizing certain feelings against the state, government or certain political forces. In contrast to more elaborate and universal conspiracy theories related, for example, to the origin of the pandemic or the vaccine for contracting Covid-19, the conspiracies circulated in Moldova are of much inferior scope. Launched before the election, they can survive even after the second round, significantly diminishing the legitimacy of the election and the credibility of the end result. Regardless of the name of the winner, the suspicions of an undeserved victory, obtained through dubious local or foreign political engineering, will hover over him.
Conspiracies moment - between the “falsification” of the elections and the “colored revolution”
Observing the conspiracies that were downloaded into the local public space before the first round of the presidential election can help the definition provided by Joseph E. Uscinski. According to him, conspiracy theories are “unverified explanation of past, present, or future events or circumstances that cites as a main causal factor a small group of powerful people working in secret for their own interests and against the common good.”
The Moldovan electoral environment is currently intoxicated by several conspiracies of both local and foreign origin. First of all, the opposition in Chisinau intensely pedaled the idea concerning the "preparation of the electoral fraud" by the current government. Neither national nor international observers have provided conclusive evidence of that. In the 5 monitoring reports, published by the only organization in the country specialized in election monitoring - Promolex - various irregularities are listed. Inequality in media coverage, use of administrative resources, inconsistencies in the voter register or non-reporting of certain financial expenses are included in Promolex reports. Ensuring voting for the population in the Transnistrian region (42 polling stations) or increasing the number of polling stations open in Russia (from 8 polling stations in 2016 to 17 polling stations in 2020) are attested as risks. However, contrary to the opposition's beliefs, these circumstances are not qualified by national and international observers as "preparation for electoral falsification." Other assessments made by the multitude of civil society representatives also highlight irregularities. The systemic imperfections of the legal-institutional framework in the electoral field are outlined. However, the imminence of the falsification of the elections is not validated in any way. The primary purpose of this conspiracy is to make the voters to go in mass to the polls to counter the hypothetical "fraud", as opposition assumes. But such conspiracy endangers the credibility of the entire electoral process in which the opposition participates itself.
Furthermore, representatives of Russian diplomacy and foreign secret services - Sergey Lavrov and Serhey Narishkin, respectively - inoculated the message that the US intends to provoke a “colorful revolution” in Moldova (3DCFTA, October 23, 2020). Initially, this conspiracy was not even supported by Igor Dodon, the most pro-Russian candidate in these presidential elections, who was convinced that no one - Russia, the US or the EU - aspires to destabilize the situation in the country. In general, "colored revolutions" are successful or unsuccessful attempts at pressure and change of government, following the contestation of election results and mass protests. In the Russian version, the "colored revolutions" are the operations of overthrowing political regimes friendly to Moscow. Theoretically, the results of Moldovan elections could be subjected to contestation by the opposition, which has already talked about falsifying the elections. Such a scenario can take place before and after the second round, as Maia Sandu announced that the citizens will go out to protest against fraud. At the same time, another opposition leader Andrei Nastase is ready to appeal to the veterans of the Dniester war ("Veterans Force") to prevent, including by using force, the transportation of voters from the Transnistrian region (NewsMaker, October 30, 2020). At the same time, Moldovan Prime Minister Ion Chicu showed determination to "prevent" actions that incite events similar to those of April 2009 (Unimedia, October 30, 2020). Considerably, the roots of the conspiracy about the attempt of importing “colored revolution” to Moldova stem from its merging with the conspiracy promoted by the opposition about the imminence of elections' “falsification” followed by public protests.
Last but not least, the anti-civil society rhetoric launched by the deputy from the Socialist Party, Bogdan Țîrdea, is of a conspiratorial nature. Through his book entitled "Civil Society of the Republic of Moldova: NGO sponsors, cultural wars", he launched a campaign to discredit Moldovan NGOs receiving funding from the US and EU. The non-governmental sector is defined as the “agent” of Western influence, which would hold the state and its institutions captive. They also target non-governmental organizations that monitor the presidential election, as well as the media, which is either neutral or sympathetic to the opposition. Although the civil society condemned the attacks of the Socialist deputy, the conspiracy built by Țîrdea permeated and will circulate in the public space for an indefinite time. Substantial efforts will be needed to eradicate it, including through strategic communication, increased transparency and the demonstration of the usefulness of civil society for the country's democratic processes. Until then, between the first and second rounds of the 2020 presidential elections, the Socialists will use the conspiracy launched by Țîrdea for two purposes.
On the one hand, civil society criticism of the fairness of the elections will be suspected of (geo) political partisanship, if they target Igor Dodon and the Socialists. And, on the other hand, the intoxication of the image of the civil society puts in difficulty both the opposition led by Maia Sandu. The latter relies on the support, often open, of those who work in the civic environment. The risk of "chain intoxication" of the image is also borne by those Western institutions, which will decide to show solidarity with civil society.
In lieu of conclusion…
The duration and depth of the impact of conspiracies depend on the socio-political and economic circumstances. As a matter of fact, the nature of the target counts too. The more polarized society is, the deeper the conspiracies permeate and the harder they can be extracted from the public space. For these reasons, the use of conspiracies for political purposes, especially in an electoral context, can have unpredictable consequences for the stability of the country and the credibility of the final election results.
Discussions about Moldova being on the verge of a "colorful revolution", which would be coordinated from outside, originated in Moscow. Soon after that, the government in Chisinau adopted it too. Both parties are trying to exploit the Moldovan opposition's approach to "falsifying" the elections and the inevitability of protests. This merging of the Russian conspiracies with the local Moldovan ones generates a favorable ground for mutual confusions and suspicions between Igor Dodon's supporters and those of Maia Sandu.
Despite the conspiracies propagated, the Moldovan legal framework allows partial or exhaustive contestation of the elections. Any electoral candidate benefits from this right. Its exercise does not require the approval of external factors. The conduct of public protests is a constitutional right either, though its application may be somewhat complicated by epidemiological restrictions. Both contestation and protests are legal tools in a democracy. Therefore, they should not be interpreted as actions aimed at overthrowing the existing regime seeking the realization of yet another "colored revolution" in the CIS.
Areas of research: European Neighborhood Policy, EU-Moldova relationship, EU's foreign policy and Russia, migration and energy security.
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IPN publishes in the Op-Ed rubric opinion pieces submitted by authors not affiliated with our editorial board. The opinions expressed in these articles do not necessarily coincide with the opinions of our editorial board.