Moldova has more and more advocates in the EU, but before asking more Chisinau should do more. Interview with Andrei Popov, executive director of the Foreign Policy Association

[- On September 3, you participated in the Conference “Working Together – Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy" organized by the European Commission in Brussels. What was the aim and format of this meeting?] The September 3 conference was organized by the European Commission with the aim of giving an intermediary outline of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) three years after it was initiated and of identifying ways of making the multilateral cooperation between the EU and the 16 neighbour states participating in the ENP more efficient. Therefore, about 400 representatives of all the interested sides were invited to Brussels to a first-ever extended meeting. On the one hand, the meeting focused on the direct beneficiaries of the policy in the neighbouring states, represented in Brussels at ministerial level and at the level of civil experts, who spoke about the way in which the ENP corresponds to their interests and aspirations and formulated objections and proposals. On the other hand, the EU member states, many of which delegated ministers and vice ministers to take part in the meeting, presented their offers and ideas, reacted to the commentaries and initiatives of the neighbours, explaining what and in what conditions they are ready to do to better satisfy their needs. On the basis of these discussions, the European Commission will work out proposals to increase the efficiency of the ENP and adjust it better to the interests and possibilities of all the sides involved. [- What major proposals and conclusions were formulated at the conference?] Probably, the main idea to which many representatives of the EU member states and of the European Commission referred is the adoption of a differentiated approach in the relations between the EU and the ENP states, which will enable to encourage and ‘reward’ the states where the reforms are properly implemented, by increasing significantly the assistance offered to them. At the same time, the assistance for the countries that do not have good governance and do not prove political will could remain at the same level or will be even reduced. This differentiation for Moldova is an opportunity, but also a risk because the tendencies to slow down the reforming process in 2007 and the lagging behind in implementing the Plan of Action do not create a good basis for fully making use of this new offer from the EU. Currently, the European Commission is preparing the second assessment report on Moldova’s performance under the Action Plan. According to all the indices, this report will be perceptibly more critical than the first presented in December 2006, especially as regards the failures and faults related to the functioning of the democratic institutions, to the freedom of the press and independence of justice. To give no room for ambiguous interpretations and deliberate misrepresentations, the European Commission is ready to formulate clearer and more comprehensive objections. Another topic for discussion was the necessity of strengthening the economic cooperation and promoting interhuman contacts, of facilitating the regime of travels to the EU and goods’ access to the European markets; that is to make concrete steps to make the four freedoms cover the states neighbouring the EU. To foster the democratic transformations and good governance, the openness of the EU will be directly proportional to the reforms implemented in every state. As regards the visas, these should not be cancelled or liberalized, but there are needed facilitated regimes, similar to the one that Moldova will get as from January 1, 2008. A number of speakers, first of all Romania’s representative, underlined the importance of increasing the EU’s involvement in the Black Sea Basin, in the context of the new European Black Sea Synergy Strategy and given the necessity of strengthening the cooperation in the energy sector between the EU and partner states. [To what extent did the conference discuss the European integration aspirations, shown by some of EU’s neighbours?] This subject constituted one of the main topics and probably the most controversial among the debates. Hence, more than one country expressed their discontent regarding the fact that ENP doesn’t reflect those major differences in the geographic and social fields, and the differences in the aspirations of the 16 participant states, treating them as a group; from Algeria, Libya and Lebanon to Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine, the states are viewed as a neighbour group without any immediate prospect of becoming candidate states and EU members. Ukraine objected most actively to this approach and demonstratively lowered down its level of representative at the conference to that of Ambassador to EU. The country declared trenchantly that it is not content with the ENP offer and insistently asks for a European prospect, which would allow in the future highlighting the cooperation with EU in a bilateral framework, instead of a multilateral one proposed by ENP. The Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs also spoke about the necessity of offering Moldova a clearer European prospect and an evolution of the relationship between EU and the South-East European countries, with which Moldova is participating in various regional agreements. The speakers representing the new members of EU, as well as the Minister of European Affairs of Great Britain, expressed their agreement towards the necessity of finding a formula for differentiating the states with a legitimate European vocation and identity and those which “a priori” are unable to claim a European prospect, since they are geographically placed on other continents. In other words, as the Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs put it, it’s one thing to be “a neighbour of Europe” and another to be “a European neighbour”. ENP shouldn’t hinder the states with a European vocation to advance in their integration. However, the conference also took account of other speakers, who opted against applying equal standards to the southern and eastern regions. Moreover, the German Secretary of State declared bluntly that “ENP has nothing to do with the enlargement policy; the European neighbours shouldn’t make illusions that this policy will increase their chances of becoming EU members”. [- How are these contradictions within the EU relevant to Moldova?] On one hand, we should be pleased that such a numerous group of states which, even though not so influential, actively advocates for the European aspirations of Moldova. It’s a favourable tendency which indicates the fact that the 2004/2007 enlargement made Europe closer and more receptive to us and our problems. On the other hand, not all Europe has changed towards this direction. On the contrary, some states prove to be even more reticent and rigid towards the idea of continuing the enlargement and especially towards the perspective, even if only in theory, according to which EU could assume new commitments concerning the present neighbours – Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. These sceptics are supported by the countries in the southern region of EU – France, Spain, Portugal and Italy, who are worried that such an emphasis on the eastern neighbours would distract the European attention (and the funds) from the Mediterranean states. Therefore they reject the proposals of consolidating the European dimension of the enlargement policy at the expense of the Southern region. The European Neighbourhood Policy in its present form represents a compromise of these different approaches. The discussions in Brussels will lead to some adjustments and changes, for instance in the direction of adopting a different attitude depending on the quality and deepness of the reforms. However, it is unrealistic to hope that in a short term of 2-3 years, at least until the situation of the Reform Treaty is clarified, EU would reach an agreement approved by all 27 member states to offer a European prospect to Moldova and Ukraine. Even less realistic is Chisinau’s ambition to manage in the immediate future to detach from Ukraine and individually join the group of West-Balkan states included in the Process of Stabilization and Association. Detaching from Ukraine and obtaining a European prospect before it would be theoretically possible only in one case: if Moldova convinces EU that is by two-three steps ahead of Ukraine on the level of corresponding to European standards. However, this is not the case. Today, considering the institutional mess in Ukraine, our neighbour is considered by Brussels to be more advanced than Moldova on the reforming path. It is not accidentally that Kiev advances rapidly in talks with EU on an Agreement of intensified partnership which would replace the Agreement of Partnership Cooperation (APC), while Chisinau only has the chance of a prolonged APC. Therefore, before talking seriously about detaching from Ukraine and obtaining a separate European prospect – eventually through the south-eastern region – Moldova needs firstly to reach the level of Ukraine and then to surpass it. Otherwise, I don’t see how EU could accept for Chisinau a more privileged status than that of Kiev. [The September 3 conference was preceded by a reunion of the European vice-ministers of external affairs organized by Moldova on August 24 in Brussels in order to convince EU to offer a clearer European prospect. What can be said about the result of this event?] Moldova has all the right to “ask for more” from EU and to hope for a support from some friends within the Union. But before all this, Moldova has to firstly “do more”. EU expects from Chisinau not just conferences and declarations, but reforms and actions. It is not accidentally that the idea of the event on August 24 organized in Brussels by MAEIE was received coldly by many European capitals. The awkward organization of the event only stressed this feeling (for instance, a number of important states, including the Presidency of Portugal and the European Commission received the invitations a couple of weeks later than other states, considered by Chisinau “friendly states”). Concerning the real impact of the event – actually, its total and predictable failure – was proven by the fact that the reunion lasted less than an hour and a half, instead of the three planned ones, conditioned by more than just a modest representation. Therefore, instead of the “more than half of the European ministers” publicly assured by President Voronin on July 25, only one came to Brussels, while other capitals didn’t send anybody at all.