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Igor Munteanu: The Transnistrian dispute is not a conflict, but a military rebellion inspired and patronized by Russia. Info-Prim Neo survey


https://www.ipn.md/index.php/en/igor-munteanu-the-transnistrian-dispute-is-not-a-conflict-but-7965_969548.html

Info-Prim Neo News Agency has launched an opinion poll on the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict among leaders of political parties, representatives of the civil society, and opinion shapers from both banks of the Nistru. The survey is aimed at finding out viewpoints that could contribute to the improvement of the present situation. All the participants were asked the same two questions. This time, the answers are given by political commentator Igor Munteanu. [ - How can the Transnistrian dispute be solved in your opinion? In what way, through what mechanisms and during what terms is a settlement possible?] - I would like to specify that the Transnistrian dispute is not a conflict, but a military rebellion inspired and patronized by Russia by now, as part of the existent dispute, disguised through an improper role of “mediator” in the conflict. The Explicative Dictionary says that the dispute is “a divergence of the opinions expressed by two and more sides”. Transnistria is a conflict frozen by military means, inspired by economic and ideological interests, the settlement of which depends on geopolitical factors. In my subjective opinion, this conflict goes on due to the weaknesses and incoherence of Chisinau, first of all, or to the incapability of the consultants and officials designated to manage the Transnistrian portfolio. The key to this conflict is not in Moscow as some analysts say. They suggest that the improvement of the relations with Moscow will lead to the settlement of the conflict or that a deal struck in any Western or Euro-Asian capital city can be a suitable solution that would satisfy the national interests. The key is in the middle and in the understandings of the political and economic power in Chisinau, which should not stay and dream of “geschafts” from abroad, but try to understand their logic and step up efforts in order to work with the multitude of regional players (Ukraine, Romania, Poland, Turkey, the EU) as well as local players (businesses, church, locale authorities), building what was ruined in the last decade of isolation and “active Russian mediation”. As long as the orange revolutions are born and die in the head of a single person, the settlement strategies and tactics will be fatally erroneous. Another failure of the present government is the fact that it selectively assumed obligations or phrases that sound well, without understanding their essence, as it happened with the “3D Strategy” launched in 2004 in the name of the civil society and which was perverted by incompetence and inaction because the aims of this government are obsessively limited to a “vegetative” way of old-style, Communist-oligarchic political administration that has nothing to do with the modern European policy and the national interest. [ - How do you think, how efficient and relevant to the created situation are the actions taken by the administration of Moldova at present? When do you think the effort made by the authorities will begin to produce results and what results we can expect?] - The steps taken by the Moldovan authorities are for the most part aberrant, incoherent and disorderly. Though certain measures taken by the authorities are presented publicly as a result of the laws adopted in July 2005, in reality we witness obscure talks that have unclear goals and unacceptable players. Frankly speaking, the leader of the Communist Party perfectly realizes the irony and absurdity of the resumption of the direct talks with I. Smirnov, after considering a paradoxical set of options: Russia (the plan on Moldova’s federalization and maintenance of the Russian troops during the next 30 years, called the Kozac Plan), Ukraine (7 steps), the EU (assistance in delimiting the border with Ukraine), and again Russia (equality of the sides, legalization of privatization, full demilitarization of Moldova). The efforts made by Chisinau seem ridiculous and not well planned. Chisinau would like an international tutelage that would “guarantee its self-declared neutrality”. This would transform its international status into a status of “capitulated state”, status wanted by the secessionist leaders that build their application for independence on the assertion that they won the war against Moldova, while most of the internationally “neutral” states were capitulating states (Austria, Switzerland, Sweden), as a result of external defeats and not of internal decisions. The neutrality costs a lot from military, political and economic viewpoints and does not mean the disappearance of the armed forces as V. Voronin said in 2007, when speaking about the parallel liquidation of the illegal paramilitary Transnistrian troops and of the National Army of Moldova. The head of state’s decision to present Moldova as “a net consumer of security” that is at the latitude of “great powers” is erroneous and inconsistent with the way in which the states insure their own security, mainly by security alliances, i.e contrary to the conception of “international recognition of Moldova’s neutrality”. If we speak about another controversial topic – the legalization of the Transnistrian businesses – we ascertain new divergences and omissions that cannot be admitted in politics. If the initial decision of the Moldovan Government to register the Transnistrian companies according to the Moldovan legislation and encourage exports under the asymmetric trade regime with the EU was considered a rational option, the second logical step had to be the integration of these entities into the economic-fiscal system of Moldova and obligatorily, would have required a different approach by Chisinau to the problem of recognition of privatizations in Transnistria – two elements of the same equation. But the Government avoids pronouncing on this, and when it does so it seems unprepared and expresses itself ambiguously. At the same time, we consider that it is not up to the head of state to pronounce on the legality of the privatizations. This is the duty of the Moldovan Parliament that must treat these issues separately from the special status of the Transnistrian region and not together. The illegal privatizations in the region affect Chisinau’s position at the talks, running counter to articles from the Constitution (article 9 – fundamental principles of ownership, article 46 – expropriation of property etc.). The fact that the legislature avoids these talks increases the risks related to certain hasty decisions that are incompatible withy the national interest and the existent constitutional framework.