The reforms done in Moldova since 2005 always entailed a particular dose of conditionality. But this mechanism has never been so often and forcefully invoked as it was in the period after the signing of the Association Agreement, in 2014, political pundit Dionis Cenușa noted in an analysis article for IPN Agency.
Since then, on the one hand, the bilateral relations gained substance and mutual juridical and political commitment that calls for more responsibility. On the other hand, the Moldovan political class that ruled after 2009 created a favorable perception of itself as to the transposition of the European recommendations, even in sensitive areas and in a difficult way (antidiscrimination legislation in 2010-2012), explained Dionis Cenușa.
According to him, the Democratic Party’s unwillingness to follow the Europeans’ pieces of advice dictated by the EU’s intention to defend the democratic institutions generated in Brussels, in turn, reactions of confusion, dissatisfaction and, finally, of condemnation.
The EU’s conditionality is essential for promoting reforms in Eastern Europe. That’s why the lack of progress or, worse, the degradation of the situation should definitely determine the flow of financial assistance and other recompenses provided by EU.
Any government absorbed by group interests of parties will agree to adopt reforms that are costly from political-electoral viewpoint if it is stimulated. This way, the more legitimate and upright the government is, the greater will be the number of “carrots” (positive incentives) used by EU, compared with the number of “sticks” (negative incentives). In the case of Moldova, the use of negative insensitive, namely the blocking of the macro-financial assistance, was inevitable, even if difficult and this offered the PDM a broad space for maneuvering and readjustment of the political tactics.
In practical terms, the EU lost time when it only warned about the activation of political preconditions, even if it had reasons to activate them after the introduction of the mixed electoral system already, in June 2017. Present earlier among the criteria for EU budget support, the political preconditions became a reality for the macro-financial assistance as of 2017, several years later than for Georgia and Ukraine.
So, the European conditionality can start the engine of major reforms, including in sensitive areas, such as the banking system, but this considerably diminishes its effects if the decisions are related to the change of the political status quo. For these reasons, the EU could not prevent the introduction of the mixed system or the invalidation of elections and the ruling party remained fully intact before the imminent suspension of the assistance and the attraction of the title of “problematic pupil” among the countries with Association Agreements, concluded the politologist.
