(Geo)political behavior of Presidents of Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine: between fluctuating perceptions and realities, OP-ED

The political systems in Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia are in the process of positive or negative transformation, but under the powerful influence of external factors. On the one hand, the Association Agreements signed by the three countries with the EU stimulate useful changes that are often unwanted and are even boycotted by the political class. On the other hand, the inclination of the Moldovan, Georgian and Ukrainian political players to the West is justified by their fears of the unpredictability of the Russian factor. By the wish to build closer relations with the EU and/or NATO, these countries actually offset the seriously affected confidence in Russia whose actions at the foreign level are oftenly guided by hegemonic-revanchist feelings.

The accentuation of the aggressive character of the Russian foreign policy makes the dominant political players in the three countries to look for systems of guarantees in the West, which are subsequently used by Russia as justification for the escalation of its interventions. This vicious circle can be exited in a simpler, but definitely dangerous way – by normalizing the relations with Russia. This means returning to the previous asymmetry according to which Russia has the right of veto over the foreign policy of the three countries. Strengthening the statehood of Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia by empowering the state institutions – the judiciary, the central and local public administration, state agents and the army – is another, more intricate and costly, but sustainable solution for breaking the vicious circle. The behavior of the Presidents of Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine match namely these two directions of action. However, Ukraine’s presidential elections of March-April 2019 can induce particular shift of emphasis.

The transformation of the political party motivations favorable towards Russia into national priorities characterize the way in which Igor Dodon fulfils his duties of President. A distinct line of behavior can be seen in Georgia, where President Salome Zurabishvili promotes a narrative critical to the undermining of the territorial integrity of the Georgian state by Russia through Abkhazian and South-Ossetia separatism. The President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko is opposite to Igor Dodon, who is friendly towards Moscow. Since 2014, Poroshenko has built a political image of defender of the Ukrainian sovereignty against the Russian aggressor. Owing to the indulgence of Vladimir Putin’s rhetoric and actions, in particular regarding Ukraine, the President of Moldova hasn’t yet visited Kiev and other capitals from the neighborhood during his two years of office so far. Instead of removing the reasons for his external isolation, Igor Dodon chose to expand the dialogue with the Kremlin, looking for access to the chancelleries that develop or maintain their own dependences on the Russian factor – Belarus, Hungary, Iran etc.

Three types of behavior towards Russia: between trenchant sympathies and unbeatable animosities

Moldovan President Igor Dodon’s positive attitude to Russia contrast strikingly with the reticence of President Salome Zurabishvili in Georgia and the chronic intolerance of the Ukrainian leader Petro Poroshenko.

Igor Dodon’s friendship with the Russian authorities by intensity and duration beats even the most pro-Russian governments of the past, like that led by Vladimir Voronin, who managed to maintain good Moldovan-Russian relations, but only during 2001-2003. Currently, President Igor Dodon insists on the imperative necessity of having a dialogue with Russia in a strictly friendly and strategic atmosphere. Since taking up in 2016 the presidency, which represents half of the executive power of Moldova, he concentrated in his hands all the negotiations with Moscow. The rest of the institutions, the Government and Parliament, which are controlled by the Democratic Party (DPM), voluntarily gave up officially contacting the Russian authorities. Later, the geopolitical duality of Chisinau has considerably influenced the relations with the Russian side. The rupture reached an apogee when the Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Dmitry Rogozin, who is responsible for the Transnistrian file and the Moldovan-Russian commercial relations, was declared persona non grata (Reuters, August 2, 2017). The adoption of the UN Resolution on the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Russian military potential from Moldova (UN, June 22, 2018), which was successfully promoted by the DPM and was later condemned by President Dodon (Tass, July 15, 2018), represented another major shock in the Moldovan-Russian relations. The divergence on geopolitical issues inside the Moldovan legislature became a frequent argument of Russia in undermining the significance of the measures taken by the government in Chisinau, which, even if they were politicized, resembled expressions of the national sovereignty.

The trajectory of the Georgian leader Salome Zurabishvili started with the supposition that she will try to adjust to the interests of Moscow. However, when she took over in December 2018, Zurabishvili leveled criticism at Russia’s policy towards Georgia. During the first about three months of office, the first female president of Georgia and among the CIS countries condemned the Russian propaganda (Presidential Office of Georgia, January 11, 2019) and the policy to recognize  the independence of the separatist regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moreover, the President highlighted the irreversibility of the Euro-Atlantic course of Georgia, which is vital for improving its defense and army (Presidential Office of Georgia, January 23, 2019). The idea to strengthen security in the Black Sea region by ensuring the NATO presence promoted by Zurabishvili (Presidential Office of Georgia, January 24, 2019) evidently runs counter to Russia’s interests to block the Eastern enlargement of NATO. Unlike the principle “more NATO in Georgia and more Georgia in NATO” that is promoted by Zurabishvili, the President of Moldova wants internationally guaranteed permanent neutrality for the country (Presedinte.md, March 22, 2019). Moreover, he intends to diminish the already existing contacts with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and this was manifested through the hostility to the foundation of the NATO Liaison Office in Chisinau (RFI, December 8, 2017). 

Petro Poroshenko has only one option in relation to Russia, namely to riposte. It’s true that during his five-year tenure, President Poroshenko didn’t manage to return Crimea or to solve the problem in Donbass. However, in the period the President of Ukraine led initiatives to set down policies that would remove the main weaknesses towards the Russian influence, in particular in the military, religious and linguistic sectors. He is the active supporter of the introduction of a peacekeeping mission under the aegis of the UN in Donbass region (RFERL, February 20, 2019), which, in his view, can contribute to demilitarizing the region and ending the Russian aggression. This message can be found in his electoral speech about “the freeing of Donbass and Crimea” (President.gov.ua, March 25, 2019). Contrary to Poroshenko, the President of Moldova rejects the idea of an international peacekeeping mission in the Transnistrian region and supports the maintaining of Russian peacekeepers that have stayed in Moldova for 25 years already. Moreover, despite the critical approach of civil society, President Dodon glorified the activity of the Russian peacekeepers that were awarded orders in July 2017. The attitude to the European integration is another important dimension that makes a distinction between the President of Moldova and Poroshenko. The latter launched the process of constitutionalizing the European and Euro-Atlantic courses in 2018 (Unian, September 4, 2018), which ended with an overwhelmingly majority vote - 334 votes in favor out of 385 attending MPs (Unian, February 7, 2019). The modification of the Constitution set as a strategic priority the country’s orientation to the EU and NATO for any of the future elected Presidents, including the governments controlled by them (Articles 102, 116). This way, Ukraine joined Georgia where the irreversibility of the European integration and the entry into NATO were already inserted in the Constitution (Constitution of Georgia, Art. 78). The attempt to enshrine the European integration in Moldova’s Constitution failed in 2018 (IPN, October 22, 2018). Igor Dodon described this initiative as a destructive element for society, which does not serve the country’s pro-Moldova orientation (Presedinte.md, October 9, 2018).

Between polls and elections

The presidential elections held in Georgia in October 2018 and those held in Ukraine in March 2019 took place in a social climate that was rather depressive (IPN, January 15, 2019), similar to the presidential elections held in Moldova in 2016. The difference between Moldova and Georgia, on the one hand, and Ukraine, on the other hand, resides in the fact that public perception in the latter is dominated by the military conflict in Donbass, where Russia’s interference is incontestable. Of the top ten problems faced by the Ukrainians, two refer to the quality of governance, which is considered corrupt and/or incompetent (See Table 1). Actually, namely the government deficiencies could be decisive in electing the future President of Ukraine. That’s why Ukrainians’ votes can be determined by crass populism and the wish to take revenge on the corrupt elites by installing an apolitical person (Volodymyr Zelenskiy). Or the competiveness between powerful and already experienced politicians will take the lead in elections owing to the oligarchic substratum where Yulia Tymoshenko could take revenge for the defeated in the presidential elections of 2014.

Table 1. List of major problems faced by countries in people’s opinion

Moldova (Dec. 2018)	Ukraine (Dec. 2018)	Georgia (April 2018)
1. Small salaries and pensions 2. Corruption 3. Unemployment 5. Emigration 6. Poverty 7. High prices 8. Roads 9. Poor governance 10. Economic crisis	1. Military conflict in Donbass 2. Corruption in state institutions 3. Low industrial production 4. Rise in prices 5. Incompetence of government 7. Politicla instability 8. Unemployment 9. Social protection of the poor 10. Relations with Russia	1. Unemployment 2. Economy 3. Territorial integrity 4. Social problems 5. Crimes 6. Unqualified government 7. Security 8. Small pensions 9. Migration 10. Health system

Source: IRI.org

 

Even if they came to power in conditions of negative moods in society, the Presidents of Moldova and Georgia have reduced government powers. Compared with these, Poroshenko became a President in 2014, when the post-Euromaidan expectations among the Ukrainians were higher than before the presidential elections of 2019. This way, the encouraging feelings about Ukraine’s future decreased from 29% in September 2014 to 16% in December 2018, while pessimism in the same period climbed from 51% to 70% (See Table 2). Poroshenko had broad powers to change the state of affairs, but the inappropriate prioritization or the avalanche of problems overcame him.

Table 2. Citizens’ opinions about state of affairs in the country and geopolitical options, %

	State of affairs in the country		Country’s external orientation
Moldova	Negative	Positive	Pro-EU	Pro-Eurasian Union
Dec. 2018	68	27	46	39
Oct. 2018	71	24	48	37
Feb. 2018	73	26	43	42
Oct. 2017	78	16	49	38
March 2017	62	32	42	43
Sept. 2016	82	10	40	43
Ukraine	Negative	Positive	Pro-EU	Pro-Eurasian Union
Dec. 2018	70	16	53	13
Sept. 2018	71	16	54	14
March 2018	71	15	52	18
Dec. 2017	71	14	50	16
April 2017	72	13	53	18
Sept. 2016	72	11	51	19
Feb. 2016	76	11	55	15
November 2015	70	15	57	15
July 2015	72	15	55	14
Sept. 2014	51	29	59	17
Georgia	Negative	Positive	Pro-EU	Continuation of dialogue with Russia
Apr. 2018	67	22	85	76
March 2017	65	21	90	82
March 2016	70	16	85	83

Source: IRI.org

 

Poroshenko’s incapacity to fight corruption is the main reason for his unpopularity that makes the Ukrainians ignore his contribution to the launching the unprecedented “Europeanization” of Ukraine. Also corruption and the fact that Poroshenko didn’t renounce oligarchy maintained the pro-European sympathies below the pro-European zeal of the Euromaidan of 2014. In such a way, the pro-EU feelings varied between 50% and 57% during the presidency of Poroshenko, while the sympathies with Russia between 13 and 19% (See Table 2). From the perspective of the public perception of the external orientation, President Igor Dodon didn’t manage to make massive jumps in the direction of Russia, which already enjoys the sympathies of about 40% of the Moldovans.

The dedication by which Igor Dodon promotes the legitimacy of the Russian influence shows how permissive the Moldovan public is towards a presidential administration that prioritizes an external agenda that does not actually contribute to strengthening institutions. Igor Dodon’s multi-vector policy, which is also called “balanced”, (Presedinte.md, March 25, 2019) is one of the conditions imposed by the Socialists for forming a future government coalition (IPN, March 18, 2019). Such a development can yet extend Moldova’s isolation, at least in relation to the neighboring countries, from the presidential administration to the other central institutions.

Instead of conclusions...

Igor Dodon’s attempts to proliferate a positive image of Russia in Moldova represent an anomaly for the countries that signed Association Agreements with the EU. For similar gestures, Salome Zurabishvili or Petr Poroshenko would have faced mass protests that would have resulted also in their removal from office.

But loyalty towards a particular geopolitical course in Moldovan politics is relativized and robustly traded off for political-electoral purposes. For these reasons, the Moldovan voters do not penalize the movement towards Russia as vigorously as do the citizens in Georgia or Ukraine.

If the President of Ukraine that will be elected in the March-April 20019 elections renounces a harsh rhetoric towards Russia, the moderation of the attitude among Ukrainians to the Russia aggressor will inevitably follow. Evidently, the constitutional amendments propelled by Petr Poroshenko prevent anyone who will succeed him from making any radical foreign policy changes. Unquestionably, the next President of Ukraine will have to keep the packages of measures to stop the Russian aggression initiated by Petr Poroshenko. This is the minimum that the successors of Poroshenko, if not he himself, will have to do, with the fighting of corruption being the maximum.