Most of the forecasts made for 2018 materialized, political pundit Dionis Cenușa noted in a feature article for IPN Agency.
At internal level, the EU permanently intonated the political preconditions concerning its financial assistance for Moldova. Also, the political forces that associate themselves with the EU, those that were in power and those from the opposition, could not reach a compromise, the politologist wrote, referring to his forecasts concerning the European integration made for 2018.
He reminded that the controversial annulment of the results of the Chisinau mayoral elections excluded any possibility of a minimum dialogue between the sides.
The cementing of Moldova’s Eurasian course by numerous trips to Moscow made by President Igor Dodn was also close to forecasts. But President’s efforts didn’t convert into increased public support for the Eurasian geopolitical option, explained Dionis Cenușa.
At foreign level, the fears related to the strengthening of the Eurosceptical views in Central and Eastern Europe materialized. This way, Hungary and Poland faced the European institutions owing to their attempts to undermine the rule of law. Warsaw coped with the pressure exerted by the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union.
The forecast about the intensification of the Russian factor that stepped up its military actions in Eastern Europe and the Sea of Azov, committed an attack with a chemical weapon on British soil and promoted misinformation at European level and worldwide, also came true, noted the politologist.
According to him, of ten forecasts, two didn’t become a reality.
The first forecast that deviated from the initial calculations refers to the materialization of the macro-financial assistance. The turning point was the invalidation of the elections held in Chisinau in July 2018 before which the EU was ready to provide assistance in September 2018 already. The DPM prioritized the isolation of the opposition from any public institution and sacrificed the positive dialogue with the EU.
The implementation of aspects of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) in the Transnistrian region saw a different development than the forecasts predicted. The changes concerning the customs procedures and taxation of commercial flows from the EU adopted by Tiraspol kept a particular optimism among the European institutions.
Tiraspol’s movement towards the DCFTA shows that Russia is not at all against the Transnistrian companies’ opportunities to export to the European market. Even if they maintain the bans on a number of Moldovan products, the Russian officials expressed interest in making investments in Moldova so as to benefit from the Moldovan exporters’ access to European consumers, concluded Dionis Cenușa.
