The activation of the political preconditions in Moldova owing to the annulment of the results of the municipal elections of 2018 created a precedent that can serve as a source of inspiration for the EU and as an anti-example for the countries of the neighborhood that are interested in obtaining EU macro-financial assistance, political pundit Dionis Cenușa says in an analysis article for IPN Agency.
According to the expert, the Moldovan precedent shaped two positive tendencies.
Firstly, it became evident that the non-observance of the political preconditions has unfavorable consequences for the national authorities. Thus, following the Moldovan example, the political opposition and civil society of Georgia, Ukraine and other countries of the European neighborhood can exert pressure on the EU and on the own governments.
The second tendency is related to the increased attention devoted to the way in which the EU funds are used. As a result, a greater care for the European assistance can cumulatively improve the approach to the national public finances in general.
Both the negotiation of the second portion of macro-financial assistance for Moldova and its postponement for the reason that the political preconditions weren’t met point to a significant development of this type of European financial instrument.
On the one hand, the Moldovan authorities has to accept the modification of the EU approach to the macro-financial assistance noticed after the signing of the agreement with Georgia (2013). This way, the political preconditions that weren’t wanted by the Moldovan authorities materialized.
On the other hand, the negative practices identified in Moldova (distrust in the management of public funds) led to the toughening up of the conditions for providing macro-financial assistance for the other states situated in the European neighborhood, explained the politologist.
The macro-financial assistance is an instrument of conditionality of the EU in relation to the counties with Association Agreements, among which is Moldova, and this can be further improved. To a certain extent, this enables to equalize the game rules between the governments that are not interested in democratic commitments and, respectively, the opposition and civil society whose participation in the democratic processes is paralyzed by the national governments, concluded Dionis Cenușa.
