{"id":585339,"date":"2020-03-24T06:35:00","date_gmt":"2020-03-24T04:35:00","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"2026-07-20T23:39:17","modified_gmt":"2026-07-20T20:39:17","slug":"on-the-effects-of-the-pandemic-between-european-solidarity-and-the-eastern-neighbourhoods-resilience-op-ed","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/en\/on-the-effects-of-the-pandemic-between-european-solidarity-and-the-eastern-neighbourhoods-resilience-op-ed\/","title":{"rendered":"On the effects of the Pandemic \u2013 between European solidarity and the Eastern neighbourhood’s resilience, Op-Ed"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n\u00a0<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\"\"<\/td>\n\n

\"\"\u00a0<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

\t\t\tEU responses to coronavirus require effective engagement with Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia – by broadening political and sectoral communication, facilitating access to European medical equipment and revising association agendas to reflect health needs in the post-Covid period \u00a0<\/i>.<\/em>.<\/em>.<\/em><\/p>\n

\t\t\t\"\"<\/em><\/h3>\n

\u00a0<\/h3>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

Dionis Cenu\u015fa, Senior Contributor<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u00a0<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table><\/div>\n

Europe is learning from its own experience how to fight the coronavirus pandemic, even though it has had almost two months (January-March 2020) since the initial reporting of the epidemic’s outbreak in China, to mobilize its prevention capacity. At the level of political communication, the EU reacted to the existence of Covid-19, through the rotating Council Presidency of Croatia, which launched the Integrated Crisis Response, at the end of January<\/a>. In practical terms, however, other concerns dominated the European agenda until very recently- tensions in northwestern Syria (Idlib, February 2020<\/a>) and the threats by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to “open the borders” (NYT, February 29, 2020<\/a>). The risk of a repeated “2015 migrant crisis<\/a>” has disoriented Brussels and the Member States. While Italy was fast becoming the epicentre of the coronavirus on the European continent, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen praised Greece for taking on the role of “shield of Europe” (Euronews, March 4, 2020<\/a>) against illegal crossings at the Greek-Turkish border. The reorientation of the EU toward crisis management of the Covid-19 pandemic has interrupted the handling of the situation in Greece. On the one hand, Athens necessitates help managing the border and migration flows, and on the other hand, has been subject to attempts at persuasion to uphold the right to asylum in Europe (Guardian, 13 March 2020<\/a>).<\/p>\n

After the epidemic violently hit the Italian population (March 23: over 53,000 cases of infection and more than 4,000 deaths<\/a> reported<\/i>), the virus advanced across the continent – to Spain (the second most severely affected European country with over 1000 deaths), France, Germany and beyond. The close connections of the Eastern European diaspora and migrants with EU member states facilitated the penetration of the virus into the Eastern Partnership states via the tissue of interpersonal contacts. The increasingly dense air travel networks, as well as simplification of procedures for the movement of persons – including by facilitated and liberalized visa regimes – have undoubtedly contributed to the spread of the virus. In the northern extremity of the Partnership, particularly in Moldova and Ukraine, the epidemic has predominantly arrived via European Union states. In addition to these countries, Iran has become an additional source of risk for the Southern Partnership countries – Armenia<\/a>, Georgia<\/a> and Azerbaijan<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Although criticized for not being quick off the mark, the EU has succeeded in developing regulatory and financial measures to counteract the effects of the health crisis and to stimulate solidarity between European states. In a partial, indirect and subtle form, the allusion to European solidarity with the eastern neighbours, concerning the Covid-19 pandemic, was included in the document, entitled “Reinforcing Resilience – An Eastern Partnership that delivers for all<\/a>“, launched by the EU, on March 18, 2020.<\/p>\n

Testing European solidarity<\/b><\/p>\n

The EU’s decision-making machinery reacted rather slowly to the first signs of the spread of the Covid-19 virus. There were virtually no existing supranational instruments available for the sanitary protection of Europeans and the rapid, coordinated and unified counteracting of epidemiological dangers of this magnitude. European solidarity between the EU and the Member States, but primarily state to state solidarity, was challenged by the assertion of national interests. Some European governments have been overwhelmed by the rapid transmission of the virus, while others resorted to uncoordinated actions, such as restricting the sale of medical equipment to within national boundaries\u00a0 (FinancialTimes, March 13, 2020<\/a>).<\/p>\n

The lack of immediately available tools generated a wave of creativity from the European institutions. But the exceptional measures were only launched where the EU has express powers to do so (state aid, internal common market, public procurement, internal movement of goods, etc.). The 27 member countries (and the UK that is in transition period until December 31) and 6 non-EU countries (Iceland, Norway, Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Turkey) participating\u00a0in the European Civil Protection Mechanism<\/a>, did not show any response when Italy activated it. In the absence of aid from within the EU, the Italian call for help was received and acted on by China (EuroActiv, 19 March 2020<\/a>), with Chinese help subsequently extended also to Spain. US unilateralism and the inadequate EU pandemic response potentially reinforces China’s “soft power” in post-Covid-19 Europe, including in Western Balkans (Serbia), and its economic-technological ambitions, such as bringing Huawei to the pinnacle of European 5G infrastructure (Politico, January 29, 2020<\/a>).<\/p>\n

Although the EU has been harshly criticized for not enabling European solidarity, in reality, the European Union treaties do not allow it to act differently. Primo,<\/i> Art. 222 of the Treaty on the EU Functioning of the EU (TFEU), abbreviated as the “solidarity clause”, provides that the EU and the Member States must act in a spirit of solidarity, when a Member State becomes the victim of a terrorist act or natural or anthropogenic disaster. But, from a technical point of view, Covid-19 does not fall into the category of reasons that can trigger the solidarity clause. Segundo<\/i>, the European Commission can come up with proposals that could potentially lead to the activation of the solidarity clause, but their implementation requires the approval of the EU Council, meaning the national governments. Tertio<\/i>, even if the clause comes into force, Member States have the right to select the method considered appropriate to transpose solidarity with the requesting party. Therefore, in its current form, the EU solidarity mechanism exhibits legal ambiguity, which impedes its substantial application, for any type of crisis and (crucially) by all member states.<\/p>\n

However, in the end, the Member States supported the “coordinated economic response”<\/a> of the European Commission meant to alleviate the economic shock and financial burden of the Covid-19 crisis. These measures can be divided into three blocks. The first block<\/i> of actions aims at simplifying the joint procurement procedures for personal protection equipment (PPE), including from non-European producers. The possibility of reorienting the production of the European textile industry is being examined. In addition, a system of authorization for the export of personal protective equipment (gloves, respiratory masks, suits, etc.) has been introduced temporarily for third countries (EU, March 15, 2020<\/a>), which also includes the Eastern Partnership states. Medicines do not fall into this category, which allows Romania to deliver drugs to Moldova (Digi24, March 15, 2020<\/a>).<\/p>\n

The second block<\/i> of measures concerns aid to the aviation sector, the tourism industry, businesses and employees. Airlines can derogate from the “use or lose” principle when requesting and allocating time slots in advance, between March and June 2020. The situation in the tourism industry is monitored through engagement with the relevant associations in the member countries, to identify solutions. The EU has also redirected money from existing funds to increase the liquidity available to save over 100 thousand small and medium-sized enterprises<\/a> (around EUR 9 billion). To support vulnerable groups of employees, the European Social Fund (ESF) is being used, along with the proposal to establish a “European reinsurance system for unemployment benefits”.<\/p>\n

The third block<\/i> refers to the steps taken by the EU to support the Member States. On the one hand, the conditions for granting state aid<\/a> are relaxed – both towards citizens and companies. On the other hand, the EU is contemplating the mobilization of to existing and unused funds (about EUR 65 billion<\/a>) – structural and cohesive ones – to identify the sources needed to (co-)finance the actions of national governments. At the same time, the European Commission suggests maximum flexibility for the fiscal framework, giving the Member States the freedom to operate the necessary expenses to eliminate the socio-economic consequences caused by Covid. These measures are part of a legislative proposal of the European Commission – “Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative<\/a>“. Following the “co-decision” of the EU Council (national governments) and the European Parliament, ready to speed up the legal procedures (EuropeanParliament, March 17, 2020<\/a>), the initiative can become implementable.<\/p>\n

Eastern resilience and the role of the EU-Moldova Association Agreement<\/b><\/p>\n

Referring to the Eastern Partnership as a “crucial element of the EU’s foreign policy<\/a>“<\/i>, EU High Representative Josep Borrell launched the proposal to “strengthen the resilience<\/a>” of the Eastern Partners (March 18, 2020). The priorities set in the renewed approach mainly provide for the closer interconnection of the countries in the region and investment in their own sources of economic development. Borrell considers that the EU\u2019s “Neighbours’ strength is also the European Union’s strength<\/i>“. It seems clear that the Covid-19 crisis provided at least some impetus for the strengthening of the EU’s priorities for the Eastern Neighborhood. EU Neighborhood and Enlargement Commissioner Oliv\u00e9r V\u00e1rhelyi said the EU will work closely with Eastern neighbors to “address current challenges at all levels, including the COVID-19 pandemic<\/i>” (EU, March 18, 2020<\/a>). In addition to the promised aid for the modernization of the public health sector (medical infrastructure, training of medical personnel, access to health services), the EU will provide support to “better manage” case-related diseases, such as the coronavirus. However, this laudable promise lacks detail and it remains to be seen whether the EU will provide tangible support to tackle the current pandemic rather than helping to prevent similar situations in the future.<\/p>\n

The EU-Moldova Association Agreement considerably exceeds the opportunities offered by the Eastern Partnership’s multilateral platform. As in the field of civil protection (IPN, April 25, 2017<\/a>), the Agreement contains relevant provisions in the area of public health (Title IV, Chapter 21, Art. 113-116<\/a>). Moldova has committed to harmonize legislation with 4 European measures in the field of transmissible diseases, including the creation of an epidemiological surveillance network until 2023 year.<\/p>\n

Three provisions of the Agreement are essential in the context of COVID-19: 1) \u201cincreasing the capacity to prepare for threats and emergencies for public health<\/i>\u201d; 2) the integration of Moldova in EU networks in the field of health; and \u201cprogressive improvement\u201d of relations between Moldova and the European Center for Disease Prevention and Control. Only point three, however, can be found in the 2017-2019 Association Agenda<\/a>, which sets out the priority actions for the reform agenda. Based on recognized flaws in Moldovan governance highlighted by Covid-19, the EU-Moldova Association Agenda for 2020-2022 necessitates references to the fast transposition of the European acquis on the surveillance of transmissible diseases. At the same time, the EU can provide technical-financial support for the effort to map the relevant European health institutions. Moldova should be encouraged to gradually join the institutions that currently manage the Covid-19 crisis. It is also crucial to develop a \u201croad map<\/i>\u201d to materialize relations with the European Center for Disease Prevention and Control, which is the key EU institution with expertise and technical capabilities. The services of this European agency already benefit the countries with observer status, such as the states of the European Economic Area (3 countries) and some candidate states \u2013 from the Western Balkans (Montenegro) and Turkey. The collective approach to deepen relations with the EU, initiated by Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, can be updated by requesting an efficient integration in the field of public health.<\/p>\n

Moldova needs solutions to provide guarantees to beneficiaries of the public health system and guidance for government when they are faced with epidemiological pressures. Currently, without these tools, the situation in Moldova is deeply uncertain. The Moldovan authorities underestimated the depth of the relationship between the diaspora and the Moldovan migrants within the European space (IOM, 2015<\/a>:\u00a0Italy – 142,266 Moldovan citizens, Spain – 16,202, Germany – 14,815<\/i>). At the same time, it seems clear that many Moldovan citizens ignored official requirements\/advice because of ignorance or scepticism towards the authorities, contributing to the easy penetration of the virus into and within the country. The non-identification of \u201cpatients zero\u201d, the organization of new parliamentary elections in Hincesti (March 15) ignoring the local outbreaks of infection and inefficient filtering of Moldovans at the airport, faciliated the import, and subsequently the local expansion of the virus.<\/p>\n

In just two weeks after the first case was detected (Digi24, March 7, 2020<\/a>), the authorities identified over 80 coronavirus cases. Today, more than 100 people are suspected of infection. Due to the need to tighten up the measures, the executive convinced the Moldovan legislature to adopt a motion providing for 2 months of a state of emergency (March 17-May 15, 2020<\/a>), a period in which derogation from the obligations towards the ECHR are made, except for Article 15 (IPN, March 21, 2020<\/a>). \u00a0Moldova introduced the special regime after Armenia (one day – March 16<\/a>), but before the regions of Ukraine (Kyiv and Kharkiv – March 20-21<\/a>) and Georgia (4 days – March 21<\/a>). Government actions are supervised by civil society, failures are revealed by the media is a usual modus vivendi<\/i>. Today, however, Moldova displays some unreal images.\u00a0 While the army is providing vehicles to help with Covid-19, the church is asked to pause gatherings of parishioners, the majority of citizens stay in quarantine, which will affect the Easter celebrations. Last year, Moldova tested the resilience of democracy in the face of threats from the oligarchic regime. In 2020, Covid-19 challenges the country’s resilience in the face of an exceptional health crisis, coupled with governance by an unpopular administration.<\/p>\n

Instead of conclusions…<\/b><\/p>\n

So far, the EU has displayed too little capacity to handle several crises at the same time. The reappearance of a real, previously felt crisis – such as that of migration \u2013 initially distracted attention from the emergence of the new crisis – that of the coronavirus pandemic. Despite the criticisms, the ecosystem of the European institutions has managed to produce various economic and financial measures, which give a certain sense of control of the situation. However, the national governments have the primary responsibility for circumventing and lowering the epidemic. Without drastic measures, similar to those in Spain and France, the capacity of national systems of public health to overcome and taper down coronavirus infections remains far from certain.<\/p>\n

The EU openly recognizes that the resilience of its Eastern neighbours is a priority. The Covid-19 crisis demonstrates how important it is to coordinate actions both within the EU and between Brussels and its eastern neighbourhood. Blocking borders, stopping flights and other urgent measures taken by EU countries, with or without Brussels\u2019 notice, is impacting eastern neighbours, primarily the Eastern Partnership states. In the last 5 years, Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia have advanced economic integration with the European market and intensified human contacts, in response to Russia’s political, commercial and military pressures. That is why EU responses to the coronavirus pandemic require active engagement with Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia – by broadening political and sectoral communication, facilitating access to European medical equipment and reviewing association agendas to reflect existential health needs in the Covid-19 period.<\/p>\n

\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n

\n
Dionis Cenu\u015fa, Senior Contributor<\/div>\n
Dionis Cenu\u0219a is a political scientist, researcher at the Institute of Political Sciences at Liebig-Justus University in Giessen, Germany, MA degree in Interdisciplinary European Studies from the College of Europe in Warsaw.
\nAreas of research: European Neighborhood Policy, EU-Moldova relationship, EU’s foreign policy and Russia, migration and energy security.
\nFollow Dionis Cenu\u0219a on\u00a0Twitter<\/u><\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
\n

IPN publishes in the Op-Ed rubric opinion pieces submitted by authors not affiliated with our editorial board. The opinions expressed in these articles do not necessarily coincide with the opinions of our editorial board.<\/em><\/p>\n

Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/div>\n
\n
See related articles:<\/div>\n
    \n
  1. “Multi-vector” foreign policy and European integration: the realities of Serbia, Moldova and Georgia. Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  2. Differentiated European accession: the imminent decoupling of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  3. (Geo)political polarization in Georgia and Moldova and what is at stake for the EU and Russia. Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  4. Prevalence of the geopolitical factor in the EU accession agenda of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  5. The new EU defense agenda and the dynamics in Eastern Europe. Analysis of Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  6. Forecasts for Eastern Europe in 2024: The crisis of EU influence and the electoral renewal of autocracies. Analysis of Dionis Cenusa<\/a><\/li>\n
  7. The Hungarian-Russian factor and the Ukrainian dimension of the EU’s eastern enlargement. Analysis of Dionis Cenusa<\/a><\/li>\n
  8. The Middle East crisis and the European perspective for Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Analysis of Dionis Cenusa<\/a><\/li>\n
  9. The Transnistrian conflict settlement: three scenarios in the context of the geostrategic interests of Moldova, Ukraine and Russia. Analysis by Dionis Cenusa<\/a><\/li>\n
  10. The Cyprus precedent, the post-Soviet \u201cfrozen conflicts\u201d and the European agenda of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Analysis by Dionis Cenusa<\/a><\/li>\n
  11. The effects of the anti-government protests in Georgia and Moldova on the EU positions. Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  12. Russia and the geopolitical costs of war: the “frozen conflicts” in Moldova and Azerbaijan. Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  13. Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia on the road to the EU: 5 principles to make reforms more efficient. Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  14. Bringing Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia closer to the EU: a multi-speed progress. Analysis by Dionis Cenusa<\/a><\/li>\n
  15. Disinhibiting EU strategic thinking under the pressure of Russian militarist revisionism: breaking European “taboos”. Analysis by Dionis Cenusa<\/a><\/li>\n
  16. Preventing Russian-origin threats in 2023: three priorities for risk reduction for the West. Analysis by Dionis Cenusa<\/a><\/li>\n
  17. “Reshaping” of regional critical infrastructure under the impact of war: the case of Ukraine, Russia and the EU. Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  18. The energy crisis in Moldova and support for reunification with Romania, analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  19. Ukraine’s critical infrastructure vs. Russia’s energy positioning – the “war of nerves”. Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  20. The parameters of Western aid to Ukraine and Moldova: preparation for the \u201cRussian winter\u201d. Analysis by Dionis Cenusa<\/a><\/li>\n
  21. Russian Tactics against Ukraine and Moldova: Ramifications of the Energy Crises. Analysis of Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  22. Russian attacks on critical infrastructure: risks for Ukraine’s resilience and implications for the EU. Analysis of Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  23. The new scenarios of Russian aggression in the light of the illegal annexation of southeastern Ukraine. Analysis of Dionis Cenusa<\/a><\/li>\n
  24. Moldova-Russia relations: between anti-governmental protests and gas blackmail. Analysis by Dionis Cenusa<\/a><\/li>\n
  25. Russia’s gas war and the EU’s resilience test: three Russian goals and three European dilemmas. Analysis by Dionis Cenusa<\/a><\/li>\n
  26. The de-oligarchization of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia: the EU condition for advancing the European perspective. Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u015fa<\/a><\/li>\n
  27. Georgia and Moldova: Comparative analysis of state resilience and risks of Russian origin. Analysis of Dionis Cenusa<\/a><\/li>\n
  28. EU sanctions and Russia’s energy weapon – solidarity versus fragmentation. Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  29. Moldova and the candidacy for the EU: between the loss of legitimacy and the need for a national dialogue. Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  30. EU membership candidacy: internal and geopolitical differences between Ukraine and Moldova. Analysis of Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  31. The race for EU membership status: the three scenarios for Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Analysis of Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  32. EU energy autonomy and “crisis” of sanctions against Russia: between blockades and new alternatives. Aanalysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  33. Regional insecurity and the search for resilience for Moldova – based on EU or NATO assistance? Analysis by Dionis Cenusa<\/a><\/li>\n
  34. New trends in aggression against Ukraine, Western sanctions and Russian energy weapon<\/a><\/li>\n
  35. Moldova and Georgia’s Dialogue with the EU and NATO: Seeking External Attention and Resources for State Resilience. Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  36. The “new” European agenda of Moldova, the unification with Romania and the separation of the Transnistria region. Analysis of Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  37. Sanctions against Russia to save Ukraine and the Chinese factor, analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  38. The Russian invasion and the “rivalry” of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia for accession to the EU. Analysis of Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  39. Russian crisis 2.0: Ukraine’s demands towards the West in the face of new scenarios in Moscow. Analysis of Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  40. The role of EU assistance in Moldova’s detachment from Russia. Analysis of Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  41. Ukrainianization of European security: Why is Russia acting now? Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  42. Top Seven Forecasts for the Eastern Partnership in 2022: Stress Test for Local Reforms and Pressure from Regional Geopolitical Competition. Analysis of Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  43. Top 5 advances and challenges in the EaP in 2021: pro-EU resilience and new sources of regional instability. Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  44. Germany’s post-Merkel foreign policy: more pro-European in Eastern Europe, tougher on Russia. Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  45. Moldova’s foreign policy – between “interconnection” with Romania and “balancing” with Russia. Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  46. The migration crisis in Belarus, the EU\u2019s weaknesses and the scenarios of the Lukashenko regime. Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  47. Drawing lessons from Moldova on EU energy security and the Russian monopoly. Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  48. Russia’s intentions to counter Western influence in the CIS space, analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  49. Revitalizing the EU-Moldova dialogue: between geopolitical enthusiasm, \u201chistorical moment\u201d and local limitations, analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  50. Between EU expectations and the political reality in Georgia and Moldova: contradictions and risks, analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  51. The Post-Merkel Era and the Fate of Eastern Europeans: Continuation of European Integration and Restoration of Territorial Integrity, Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  52. Resuscitation of Russia-Moldova relations and the impact of the European vector. Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  53. Resolving territorial conflicts in the Eastern Partnership: In search of a personalized EU approach, analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  54. Georgia-Moldova-Ukraine \u201cAssociation\u201d Triangle: Deepening EU Integration and the \u201cShield\u201d Against Russian Influence, Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  55. EU Economic Sanctions and Vulnerability of the Eastern Partnership to Belarusian Precedent. Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  56. Early Elections in Moldova and the Geopolitical Power of the Diaspora. Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  57. Deepening differentiation within the Eastern Partnership and the emergence of the pan-European “Trio”. Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  58. Oligarchy in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine: between withdrawal, regrouping and \u201cre-education\u201d. Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  59. Public Attitudes in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine towards the EU – between Adoration and Moderation. Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a <\/a><\/li>\n
  60. Adjusting the visa-free regime with the EU for Eastern Europeans – from the pandemic to the “green pass”. Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  61. “Sputnik V” at the EU border and Russia’s targets in Moldova, Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  62. The signs of \u201cvaccine diplomacy\u201d in Moldova: Romania’s advantages over Russia. Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219\u0103<\/a><\/li>\n
  63. The EU\u2019s calculus in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova – navigating between political crises, reforms and the “shadows” of Russia. Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219\u0103 <\/a><\/li>\n
  64. Anticipating Russia’s reaction to future EU sanctions: division, disinformation or destabilization? Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219\u0103 <\/a><\/li>\n
  65. EU-Russia relationship in 2021 – between “distorted pragmatism” and “resilient foreign policy”, Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  66. Re-Europeanization of Moldova’s foreign policy and the EU’s position on the Moldovan political crisis, Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a <\/a><\/li>\n
  67. Top eight forecasts for Eastern Partnership states in 2021 – between \u201ccontestation\u201d and \u201crenewal\u201d. Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219\u0103 <\/a><\/li>\n
  68. The Eastern Partnership’s Top 5 Opportunities and Challenges in 2020, Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219\u0103<\/a><\/li>\n
  69. The EU, the “Magnitsky Act” and targeting autocrats in the Eastern neighborhood. Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  70. Moldova-Russia relationship and the post-Dodon transition – between \u201crational\u201d and \u201cemotional\u201d approaches, Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219\u0103<\/a><\/li>\n
  71. Informational resilience near the eastern borders of the EU, Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219\u0103<\/a><\/li>\n
  72. The EU’s eastern neighborhood at a new crossroad – between electoral riddles and security crises, analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  73. Moldova – presidential elections without a “geopolitical vote”? Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  74. The perspective of Russia, China and the EU on the political crisis in Belarus – between intervention, support and influence, analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  75. Belarus – a new “velvet revolution” in the Eastern Partnership? Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  76. The \u201edarlings\u201d of the EU conditionality mechanism – Georgia, Moldova or Ukraine? Analysis by Dionis Cenu\u0219a<\/a><\/li>\n
  77. The effects of EU actions in Moldova – financial assistance and the opposition\u2019s contradictions. Analysis<\/a><\/li>\n
  78. Germany\u2019s Presidency in the EU Council and the Eastern Partnership\u2019s future: A Guide to handling an “uncomfortable” reality, analysis<\/a><\/li>\n
  79. The EU’s political agenda and the “moving sands” in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, analysis<\/a><\/li>\n
  80. The EU’s conditionality and fighting Euroscepticism in Eastern Partnership, Op-Ed<\/a><\/li>\n
  81. The Eurasian Union and the health crisis: lacking integration and geopolitical ambitions, Op-Ed<\/a><\/li>\n
  82. NATO\u2019s solidarity and the Russian factor: the tough lesson of state resilience, Op-Ed<\/a><\/li>\n
  83. China and Russia \u2013 the health diplomacy and the “fragmentation\u201d of Europe, Op-Ed<\/a><\/li>\n
  84. The “falling governments” in Moldova and Ukraine: Four similarities and two differences, Op-Ed<\/a><\/li>\n
  85. European integration in the EU’s neighbourhood: With or without “de-geopoliticization\u201d?, Op-Ed<\/a><\/li>\n
  86. \u201cMacronization\u201d of EU-Russia ties and effects on Eastern neighborhood, Op-Ed<\/a><\/li>\n
  87. Moldova-Romania unification, migration and European integration in the East, Op-Ed<\/a><\/li>\n
  88. Immobilization of the oligarchs in Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine: mission (im)possible? Op-Ed<\/a><\/li>\n
  89. Ten forecasts for 2020: \u201cGeopolitization\u201d of the oligarchy in Moldova and EU-Russia rapprochement, Op-Ed <\/a><\/li>\n
  90. Year of “Shortened” Europtimism in Moldova: Top 3 Successes and Setbacks in 2019. Op-Ed<\/a><\/li>\n
  91. Romania-Moldova dialogue: from \u201ccalm tone\u201d to the conditionality regime, Op-Ed<\/a><\/li>\n
  92. Traumatized European perspective in EU\u2019s vicinity and the Moldovan echoes, Op-Ed<\/a><\/li>\n
  93. EU-Moldova dialogue: Is there European integration after Maia Sandu\u2019s government?, Op-Ed<\/a><\/li>\n
  94. Enlargements “in between” the EU and the Eurasian Union: Serbia and Moldova as showcase, Op-Ed<\/a><\/li>\n
  95. EU macro-financial aid for Moldova: objective rewarding or political stimulation?, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  96. Russia, the EU and the restoring geopolitical coexistence along the Kiev-Chisinau-Tbilisi line, Op-Ed<\/a><\/li>\n
  97. Moldova\u2019s government of reform and the European “credit of trust”<\/a><\/li>\n
  98. Moldova’s “balanced” foreign policy, the Paris-Moscow axis and the Ukrainian dossier, Op-Ed<\/a><\/li>\n
  99. Moldova\u2019s fragile government and the European agenda by 2020, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  100. Unlocking European Assistance for Moldova: with or without conditionality?, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  101. “Anti-oligarchic spring” or temporary illusions in Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  102. Surrendering oligarchic regime, re-launching of European integration in Moldova and Russia\u2019s agenda, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  103. Moldova\u2019s political crisis: Overcoming the geopolitical complex and the “captured state”, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  104. Political speeds in Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia: in search of a \u201cvirtuous circle\u201d, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  105. Intersection of geopolitical symbols in Moldova: between Soviet past and rights of sexual minorities, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  106. Visa liberalization in Moldova after five years: weaknesses of good governance and comparisons to Ukraine and Georgia, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  107. Post-electoral Moldova: between Russia\u2019s warnings, absence of EU and snap elections, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  108. (Geo)political behavior of Presidents of Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine: between fluctuating perceptions and realities, OP-ED
    \n<\/a><\/li>\n
  109. Formation of post-electoral coalition in Moldova and Moscow\u2019s benefits, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  110. Diaspora\u2019s power in the Moldovan Elections – Between Perceptions and Realities, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  111. Attitudes of citizens of Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia towards EU and paradoxes of polls, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  112. Ten forecasts for 2019: Reconfiguration of European agenda in Moldova and the rule of law crisis in EU, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  113. Year of disruptions in Moldova\u2019s European integration: Top 3 accomplishments and failures in 2018, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  114. Deficiencies of European conditionality and survival of Moldova political class, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  115. Warning about suspension of visa-free regime for Moldova and synergy of EU criticism, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  116. Difficult coexistence between civil society and oligarchic regimes in Moldova and Georgia, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  117. Failure to insert the European integration in Moldova\u2019s Constitution: losers and winners<\/a><\/li>\n
  118. Future of Association Agreements in Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia: local, European and Russian factors, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  119. Opportunities of extraparliamentary opposition, fears of government and positioning towards EU, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  120. Scanning of EU macro-financial assistance to Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia: frontrunners and laggards, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  121. Decay of EU-Moldova relations until a new electoral test, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  122. Antigovernment protests, government\u2019s stratagems and European agenda of Moldova, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  123. Discrepancies between Chisinau and EU and intention to make use of Russian factor, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  124. Is Moldova\u2019s case a dangerous precedent for EU\u2019s relations with Ukraine and Georgia? OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  125. Impact of EP resolution: from political crisis of government to attack on EU\u2019s image in Moldova, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  126. Deterioration of EU-Moldova dialogue and calculations of Moldovan government, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  127. Invalidation of elections in Chisinau, government scenarios and EU reaction, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  128. Romanian Presidency of Council of EU and political-energy context in Moldova, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  129. Social protests amid European integration: Why do citizens in Georgia protest more often than those in Moldova? OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  130. Impact of rapprochement between EU and Russia on Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  131. Foreign multi-vectorialism of President Dodon and post-electoral geopolitical uncertainties, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  132. Moldova\u2019s energy dependence, avoidance of transparency and ignoring of debt for Russian gas, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  133. EU and limits of \u201cstrict conditionality\u201d in relation to Moldova, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  134. Role and implications of (Euro)unionism in Moldova, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  135. Georgia\u2019s European aspirations and lessons to be learned by Moldova, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  136. Regeneration of Putin regime and implications for EaP and Moldova, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  137. (Geo)political scenarios for parliamentary elections of Moldova, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  138. Moldova and EU: a dialogue clogged up with old problems and new expectations, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  139. Diagnosis of oligarchy in Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia and de-oligarchization solutions, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  140. EU assistance for Moldova, hastening of reforms and government\u2019s survival, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  141. European integration, import of EU legislation and practical solutions for shaping benefits, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  142. Moldova and position of EaP leader between forced reforms and advantage of regional comparison, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  143. Moldova\u2019s struggle against Russian misinformation: shortcomings and electoral calculation, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  144. New visa suspension mechanism as an additional instrument targeting corruption in Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  145. Constitutional Court, European integration and (geo)political struggle in Moldova, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  146. Bulgarian presidency of EU Council and effects on Moldova, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  147. Ten predictions for 2018: Electoral test for the European course, resurgence of the pro-Russian forces, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  148. Nature of growth of pro-European perception and attempt to \u201cconstitutionalize\u201d European course, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  149. Struggle against Russian propaganda in Moldova, touching of U.S. and European content, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  150. Moldova and prospects of joining EU \u2013 lack of political, institutional and emotional readiness on both sides, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  151. Future of EaP and Moldova following Brussels Declaration \u2013 between pragmatism and local realities, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  152. What do Eastern Partnership and Moldova go with to Brussels summit? OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  153. Moderation of Euroskepticism of President Dodon, Moldova-EU trade and resuscitation of pro-European sympathies, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  154. Legitimacy of governments of EaP, survival of European course and Moldova, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  155. Multiple speeds of Eastern Partnership, civil society and Moldova\u2019s case, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  156. Russia, nationalism in Europe and Moldova, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  157. European integration, pro-European unionism and defects of Moldovan government, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  158. Pro-reform agenda instead of blocking of macro-financial assistance, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  159. Mandate of new Head of EU Delegation to Moldova and first major challenge, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  160. EU\u2019s mission in Eastern neighborhood and Moldova: stimulation of development or European integration? OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  161. Magnetization of Eastern Partnership, Russia\u2019s role and implications for Moldova, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  162. Civil society: agents of influence or sanitarians of political system. OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  163. European integration in Moldova: elitist project or not?, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  164. Moldova on 26th anniversary of independence: between sustainability and Europeanization, Op-Ed<\/a><\/li>\n
  165. The end of Pirkka Tapiola\u2019s tenure, the pro-Russian president and the pro-European oligarch, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  166. Chisinau\u2019s bet: Macro-financial assistance and EU recognition, Op-Ed
    \n<\/a><\/li>\n
  167. Moldova and \u201cstabilitocracy\u201d in European neighborhood, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  168. Re-evaluation of Moldova-EU Association Agreement: solution or new uncertainties? OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  169. EU\u2019s reaction to introduction of mixed electoral system: pragmatism or weakness, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  170. External financing of civil society, government pressure and European integration, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  171. Stimulation of reforms in Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine: new conditionality vs European perspective<\/a><\/li>\n
  172. Estonian presidency of EU Council and implications for Moldova<\/a><\/li>\n
  173. Restoration of power supplies from Transnistrian region and weakness of European factor, Op-Ed<\/a><\/li>\n
  174. Venice Commission, mixed-member electoral system and European assistance, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  175. Role of President Dodon for Russia and implications for European integration, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  176. Priorities of Eastern Partnership until 2020 and how Moldova can benefit from these, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  177. European values versus traditional values and geopolitical subtext in Moldova, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  178. European agenda, civil society and confrontation with government, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  179. Three scenarios concerning fate of EU macro-financial assistance for Moldova, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  180. Halt in EU funding versus uninominal voting system in Moldova, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  181. How did Moldova become a \u201dcaptured state\u201d? OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  182. Natural disasters in Moldova and opportunities of relationship with EU, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  183. Moldova after three years of visa-free regime with EU and new European realities, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  184. Can Memorandum with Eurasian Union diminish Moldova\u2019s European agenda? OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  185. Hidden concerns of EU and adaptability of government, Op-Ed<\/a><\/li>\n
  186. Moldova forced to combine CIS and Eurasian Union with European integration, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  187. Pro-reform approach of EU and pro-Russian plans of President Dodon, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  188. Multi-speed in EU and its neighborhood: Where is Moldova? OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  189. Pro-European sympathies and role of pro-EU opposition, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  190. Presidential administration vs government: between political coexistence and geopolitical antagonism, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  191. European security and Russia\u2019s approach for a post-Western world, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  192. Association Agreement with EU and paradoxes of President Dodon, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  193. EU dilemma: to criticize government or to combat Euro-skeptical propaganda of pro-Russian President? OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  194. Parallel dialogues between EU and Moldova and Russian-Eurasian factor, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  195. Is DCFTA implemented in Transnistrian region or not? OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  196. Populism and European integration in Moldova, Op-Ed<\/a><\/li>\n
  197. Difficult mission: advancing of Europeanization and restoration of relations with Russia, OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  198. Eastern Partnership becomes more \u2018practical\u2019. What does Moldova gain? OP-ED<\/a><\/li>\n
  199. About \u2018application for accession\u2019 to EU and Moldova\u2019s homework, OP-ED IPN<\/a><\/li>\n
  200. Energy interconnection with EU: Recipe for diminishing dependence on Transnistria and Russia<\/a><\/li>\n
  201. Europeans\u2019 tactic in relation to Chisinau: Reforms here and now, Op-Ed<\/a><\/li>\n
  202. Georgia, liberalization of visas with EU and implications for Moldova<\/a><\/li>\n
  203. Chisinau accelerates reforms to seduce European Union<\/a><\/li>\n
  204. Europeans again in Chisinau: between dialogue with government and protest leaders<\/a><\/li>\n
  205. Deciphering EU\u2019s position on Moldova: Real significance versus mistakes and omissions<\/a><\/li>\n
  206. Schengen crisis: Does it affect visa-free regime for Moldova or not?<\/a><\/li>\n
  207. Western and Russian press about protests in Chisinau: between misinformation and manipulation<\/a><\/li>\n
  208. Reactions of EU and U.S. to new anti-government protests in Chisinau<\/a><\/li>\n
  209. Idea of early elections in Moldova: New pro-Europeans in Chisinau \u2013 \u201cyes\u201d, voices from Brussels – \u201cbetter no\u201d
    \n<\/a><\/li>\n
  210. EU under Dutch presidency and allusions to Moldova<\/a><\/li>\n
  211. EU in Moldova: recipe for reanimating European course in 2016<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    Op-Ed \u00a0 \u00a0 EU responses to coronavirus require effective engagement with Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia – by broadening political and sectoral communication, facilitating access to European medical equipment and revising…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":0,"featured_media":584209,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[140],"tags":[42682,877],"class_list":["post-585339","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-featured","tag-coronavirus-covid-19","tag-op-ed-en"],"yoast_head":"\nOn the effects of the Pandemic \u2013 between European solidarity and the Eastern neighbourhood's resilience, Op-Ed - ipn.md<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/ipn.md\/en\/on-the-effects-of-the-pandemic-between-european-solidarity-and-the-eastern-neighbourhoods-resilience-op-ed\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"On the effects of the Pandemic \u2013 between European solidarity and the Eastern neighbourhood's resilience, Op-Ed - ipn.md\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Op-Ed \u00a0 \u00a0 EU responses to coronavirus require effective engagement with Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia – by broadening political and sectoral communication, facilitating access to European medical equipment and revising…\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/ipn.md\/en\/on-the-effects-of-the-pandemic-between-european-solidarity-and-the-eastern-neighbourhoods-resilience-op-ed\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"ipn.md\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ipn.md\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2020-03-24T04:35:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2026-07-20T20:39:17+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/ipn.md\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/03\/1072368__5e78d9283ea74-1.jpeg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"750\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"500\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@ipn_moldova\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@ipn_moldova\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"28 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ipn.md\\\/en\\\/on-the-effects-of-the-pandemic-between-european-solidarity-and-the-eastern-neighbourhoods-resilience-op-ed\\\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ipn.md\\\/en\\\/on-the-effects-of-the-pandemic-between-european-solidarity-and-the-eastern-neighbourhoods-resilience-op-ed\\\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"\",\"@id\":\"\"},\"headline\":\"On the effects of the Pandemic \u2013 between European solidarity and the Eastern neighbourhood’s resilience, Op-Ed\",\"datePublished\":\"2020-03-24T04:35:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2026-07-20T20:39:17+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ipn.md\\\/en\\\/on-the-effects-of-the-pandemic-between-european-solidarity-and-the-eastern-neighbourhoods-resilience-op-ed\\\/\"},\"wordCount\":5556,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ipn.md\\\/ru\\\/#organization\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ipn.md\\\/en\\\/on-the-effects-of-the-pandemic-between-european-solidarity-and-the-eastern-neighbourhoods-resilience-op-ed\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ipn.md\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2020\\\/03\\\/1072368__5e78d9283ea74-1.jpeg\",\"keywords\":[\"Coronavirus (COVID-19)\",\"op-ed\"],\"articleSection\":[\"Featured\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ipn.md\\\/en\\\/on-the-effects-of-the-pandemic-between-european-solidarity-and-the-eastern-neighbourhoods-resilience-op-ed\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ipn.md\\\/en\\\/on-the-effects-of-the-pandemic-between-european-solidarity-and-the-eastern-neighbourhoods-resilience-op-ed\\\/\",\"name\":\"On the effects of the Pandemic \u2013 between European solidarity and the Eastern neighbourhood's resilience, Op-Ed - ipn.md\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ipn.md\\\/ru\\\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ipn.md\\\/en\\\/on-the-effects-of-the-pandemic-between-european-solidarity-and-the-eastern-neighbourhoods-resilience-op-ed\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ipn.md\\\/en\\\/on-the-effects-of-the-pandemic-between-european-solidarity-and-the-eastern-neighbourhoods-resilience-op-ed\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ipn.md\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2020\\\/03\\\/1072368__5e78d9283ea74-1.jpeg\",\"datePublished\":\"2020-03-24T04:35:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2026-07-20T20:39:17+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ipn.md\\\/en\\\/on-the-effects-of-the-pandemic-between-european-solidarity-and-the-eastern-neighbourhoods-resilience-op-ed\\\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/ipn.md\\\/en\\\/on-the-effects-of-the-pandemic-between-european-solidarity-and-the-eastern-neighbourhoods-resilience-op-ed\\\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ipn.md\\\/en\\\/on-the-effects-of-the-pandemic-between-european-solidarity-and-the-eastern-neighbourhoods-resilience-op-ed\\\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ipn.md\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2020\\\/03\\\/1072368__5e78d9283ea74-1.jpeg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ipn.md\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2020\\\/03\\\/1072368__5e78d9283ea74-1.jpeg\",\"width\":750,\"height\":500},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ipn.md\\\/en\\\/on-the-effects-of-the-pandemic-between-european-solidarity-and-the-eastern-neighbourhoods-resilience-op-ed\\\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ipn.md\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"On the effects of the Pandemic \u2013 between European solidarity and the Eastern neighbourhood’s resilience, Op-Ed\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ipn.md\\\/ru\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ipn.md\\\/ru\\\/\",\"name\":\"ipn.md\",\"description\":\"Agen\u0163ie de pres\u0103 independent\u0103\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ipn.md\\\/ru\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"IPN\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ipn.md\\\/ru\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ipn.md\\\/ru\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"IPN - Agen\u0163ia de pres\u0103 independent\u0103\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ipn.md\\\/ru\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ipn.md\\\/ru\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ipn.md\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2024\\\/11\\\/photo_2025-02-05_10-45-59.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ipn.md\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2024\\\/11\\\/photo_2025-02-05_10-45-59.jpg\",\"width\":750,\"height\":500,\"caption\":\"IPN - Agen\u0163ia de pres\u0103 independent\u0103\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ipn.md\\\/ru\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/ipn.md\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/ipn_moldova\"]}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"On the effects of the Pandemic \u2013 between European solidarity and the Eastern neighbourhood's resilience, Op-Ed - ipn.md","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/en\/on-the-effects-of-the-pandemic-between-european-solidarity-and-the-eastern-neighbourhoods-resilience-op-ed\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"On the effects of the Pandemic \u2013 between European solidarity and the Eastern neighbourhood's resilience, Op-Ed - ipn.md","og_description":"Op-Ed \u00a0 \u00a0 EU responses to coronavirus require effective engagement with Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia – by broadening political and sectoral communication, facilitating access to European medical equipment and revising…","og_url":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/en\/on-the-effects-of-the-pandemic-between-european-solidarity-and-the-eastern-neighbourhoods-resilience-op-ed\/","og_site_name":"ipn.md","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ipn.md","article_published_time":"2020-03-24T04:35:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2026-07-20T20:39:17+00:00","og_image":[{"width":750,"height":500,"url":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/03\/1072368__5e78d9283ea74-1.jpeg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@ipn_moldova","twitter_site":"@ipn_moldova","twitter_misc":{"Est. reading time":"28 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/en\/on-the-effects-of-the-pandemic-between-european-solidarity-and-the-eastern-neighbourhoods-resilience-op-ed\/#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/en\/on-the-effects-of-the-pandemic-between-european-solidarity-and-the-eastern-neighbourhoods-resilience-op-ed\/"},"author":{"name":"","@id":""},"headline":"On the effects of the Pandemic \u2013 between European solidarity and the Eastern neighbourhood’s resilience, Op-Ed","datePublished":"2020-03-24T04:35:00+00:00","dateModified":"2026-07-20T20:39:17+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/en\/on-the-effects-of-the-pandemic-between-european-solidarity-and-the-eastern-neighbourhoods-resilience-op-ed\/"},"wordCount":5556,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/ru\/#organization"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/en\/on-the-effects-of-the-pandemic-between-european-solidarity-and-the-eastern-neighbourhoods-resilience-op-ed\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/03\/1072368__5e78d9283ea74-1.jpeg","keywords":["Coronavirus (COVID-19)","op-ed"],"articleSection":["Featured"],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/en\/on-the-effects-of-the-pandemic-between-european-solidarity-and-the-eastern-neighbourhoods-resilience-op-ed\/","url":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/en\/on-the-effects-of-the-pandemic-between-european-solidarity-and-the-eastern-neighbourhoods-resilience-op-ed\/","name":"On the effects of the Pandemic \u2013 between European solidarity and the Eastern neighbourhood's resilience, Op-Ed - ipn.md","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/ru\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/en\/on-the-effects-of-the-pandemic-between-european-solidarity-and-the-eastern-neighbourhoods-resilience-op-ed\/#primaryimage"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/en\/on-the-effects-of-the-pandemic-between-european-solidarity-and-the-eastern-neighbourhoods-resilience-op-ed\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/03\/1072368__5e78d9283ea74-1.jpeg","datePublished":"2020-03-24T04:35:00+00:00","dateModified":"2026-07-20T20:39:17+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/en\/on-the-effects-of-the-pandemic-between-european-solidarity-and-the-eastern-neighbourhoods-resilience-op-ed\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/ipn.md\/en\/on-the-effects-of-the-pandemic-between-european-solidarity-and-the-eastern-neighbourhoods-resilience-op-ed\/"]}]},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/en\/on-the-effects-of-the-pandemic-between-european-solidarity-and-the-eastern-neighbourhoods-resilience-op-ed\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/03\/1072368__5e78d9283ea74-1.jpeg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/03\/1072368__5e78d9283ea74-1.jpeg","width":750,"height":500},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/en\/on-the-effects-of-the-pandemic-between-european-solidarity-and-the-eastern-neighbourhoods-resilience-op-ed\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"On the effects of the Pandemic \u2013 between European solidarity and the Eastern neighbourhood’s resilience, Op-Ed"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/ru\/#website","url":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/ru\/","name":"ipn.md","description":"Agen\u0163ie de pres\u0103 independent\u0103","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/ru\/#organization"},"alternateName":"IPN","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/ru\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/ru\/#organization","name":"IPN - Agen\u0163ia de pres\u0103 independent\u0103","url":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/ru\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/ru\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/photo_2025-02-05_10-45-59.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/photo_2025-02-05_10-45-59.jpg","width":750,"height":500,"caption":"IPN - Agen\u0163ia de pres\u0103 independent\u0103"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/ru\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ipn.md","https:\/\/x.com\/ipn_moldova"]}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/585339","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=585339"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/585339\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":585341,"href":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/585339\/revisions\/585341"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/584209"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=585339"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=585339"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ipn.md\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=585339"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}