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	<title>blockage Archives - ipn.md</title>
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	<title>blockage Archives - ipn.md</title>
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	<item>
		<title>Hungary once again blocks the opening of clusters 2 and 3 for the accession negotiations of Moldova and Ukraine to the EU</title>
		<link>https://ipn.md/en/hungary-once-again-blocks-the-opening-of-clusters-2-and-3-for-the-accession-negotiations-of-moldova-and-ukraine-to-the-eu/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bolohan Maxim]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 23 Jul 2026 11:43:54 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Society]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Accession negotiations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[blockage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[clusters]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hungary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Moldova]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ipn.md/hungary-once-again-blocks-the-opening-of-clusters-2-and-3-for-the-accession-negotiations-of-moldova-and-ukraine-to-the-eu/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Hungary has blocked, for the second time in less than a week, the opening of clusters 2 and 3 for the accession negotiations of Moldova and Ukraine to the European&#8230;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ipn.md/en/hungary-once-again-blocks-the-opening-of-clusters-2-and-3-for-the-accession-negotiations-of-moldova-and-ukraine-to-the-eu/">Hungary once again blocks the opening of clusters 2 and 3 for the accession negotiations of Moldova and Ukraine to the EU</a> appeared first on <a href="https://ipn.md/en/">ipn.md</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Hungary has blocked, for the second time in less than a week, the opening of clusters 2 and 3 for the accession negotiations of Moldova and Ukraine to the European Union. A European official, who wished to remain anonymous, told IPN that the Hungarian side refused to approve the screening results on the two clusters during the meeting of the EU Council Working Group for enlargement and countries in the process of accession negotiations (COELA).</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The official stated that the next attempt is scheduled for September 1, after the summer vacation of European institutions. Cluster 2 includes chapters related to the &#8220;Internal Market&#8221;, while Cluster 3 refers to &#8220;Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth&#8221;, both being related to economic integration.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In this context, the Bureau for European Integration told IPN that Moldova is technically prepared for the opening of all negotiation chapters with the European Union. Until the resumption of discussions in September, Chisinau continues to implement the assumed reforms, deliver results, and carry out the necessary technical preparations for the next stages of negotiations, the institution&#8217;s response further states.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In the negotiation process with Moldova and Ukraine, the European Union has so far opened cluster 1, &#8220;Fundamental Values&#8221; and cluster 6 &#8220;External Relations&#8221;.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ipn.md/en/hungary-once-again-blocks-the-opening-of-clusters-2-and-3-for-the-accession-negotiations-of-moldova-and-ukraine-to-the-eu/">Hungary once again blocks the opening of clusters 2 and 3 for the accession negotiations of Moldova and Ukraine to the EU</a> appeared first on <a href="https://ipn.md/en/">ipn.md</a>.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>The road to the Cahul-Oancea border point has been unblocked</title>
		<link>https://ipn.md/en/access-to-the-ptf-cahul-temporarily-blocked-due-to-farmers-protests/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Irina Botu]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 24 Jun 2026 10:55:34 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Society]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[blockage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cahul]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Custom]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Farmers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Protest]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ipn.md/access-to-the-ptf-cahul-temporarily-blocked-due-to-farmers-protests/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Update: The road to the Cahul-Oancea Border Crossing Point has been unblocked, and vehicle traffic has been resumed, specifies the Border Police. Initial news: Access to the Cahul border crossing&#8230;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ipn.md/en/access-to-the-ptf-cahul-temporarily-blocked-due-to-farmers-protests/">The road to the Cahul-Oancea border point has been unblocked</a> appeared first on <a href="https://ipn.md/en/">ipn.md</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Update:</strong> The road to the Cahul-Oancea Border Crossing Point has been unblocked, and vehicle traffic has been resumed, specifies the Border Police.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Initial news:</strong> Access to the Cahul border crossing point is temporarily blocked due to farmers&#8217; protests, announces the Border Police, quoted by IPN.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">According to the institution, at this time, traffic to the crossing point is suspended, and the authorities are on the scene to maintain public order and manage the flow of transport.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Participants in cross-border traffic are encouraged to use alternative routes, through the Leova-Bumbata or Giurgiulesti-Galati crossing points.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Farmers <a href="https://ipn.md/en/farmers-are-protesting-again-they-demand-the-amendment-of-the-fiscal-budgetary-policy-project-for-2027/">protest</a> in several regions of the country, taking out agricultural machinery on the main national routes. They contest some provisions of the fiscal-budgetary policy project for the year 2027 and demand the maintenance of the current VAT rate in agriculture, the introduction of direct payments per hectare, and the full reimbursement of the diesel fuel excise.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ipn.md/en/access-to-the-ptf-cahul-temporarily-blocked-due-to-farmers-protests/">The road to the Cahul-Oancea border point has been unblocked</a> appeared first on <a href="https://ipn.md/en/">ipn.md</a>.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>The Gagauz Crisis and its Geopolitical Consequences. Op-Ed by Anatol Taranu</title>
		<link>https://ipn.md/en/the-gagauz-crisis-and-its-geopolitical-consequences-op-ed-by-anatol-taranu/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Editor Editor]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 03:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Featured]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Important]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Anatol Taranu]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Autonomy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[blockage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Elections]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Exceptional situation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gagauzia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Influences]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[op-ed]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Popular Assembly]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ipn.md/?p=450588</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>An electoral deadlock that exceeds the local dimension The political and institutional crisis in Gagauzia has entered a stage that can no longer be viewed exclusively through the prism of&#8230;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ipn.md/en/the-gagauz-crisis-and-its-geopolitical-consequences-op-ed-by-anatol-taranu/">The Gagauz Crisis and its Geopolitical Consequences. Op-Ed by Anatol Taranu</a> appeared first on <a href="https://ipn.md/en/">ipn.md</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong><em>An electoral deadlock that exceeds the local dimension</em></strong></p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The political and institutional crisis in Gagauzia has entered a stage that can no longer be viewed exclusively through the prism of relations between Chisinau and Comrat. The refusal of the Executive Committee of Gagauzia to accept the compromise document developed within the joint working group on the organization of elections for the Popular Assembly, as well as the promotion of an alternative project that contradicts national electoral legislation, transforms the problem into a matter of national security.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Formally, the dispute seems to focus on technical and legal aspects, including the naming of the regional electoral institution or the application of the provisions of the new Electoral Code of the Republic of Moldova. In reality, however, the conflict reflects a much deeper confrontation regarding political control over the region and the geopolitical orientation of the Republic of Moldova.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The mandate of the People&#8217;s Assembly of Gagauzia expired back in November 2025. Currently, the regional legislature operates in a precarious legal situation, without the possibility of adopting laws, which accentuates institutional uncertainty. However, instead of contributing to overcoming the deadlock, certain political groups within the autonomy continue to hinder the harmonization of regional legislation with national legislation and to procrastinate the organization of elections.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This situation raises the fundamental question: who has an interest in Gagauzia remaining in a legislative and electoral gray zone?</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong><em>The interference of the Russian Federation and the instrumentalization of autonomy</em></strong></p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">More and more signs indicate that the current deadlock is not the result of mere legal divergences. After the consultations held at the Presidency and after identifying compromise formulas acceptable to all parties, the authorities from Comrat have reversed their initial position and rejected the agreed document.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The coincidence between this change of position and the activation of the Russian Federation&#8217;s representatives in the region cannot be ignored. In recent months, Moscow has intensified its efforts to influence the Republic of Moldova, and Gagauzia represents one of the main tools used to maintain pressure on Chisinau.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The narratives promoted by the leaders of autonomy almost identically reproduce the theses of Russian propaganda: &#8220;attack on autonomy&#8221;, &#8220;undermining the rights of the Gagauz&#8221;, &#8220;excessive centralization&#8221; or &#8220;political pressures of Chisinau&#8221;. These messages do not aim to solve the crisis, but to fuel a permanent state of confrontation between the center and the region.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For the Kremlin, maintaining an open crisis in Gagauzia has multiple advantages. Firstly, it affects the internal stability of the Republic of Moldova. Secondly, it provides propagandistic arguments against the country&#8217;s European course. Thirdly, it creates the impression of a state incapable of exercising its authority over its entire territory.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In this regard, the Gagauz crisis should be analyzed in the same geopolitical register as the Transnistrian issue, even though the magnitude and nature of the two situations are different. In both cases, Moscow seeks to maintain levers of influence over the strategic decisions of the Republic of Moldova.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong><em>An electoral gray zone incompatible with the rule of law</em></strong></p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">One of the most serious aspects of the current situation is the existence of electoral rules that do not meet the standards applied throughout the rest of the Republic of Moldova.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There are numerous uncertainties regarding the financing of electoral campaigns, the verification of candidates, the control of donations, and the updating of electoral lists. These vulnerabilities create favorable conditions for external influences, electoral corruption, and the manipulation of polling results.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The central authorities rightly insist that the transparency of campaign financing, the verification of electoral process organizers, and the integrity of electoral lists must be identical across the entire territory of the Republic of Moldova. Autonomy cannot mean exclusion from adherence to the fundamental principles of the rule of law.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At the same time, there are serious suspicions that certain groups affiliated with the former political network controlled by Ilan Șor are aiming to preserve the current system in order to maintain control over future regional electoral institutions. If these objectives are achieved, the risk of perpetuating a mechanism of political and financial influence over autonomy will significantly increase.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong><em>The procrastination of the crisis becomes a risk for national security</em></strong></p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The greatest danger, however, is not the legal conflict itself, but its prolongation. Each month of deadlock weakens the authority of state institutions and sends a signal of vulnerability to both external partners and adversaries of the Republic of Moldova. A region in a constant state of political and electoral exception could become, in the context of the current confrontation between the Russian Federation and the West, a platform for destabilization.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In the context of the war in Ukraine and the intensification of the Kremlin&#8217;s hybrid operations in the post-Soviet space, the procrastination of the Gagauz crisis is no longer just an administrative issue. It transforms into a strategic vulnerability.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The state has the constitutional obligation to guarantee the functioning of democratic institutions and the exercise of the electoral rights of its citizens. The inhabitants of Gagauzia have the right to legitimate representation and functional institutions. This right cannot be sacrificed due to the interests of political groups or external influences.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong><em>The necessity of firm and decisive measures</em></strong></p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Chisinau has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness for dialogue and compromise. Consultations have been organized under the auspices of the Presidency, joint projects have been developed, and formulas have been identified that respect both the status of autonomy and national legislation.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If these efforts continue to be deliberately obstructed, the central authorities will have to resort to the available constitutional and legal instruments.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The referral to the Constitutional Court by the Ministry of Justice and the initiatives of the Central Electoral Commission represent important steps. However, if the deadlock persists, other mechanisms that would allow the organization of the vote under legal and transparent conditions will need to be examined.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A serious discussion must also be held about changing the regional electoral system. The current majority model favors obscure financial influences and the maintenance of dependency networks on external factors. A proportional system could significantly reduce the possibilities of electoral corruption and ensure a more balanced representation of political options.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In extreme situations, if the constitutional order and the electoral rights of the citizens continue to be affected, the state must be prepared to use all the tools provided by law to protect the national interest and guarantee the functioning of democratic institutions.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong><em>Exceptional situations require exceptional solutions</em></strong></p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Gagauz crisis is not just a dispute over the organization of regional elections. It represents a major test for the Republic of Moldova&#8217;s ability to defend its constitutional order, internal stability, and European path.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At stake is not only the future of autonomy, but also the credibility of the Moldovan state. Every day of delay favors the actors interested in destabilization and weakens the position of the Republic of Moldova in an extremely complicated regional context.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For this reason, the swift resolution of the crisis must become a national priority. The dialogue must continue, but it cannot be turned into a pretext for permanent deadlock. In times when the security of the state is in question, authorities have the duty to act firmly, legally, and decisively.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In any democratic state, there are situations where the defense of constitutional order and public security requires exceptional measures. Nobody wants to resort to such mechanisms. They always represent the last solution. However, there are moments when inaction becomes more dangerous than intervention.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Today, Gagauzia finds itself in an unprecedented situation of institutional uncertainty. The Popular Assembly is operating with an expired mandate. The electoral process is blocked. Regional norms contradict national legislation. There are serious suspicions regarding external influences and attempts at political control over electoral institutions. At the same time, the citizens of the region are deprived of the opportunity to freely and legitimately choose their representatives.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Under such circumstances, the examination of the possibility of instituting a territorially limited state of emergency in the region can no longer be considered a taboo subject. On the contrary, it must be discussed openly and responsibly, as one of the legal options available to the state.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The purpose of such a measure would not be to restrict autonomy or limit the rights of the Gagauz citizens. On the contrary, the objective should be to protect the population from external influences, restore the normal functioning of institutions, and guarantee the exercise of electoral rights under conditions of legality and transparency.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A potential temporary administration of the electoral process by the central institutions of the state could allow the organization of the scrutiny according to national standards, the verification of electoral campaign financing, the updating of electoral lists, and ensuring the integrity of the voting process. Such a solution would have a strictly temporary character and would aim for a rapid return to the normal functioning of autonomous institutions.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Of course, such a decision would inevitably generate reactions and controversies. Moscow would inevitably try to present it as an attack against Gagauz autonomy. Influence networks affiliated with the Kremlin and oligarchic groups would exploit the situation propagandistically. However, the real question is not what Russian propaganda will say. The real question is whether the Moldovan state can afford to accept the existence of a region where national legislation is not applied, and the organization of elections depends on the will of groups under external influence.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The experience of the last three decades demonstrates that every hesitation of Chisinau in the face of separatist challenges or external interferences has been interpreted by the adversaries of the Republic of Moldova as a sign of weakness. From this perspective, the procrastination of the current crisis could produce more severe effects than the firm measures adopted in accordance with the law.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The state has the obligation to protect not only the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova, but also the integrity of its constitutional and electoral space. There cannot be a functional democracy where the rules of transparency, financial control, and electoral organization are selectively applied.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Ultimately, exceptional situations require exceptional solutions. If all dialogue and compromise mechanisms have been exhausted, and the deadlock continues to threaten political stability and national security, constitutional authorities must have the courage to adopt the necessary decisions to restore legality. Not out of a desire for confrontation, but from the fundamental obligation to defend the state and the rights of its citizens.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At stake is not just the organization of regional elections. At stake is the ability of the Republic of Moldova to demonstrate that it is a functional state, capable of exercising its legitimate authority over its entire territory and resisting the geopolitical pressures that seek to undermine its sovereignty.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ipn.md/en/the-gagauz-crisis-and-its-geopolitical-consequences-op-ed-by-anatol-taranu/">The Gagauz Crisis and its Geopolitical Consequences. Op-Ed by Anatol Taranu</a> appeared first on <a href="https://ipn.md/en/">ipn.md</a>.</p>
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		<title>MEC accuses the authorities in Gagauzia of blocking the opening of the Moldovan-Turkish College in Comrat</title>
		<link>https://ipn.md/en/mec-accuses-the-authorities-in-gagauzia-of-blocking-the-opening-of-the-moldovan-turkish-college-in-comrat/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Irina Botu]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 06:34:59 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Society]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[authorities]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[blockage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Comrat]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gagauzia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ministry of Education]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Moldo-Turkish College]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ipn.md/mec-accuses-the-authorities-in-gagauzia-of-blocking-the-opening-of-the-moldovan-turkish-college-in-comrat/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The Ministry of Education and Research accuses the authorities of the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia of obstructing the opening of the Moldovan-Turkish College &#8220;Recep Tayyip Erdoğan&#8221; in Comrat, by&#8230;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ipn.md/en/mec-accuses-the-authorities-in-gagauzia-of-blocking-the-opening-of-the-moldovan-turkish-college-in-comrat/">MEC accuses the authorities in Gagauzia of blocking the opening of the Moldovan-Turkish College in Comrat</a> appeared first on <a href="https://ipn.md/en/">ipn.md</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Ministry of Education and Research accuses the authorities of the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia of obstructing the opening of the Moldovan-Turkish College &#8220;Recep Tayyip Erdoğan&#8221; in Comrat, by refusing to hand over the building of the institution for operation. According to the MEC, the project, considered strategic for the development of professional education in the region, is blocked for political and administrative reasons, reports IPN.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The representatives of the MEC argue that discussions about the opening of the college began as early as July 2025 and continued in October, with a joint meeting even being organized during the winter period. Moreover, a request from the ministry to organize a new meeting in March would have remained unanswered by the authorities in the region.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In parallel, the Ministry of Education and its partner institutions in Turkey have carried out all the necessary procedures for launching the educational process. Technical consultations on vocational training programs took place during December-January, with four specialties being agreed upon within the college.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">According to the Protocol signed between Moldova and Turkey, the main language of instruction will be Romanian. Some subjects may also be taught in Gagauz, Turkish or English, in accordance with national legislation. Moreover, the Gagauz and Turkish languages will be studied compulsorily.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In the context of requests coming from local actors regarding the full conduct of studies in Russian, the MEC reiterated that the institution will operate exclusively in accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Moldova and the provisions of the Moldovan-Turkish bilateral protocol.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">To facilitate the integration of students and teaching staff into the educational process, the ministry announces that Romanian language courses will be organized, so that the beneficiaries of the institution can participate under optimal conditions in the educational act.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The MEC further specifies that all necessary documents have been prepared for the approval of the Admission Plan to the Moldo-Turkish College in Comrat, including the exceptions provided by the regulatory framework, to allow the quickest possible launch of the admission and professional training process.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The project is carried out based on the Cooperation Protocol in the field of technical vocational education, signed between the Government of the Republic of Moldova and the Government of the Republic of Turkey.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ipn.md/en/mec-accuses-the-authorities-in-gagauzia-of-blocking-the-opening-of-the-moldovan-turkish-college-in-comrat/">MEC accuses the authorities in Gagauzia of blocking the opening of the Moldovan-Turkish College in Comrat</a> appeared first on <a href="https://ipn.md/en/">ipn.md</a>.</p>
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		<title>Man found drowned at Dereneu, after heavy rains</title>
		<link>https://ipn.md/en/man-found-drowned-at-dereneu-after-heavy-rains/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Alexandru Carasec]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 23 May 2026 10:54:03 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Important]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Society]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[blockage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Calarasi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[death]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[drowning]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[law enforcement officers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Police]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strong rains]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ipn.md/man-found-drowned-at-dereneu-after-heavy-rains/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>A man was found dead in the town of Dereneu, Calarasi district, after allegedly drowning during the heavy rains on Friday night, which caused flooding. The General Inspectorate of Police&#8230;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ipn.md/en/man-found-drowned-at-dereneu-after-heavy-rains/">Man found drowned at Dereneu, after heavy rains</a> appeared first on <a href="https://ipn.md/en/">ipn.md</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A man was found dead in the town of Dereneu, Calarasi district, after allegedly drowning during the heavy rains on Friday night, which caused flooding. The General Inspectorate of Police states that law enforcement was alerted on Saturday morning by a local resident, reports IPN.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">According to law enforcement, it was preliminarily determined that the man, aged 48, may have drowned near his homestead. He allegedly got trapped in several branches and was unable to save himself in time.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The lifeless body was taken over by the forensic doctors to determine the exact cause of death, and the law enforcement officers are to establish all the circumstances of the case.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ipn.md/en/man-found-drowned-at-dereneu-after-heavy-rains/">Man found drowned at Dereneu, after heavy rains</a> appeared first on <a href="https://ipn.md/en/">ipn.md</a>.</p>
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		<title>Why Comrat is not in a hurry to organize elections. Op-Ed by Denis Dermenji</title>
		<link>https://ipn.md/en/why-comrat-is-not-in-a-hurry-to-organize-elections-op-ed-by-denis-dermenji/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Editor Editor]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Mar 2026 09:36:25 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Featured]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Important]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Autonomy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[blockage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CEC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Comrat]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Elections]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gagauzia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ilan Sor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[op-ed]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Parliament]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The Constitutional Court]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ipn.md/why-comrat-is-not-in-a-hurry-to-organize-elections-op-ed-by-denis-dermenji/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The political situation related to the elections in Gagauzia is gradually transforming from a local institutional crisis into a more complex political conflict between Comrat and Chisinau. It is a&#8230;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ipn.md/en/why-comrat-is-not-in-a-hurry-to-organize-elections-op-ed-by-denis-dermenji/">Why Comrat is not in a hurry to organize elections. Op-Ed by Denis Dermenji</a> appeared first on <a href="https://ipn.md/en/">ipn.md</a>.</p>
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The political situation related to the elections in Gagauzia is gradually transforming from a local institutional crisis into a more complex political conflict between Comrat and Chisinau. It is a new conflict, against the backdrop of the old, unresolved one. Formally, it is about legal misunderstandings and procedural aspects, but the postponement of the electoral process shows that the problem is much deeper. More and more signs indicate that the delay of the elections could be not only a consequence of legal uncertainty, but also a conscious strategy of a part of the regional elites.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The dialogue that never happened</strong></p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In recent months, the central authorities of Moldova have undertaken a series of actions to unblock the situation. Discussions have taken place in parliament, representatives of the Central Electoral Commission have proposed the creation of joint working groups, and Chisinau has invited representatives of Gagauzia for consultations to find a legal solution. It should not be forgotten where all these movements started: namely from the visit of the head of the Information and Security Service of the Republic of Moldova, Alexandru Musteata, to Comrat.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">However, these recent attempts by Chisinau have not led to any real progress. Representatives of the region either postponed discussions or delegated politicians to the negotiations who adopted a rigid stance and essentially blocked any compromise.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The situation that has arisen shows that the crisis is not only legal in nature, but also political. And that makes it even more complicated. The longer the elections are postponed, the longer the current configuration of power in the region is maintained.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The logic of maintaining power</strong></p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For some political leaders in Gagauzia, postponing the elections may be a rational political strategy. Organizing a new vote involves the risk of losing influence and positions, especially in a context of declining trust in regional elites and increasing competition.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In the public space, the most active figures associated with the current power configuration in the region remain: the interim president of the Gagauz People&#8217;s Assembly, Nicolae Ormanji (appointed after Dmitri Constantinov&#8217;s flight), the vice-president of the APG of autonomy, Gheorghe Leiciu, as well as the deputy governor, Ilie Uzun. These politicians have been the key participants in the discussions about the electoral process over the past few months.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Therefore, postponing the elections allows the maintenance of the status quo. The longer the institutional deadlock lasts, the more time the politicians in power have to consolidate their positions, mobilize their supporters and shape a beneficial political agenda.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Such an approach is not unique. In many political systems, the postponement of electoral procedures is used as a tool to maintain power. However, for an autonomous region, such a strategy acquires additional dimensions: it begins to influence the relationships between the center and autonomy.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The influence of Shor&#8217;s network</strong></p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">An additional factor in the political dynamics of Gagauzia remains the influence of political networks associated with Ilan Shor&#8217;s group. Although the Shor party was declared unconstitutional, and Shor, after his defeat in the parliamentary elections, stated that he is withdrawing from politics, his political influence in certain regions of the country is maintained through local elites, civic organizations and new political initiatives.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Among the figures who regularly participate in regional political discussions are Ivan Colioglo, Vitali Derevenco, Dmitri Chiseev, Valeri Ianioglo, as well as a number of civic activists who promote the idea of a greater political distance from Chisinau.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In Gagauzia, this network continues to hold significant resources &#8211; from media influence to organizational capabilities. For politicians associated with this group, maintaining control over regional institutions is of strategic importance. Comrat can be considered one of the last support points of the political infrastructure created by Shor.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In this context, the postponement of elections becomes a means of maintaining the institutional levers of power.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>New platforms and the radicalization of discourse</strong></p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Against the backdrop of the political crisis in the region, new civic and political initiatives have begun to emerge. Among these are the &#8220;Our Autonomy&#8221; movement, associated with activists Mihail Vlah and Ivan Panei, as well as the &#8220;Platform 111&#8221; project (111 &#8211; from the article in the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova that grants autonomy a special status), initiated by Dmitri Chiseev.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Formally, they present themselves as structures for civic mobilization, however their public rhetoric is often directed against the central authorities, and some leaders of the movements have discredited themselves through ties with an oligarch in exile.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In the public space, theses about &#8220;Chisinau&#8217;s pressure on the region&#8221;, &#8220;violation of the rights of the region&#8217;s inhabitants&#8221; and the need to distance oneself from the decisions of central institutions are increasingly spreading. Such narratives gradually create an atmosphere of political confrontation, and the rhetoric can fulfill several functions simultaneously. Firstly, it mobilizes the electorate around the theme of protecting autonomy. Secondly, it provides an explanation for the delay of elections as a reaction to the actions of central authorities. Thirdly, it outlines a political agenda in which the conflict with Chisinau becomes the central element of regional politics.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Where does autonomy end</strong></p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The crisis related to the elections in Gagauzia raises yet another broader question &#8211; where is the boundary drawn between the region&#8217;s autonomy and the constitutional order of the state.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On one hand, the region possesses its own governing bodies and a certain degree of political independence. The Gagauz People&#8217;s Assembly plays a key role in regional administration and has the authority to make decisions within the framework of its autonomous status.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On the other hand, elections and electoral procedures must be in accordance with national legislation. The Central Electoral Commission is responsible for ensuring the application of uniform standards for the conduct of elections throughout the country.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Exactly at this point the conflict of interpretation arises: the regional elites emphasize the autonomous attributes of the People&#8217;s Assembly, while the central authorities insist on the necessity of respecting national rules.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The role of the Constitutional Court</strong></p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">One of the key steps of the central authorities was the notification of the Constitutional Court by the Ministry of Justice. The Court must provide a legal assessment regarding the legitimacy of organizing elections in Gagauzia and determine which competencies belong to the regional institutions and which to the central organs of the state.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The decision of the Constitutional Court could become a turning point in the conflict. This will either confirm the positions of the central authorities or will consolidate a broader interpretation of autonomous powers.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">However, even a legal decision does not guarantee an immediate political compromise. If the conflict has deep political causes, legal mechanisms can only establish the framework for further negotiations.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Possible scenarios</strong></p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The situation regarding the elections in Gagauzia could evolve, according to several scenarios. The first is a gradual de-escalation of the conflict through negotiations and the creation of common working mechanisms between Chisinau and Comrat. This scenario assumes compromise and the harmonization of electoral procedures.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The second scenario could lead to a prolonged political conflict, in which elections will continue to be postponed, and regional politics will revolve around confrontation with central authorities.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The third scenario is related to the active involvement of legal institutions, particularly the Constitutional Court. In this case, the subsequent evolution will depend on how ready the parties are to accept the legal decision.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The political test of autonomy</strong></p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The crisis related to the elections in Gagauzia becomes a sort of test for the entire autonomy model in the Republic of Moldova. This shows how resistant the interaction mechanisms between the center and the region are and how efficiently the institutional procedures can function under the conditions of a political conflict.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It is also important that all this is happening in parallel with the administrative-territorial reform that the authorities in Moldova have begun to implement.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ipn.md/en/why-comrat-is-not-in-a-hurry-to-organize-elections-op-ed-by-denis-dermenji/">Why Comrat is not in a hurry to organize elections. Op-Ed by Denis Dermenji</a> appeared first on <a href="https://ipn.md/en/">ipn.md</a>.</p>
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		<title>Grosu: Gagauzia election deadlock may have been triggered by “friends from the Kremlin”</title>
		<link>https://ipn.md/en/grosu-gagauzia-election-deadlock-may-have-been-triggered-by-friends-from-the-kremlin/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Editor Editor]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Mar 2026 06:54:06 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Important]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[blockage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Comrat]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Elections]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Electoral Commission]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gagauzia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Igor Grosu]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ilan Sor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kremlin]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ipn.md/grosu-gagauzia-election-deadlock-may-have-been-triggered-by-friends-from-the-kremlin/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The crisis around the elections in Gagauzia could be the result of the decisions of local elites and the influence of some political forces in autonomy associated with the Kremlin,&#8230;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ipn.md/en/grosu-gagauzia-election-deadlock-may-have-been-triggered-by-friends-from-the-kremlin/">Grosu: Gagauzia election deadlock may have been triggered by “friends from the Kremlin”</a> appeared first on <a href="https://ipn.md/en/">ipn.md</a>.</p>
]]></description>
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The crisis around the elections in Gagauzia could be the result of the decisions of local elites and the influence of some political forces in autonomy associated with the Kremlin, says the President of the Parliament, Igor Grosu, quoted by IPN.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">According to him, the blocking of the electoral process in Gagauzia occurred after the authorities in Comrat disbanded the regional electoral body and adopted decisions which, in practice, made the formation of a new composition of the Central Electoral Council impossible.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Igor Grosu also noted that the influence of Ilan Șor&#8217;s political group and their &#8220;friends from the Kremlin&#8221; continues to persist in the region.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The authorities of the Republic of Moldova are also awaiting the decision of the Constitutional Court regarding the referral submitted by the Ministry of Justice to verify the constitutionality of some provisions of the Law on the status of Gagauzia, which, according to the authors of the referral, create an &#8220;institutional dualism&#8221; in the country&#8217;s electoral system.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ipn.md/en/grosu-gagauzia-election-deadlock-may-have-been-triggered-by-friends-from-the-kremlin/">Grosu: Gagauzia election deadlock may have been triggered by “friends from the Kremlin”</a> appeared first on <a href="https://ipn.md/en/">ipn.md</a>.</p>
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		<title>The situation in the Vetting Commission will be unblocked within a week, Igor Chiriac</title>
		<link>https://ipn.md/en/the-situation-in-the-vetting-commission-will-be-unblocked-within-a-week-igor-chiriac/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Editor Editor]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 04 Mar 2026 06:06:08 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Important]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[blockage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Igor Chiriac]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Parliament]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Parliamentary majority]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The Vetting Commission]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vetting]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ipn.md/the-situation-in-the-vetting-commission-will-be-unblocked-within-a-week-igor-chiriac/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The situation in the vetting commission of prosecutors will be unblocked within a week, and the vacant positions are to be filled as soon as possible. The assurance comes from&#8230;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ipn.md/en/the-situation-in-the-vetting-commission-will-be-unblocked-within-a-week-igor-chiriac/">The situation in the Vetting Commission will be unblocked within a week, Igor Chiriac</a> appeared first on <a href="https://ipn.md/en/">ipn.md</a>.</p>
]]></description>
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The situation in the vetting commission of prosecutors will be unblocked within a week, and the vacant positions are to be filled as soon as possible. The assurance comes from the vice-president of the Parliamentary Legal Commission, for appointments and immunities, Igor Chiriac, who specified that the authorities will quickly identify a solution to allow the continuation of the external evaluation process, reports IPN.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Igor Chiriac mentioned that the activity of the Prosecutor&#8217;s Evaluation Commission is blocked due to the two vacant positions, and their filling is essential for the advancement of the vetting process.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">&#8220;The evaluation commission of prosecutors needs to be supplemented. The faster we supplement it, the faster we advance in this vetting process. These two vacant positions are to be filled. We will identify a solution in a very short period of time. Within a week we will have a conclusion and even new appointments&#8221;, declared the deputy during the &#8220;Rezoomat&#8221; show on RealitateaTV.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">When asked whether the solution of the parliamentary majority consists in changing the law so that the members of the committee are appointed by the vote of 51 deputies or if considering changing the proposed candidacies, the deputy clarified that both options are being analyzed.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">&#8220;We will examine the two options or identify a middle one. Either way, in a short time, within a week, we will solve this problem&#8221;, the PAS deputy emphasized.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At the last session of Parliament, the candidacies of Bernard Lavigne and Herman von Hebel did not garner the necessary 61 votes for appointment as members of the Prosecutor&#8217;s Vetting Commission. Previously, Herman von Hebel held the position of chairman of the pre-vetting commission.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ipn.md/en/the-situation-in-the-vetting-commission-will-be-unblocked-within-a-week-igor-chiriac/">The situation in the Vetting Commission will be unblocked within a week, Igor Chiriac</a> appeared first on <a href="https://ipn.md/en/">ipn.md</a>.</p>
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		<title>A man from Orhei passed away before the ambulance could arrive. It got stuck in the snow</title>
		<link>https://ipn.md/en/a-man-from-orhei-passed-away-before-the-ambulance-could-arrive-it-got-stuck-in-the-snow/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Laura Chetrari]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 16 Feb 2026 15:50:37 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Society]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ambulance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[blockage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CNAMUP]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[death]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Snow]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ipn.md/a-man-from-orhei-passed-away-before-the-ambulance-could-arrive-it-got-stuck-in-the-snow/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>A 58-year-old man from the Orhei district died because the ambulance, called to provide him with medical assistance, got stuck in the snow on the way to the village of&#8230;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ipn.md/en/a-man-from-orhei-passed-away-before-the-ambulance-could-arrive-it-got-stuck-in-the-snow/">A man from Orhei passed away before the ambulance could arrive. It got stuck in the snow</a> appeared first on <a href="https://ipn.md/en/">ipn.md</a>.</p>
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A 58-year-old man from the Orhei district died because the ambulance, called to provide him with medical assistance, got stuck in the snow on the way to the village of Jora de Sus. The National Center for Prehospital Emergency Medical Assistance specifies that the team tried to free the ambulance, but the intervention was delayed due to difficult weather conditions, reports IPN.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The call for help was received on Sunday night into Monday. The patient was suffering from cardiovascular problems and had difficulty breathing. The ambulance immediately set out for the town, but got stuck in the snow on the outskirts of Susleni village.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The rescuers intervened to unblock the car, and the crew continued their journey accompanied by them. Upon arrival, the man was found deceased. On the return journey, the ambulance got stuck again and was once again assisted by the rescuers.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Representatives of the National Center for Prehospital Emergency Medical Assistance mention that the crew carried out their activities according to procedures, however, extremely difficult weather conditions significantly delayed the intervention.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ipn.md/en/a-man-from-orhei-passed-away-before-the-ambulance-could-arrive-it-got-stuck-in-the-snow/">A man from Orhei passed away before the ambulance could arrive. It got stuck in the snow</a> appeared first on <a href="https://ipn.md/en/">ipn.md</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Minister of Finance denies blockages in the allocation of funds for the burned building in Durlesti</title>
		<link>https://ipn.md/en/the-minister-of-finance-denies-blockages-in-the-allocation-of-funds-for-the-burned-building-in-durlesti/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Irina Botu]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 11 Feb 2026 15:23:58 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Society]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[accusations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[blockage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chisinau City Hall]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Durlesti]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ministry of Finance]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ipn.md/the-minister-of-finance-denies-blockages-in-the-allocation-of-funds-for-the-burned-building-in-durlesti/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The Minister of Finance, Andrian Gavriliță, rejects the claims of the Chisinau City Hall that the funds allocated for the Durlesti City Hall did not arrive due to blockages at&#8230;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ipn.md/en/the-minister-of-finance-denies-blockages-in-the-allocation-of-funds-for-the-burned-building-in-durlesti/">The Minister of Finance denies blockages in the allocation of funds for the burned building in Durlesti</a> appeared first on <a href="https://ipn.md/en/">ipn.md</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Minister of Finance, Andrian Gavriliță, rejects the claims of the Chisinau City Hall that the funds allocated for the Durlesti City Hall did not arrive due to blockages at the Ministry of Finance. According to the minister, representatives of the Chisinau City Hall were informed in May 2025 about the necessary legal steps for the correct allocation of the money, reports IPN.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">&#8220;Last year, in May, my colleagues discussed with the representatives of the city hall and it was clearly explained to them what they need to do to comply with the law, if they wish to allocate these funds,&#8221; Gavrilita declared.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Minister emphasized that the situation could have been resolved without difficulties, if there was administrative will, and pointed out that the representatives of the Chisinau City Hall can contact the Ministry of Finance at any time for additional clarifications.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Chisinau City Hall <a href="https://ipn.md/en/the-chisinau-city-hall-allocates-3-million-lei-to-families-affected-by-the-fire-in-durlesti/">announced</a> back in August 2025 that it would allocate 3 million lei to support the families affected by the fire that broke out on May 16th in the attic of a building on Tudor Vladimirescu Street in Durlești.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On Monday, February 9, Mayor Ion Ceban announced that he has signed the <a href="https://ipn.md/en/the-funds-for-the-burnt-attic-in-durlesti-have-not-arrived-the-chisinau-city-hall-has-resumed-the-process/">order</a> for the repeated allocation of 3 million lei. According to the mayor, the transfer initiated in 2025 was not carried out due to bureaucratic reasons and issues related to the information systems managing public finances.</p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The flames destroyed approximately 1,500 square meters of roof and several apartments. 16 people needed medical attention, three were hospitalized. According to IGSU, the fire started from open flame works, carried out without complying with safety regulations.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://ipn.md/en/the-minister-of-finance-denies-blockages-in-the-allocation-of-funds-for-the-burned-building-in-durlesti/">The Minister of Finance denies blockages in the allocation of funds for the burned building in Durlesti</a> appeared first on <a href="https://ipn.md/en/">ipn.md</a>.</p>
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