Will 2009 elections bring more credibility to Moldova’s foreign policy? Political commentary for Info-Prim Neo by Victor Chirila, program director at the Foreign Policy Association

Politicians and experts in Chisinau consider that Moldova’s foreign policy is incoherent and unforeseeable, while its credibility is often questioned by the major foreign partners like the neighboring countries Ukraine and Romania as well as the U.S., the EU and even Russia. This regrettable reality did not yet come into view when the Communist Party came to power. The lack of coherence, predictability and credibility had been typical of Moldova’s foreign policy, to certain extents of course, during the democratic governments of 1991 – 2001. Yet, we must admit that since 2001 until present, the given negative trends in the country’s foreign policy have become more prominent. Most of the Opposition politicians hope that the 2009 parliamentary elections will be a turning point in the further development of Moldova and its foreign policy. Translated into words, their hopes mean victory in the spring parliamentary elections and cardinal modification of the internal political environment in Chisinau. The change of the political players in a society that tends to be democratic is in principle the expression of the will of the people that want an internal and external policy that would meet their expectations and aspirations. Consequently, the electorate’ possible decision to renew Moldova’s internal policy would also mean the formulation of a foreign policy that would meet the aspirations of the largest part of the Moldovans. Yet, it is not yet clear if the coming to power of the Opposition parties would be enough for designing and implementing a new foreign policy that would be different from the previous one by coherence, predictability and credibility. As it is well known, during 1991 – 2001, the political players in Moldova had been changed for several times, but this change did not necessarily materialize into a foreign policy without ambiguities. This can repeat after the 2009 parliamentary elections if the Moldovan politicians, new and/or old ones, do not remove the structural problems encountered in the foreign policy. [The first structural problem] is the conceptualization of Moldova’s foreign policy, more precisely the lack of any conceptualization. In most of the democratic states, the foreign policies are based on conceptual documents that define the internal and external environment, the main principles and values, the county’s objectives and interests, the resources and methods for achieving the set goals and the responsibilities of the institutions. In Moldova, the conceptual document on which the foreign policy is based is the Foreign Policy Strategy. The first and last Foreign Policy Strategy was adopted by the Parliament in 1995. The given Strategy lags behind the internal, regional and international developments. However, it is still in force, at least formally. The need to work out a new Foreign Policy Strategy that would meet Moldova’s aspirations for European integration is acknowledged both by the Opposition politicians and by the ruling party. Nevertheless, nothing has been done. In 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in concert with the Institute for Public Policy drafted a new Foreign Polity Strategy, but the Moldovan ministry’s efforts to acquire a new conceptual document were not supported by the governors. Surely, the Moldovan Foreign Ministry now works according to the foreign policy objectives stipulated in the Government’s Program for 2008 - 2009, but this program cannot substitute the role and significance of the Foreign Policy Strategy. Why? Because the Government’s policy is limited (to four years at the most) and is usually based on the programs of the ruling parties, while the Foreign Policy Strategy should rule over the narrow interests of the parties, include the long-term national strategic interests and objectives and, what is the most important, enjoy the support of most of the political parties. If there is no such support or consensus, the credibility of the foreign policy will be questioned inside and outside the country. [The second structural problem] is the diminution of the Parliament’s role in formulating and implementing the foreign policy. It is not a secret that Moldova’s foreign policy is dictated exclusively by President Vladimir Voronin. Under Article 86 of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, President Vladimir Voronin is empowered to carry out talks, to sign international treaties in the name of the country, to name or recall Moldova’s ambassadors and to fulfill other important duties in the area of foreign policy. But, under Article 65 of the same Constitution, the Parliament is empowered to set out the main foreign policy directions and, especially, to carry out parliamentary control over the executive power. Yet, during the past seven years, the Parliament has been rather “a lightning rod” for the Government than an authority for monitoring and controlling how the governmental policies are implemented, including in the area of foreign policy. In fact, the Parliament’s disregard for its legal role and duties has been undoubtedly one of the factors that strengthened President Vladimir Voronin’s position of person with utmost control over the institutions and policies carried out in Moldova. [The third structural problem] is the visible discrepancy between Moldova’s European integration message and Moldovan authorities’ efforts to transform this message into a continuous, meaningful, coherent and credible process of implementing political, economic and social reforms needed to make progress on the path to European integration. The reform process in Moldova has remained non-uniform and ambiguous even after the Moldovan authorities made concrete commitments to the EU, in the EU-Moldova Plan of Action, on February 22, 2005. This is said in the European Commission’s reports of December 2006 and April 2008 on the implementation by Moldova of the Plan of Action agreed with the EU. Both of the reports point to discontinuity in the process of adopting laws and effectively implementing them, especially in such areas as independence of the judiciary, freedom of the media, combating of corruption and development of a favorable business climate for attracting foreign investment into the Moldovan economy. [The fourth structural problem] resides in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of Moldova, which is in fact the copy of the present system of government in Moldova. The centralization of the power in the state resulted in the drastic diminution of the autonomy of the ministry, which it earlier enjoyed when working out and implementing its own tactics for achieving the set objectives. In 2005, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was subjected to a restructuring, which was meant to make its work more efficient by strengthening the internal security and the hierarchic control. The result appeared shortly afterward. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs managed to sensibly and visibly strengthen the internal security, becoming simultaneously a less communicative institution, inaccessible even for the foreign diplomats working in Chisinau. The internal hierarchic control was “improved” a lot. Presently, for the communiqués of general interest to be released to other departments and divisions, the Ministry’s management should give its consent. Even so, the communication between departments or divisions of the same department is complicated in the best case. Consequently, the diplomats are poorly informed and the internal and external realities are overlooked when setting the goals and choosing the appropriate methods for achieving them. The monitoring of the meetings between Moldovan and foreign diplomats was also “improved”. Currently, a Moldovan diplomat lower in rank that a deputy minister cannot have a working meeting with foreign diplomats without the consent of the ministry’s administration. Evidently, volens-nolens this is to the detriment of the efficiency of the Foreign Ministry of Moldova. Therefore, the logic of these preventive measures is very confused, in particular for the foreign diplomats working in Moldova. Moreover, despite the initial expectations, the modification of the ministry’s structure and internal practices led to the exacerbation of the hierarchic supervision inside the ministry, resulted in an evident centralization and lower transparency in decision making, hindered the skilled diplomats from taking part in decision making, inhibited the spirit of initiative and discouraged the creative thinking in the Foreign Ministry. Paradoxically, all these changes took place while the Foreign Ministry had been asserting itself as a promoter of the European integration values in Moldova, such values as decentralization of power, de-bureaucratization of the institutions, transparency in decision making, access to information, openness to communication, etc